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Abstract 
The growing presence of smartphones and other mobile digital devices, always within 
reach and already deeply embedded in everyday life, has been met with considerable 
anxiety. Concerns have been raised that we are perpetually distracted by our devices, 
alienated from the intimate relations that are proper to human sociability and that, 
consequently, social life as we know it is being irrevocably changed. Though often 
charged with distracting us from the social world, this thesis considers the way that 
habitual encounters with devices open the user to a new kind of intimacy, which I refer 
to as ‘impersonal intimacy.’ Impersonal intimacy, I suggest, is formed not as a personal 
relationship to humans or indeed things, but is a kind of intimacy generated through the 
mundane repetitions of the everyday. It provides the conditions in which mobile digital 
device-user relations as we know them are made possible, sparked by minute 
inclinations and facilitated by generative repetitions. This impersonal intimacy 
reconfigures awareness and generates new desires.  
In exploring the new modes of relationship emerging as a result of the proliferation of 
mobile digital devices, the thesis contributes to significant debates in sociology, in which 
the call is made for an expanded view of the social that is attentive to preindividual 
forces and emergent social realities. These key challenges for the discipline arise from 
technological and social change, but also from theoretical debates questioning some of 
the deeply held ontological assumptions within the discipline. My thesis contends that 
dominant sociological accounts grounded on human consciousness, take human-to-
human interaction as their object, and see devices as playing, at best, a mediating role 
in this interaction and, at worst, a destructive role. In responding to calls for an 
‘expanded empiricism’, this thesis proposes an evaluation of the mobile digital device 
that takes seriously the impersonal forces that constitute the device-user encounter.  
The kinds of impersonal intimacy formed through our close connections with everyday 
things challenges the priority usually given to distinct forms, focusing instead on the 
expression of forces in a given moment. I argue that it is crucial that we reconsider what 
constitutes the ‘social’, given that the familiar organising concepts of ‘social actors’ and 
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‘objects’ fail to account for the complex, never fully formed, relations in which these 
device-bodies are constituted.  
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Preface 
‘There are so many unintended consequences of these things,’ she said, gesturing 
towards the black, blank screen of my iPhone, ‘we just don’t know what they’re going to 
do to us.’ The iPhone appeared unmoved; the empty abyss of its momentarily inactive 
face merely returned her look. 
It was a brief break in the long schedule of a weekend writing retreat and for the sixth or 
seventh time that day I had explained the topic of my research. But at the same time, 
this was not just a conversation with another student; it was many conversations, 
repeated over and over until this moment had become dense with the resonances. Each 
of these moments tinged with the familiar anxiety I had come to meet upon discussing 
these devices, with most often an undercurrent of self-critique or merely a quick glance 
to their own screened-companion.  
‘We’re all so glued to our iPhones nobody actually talks to each other these days’ 
‘I don’t know why they call them smartphones, I think they’re making us all dumber’ 
I could always feel the response that was sought, collecting in the air to fill the gaps in 
the conversation. My noncommittal responses to their statements must have seemed 
odd given that the answer is so apparent, that something is very clearly wrong with these 
things. 
Realising I had left the moment a little too long to reply, I started to say ‘Well… there is 
a lot of… ’, but was mercifully saved by the announcement that the break was over. 
As I sat down in the writing room a woman at the table opposite from me was on her 
smartphone before the session began. Her eyes flicked quickly from around the room, as 
she watched others sitting down next to her, then back to the screen, then back up at 
the clock, then back to the screen. All the while her fingers flicked and tapped rapidly and 
effortlessly on the screen. It seemed to me that perhaps, in a way, what the first woman 
had said to me was right. We do not know what these ‘things’ can do. But we don’t know 
what we can do either. Held imperceptibly in my grasp, the iPhone offered no reply. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
‘So, I think it’s just a habit now. I’ll just go to it.’ She says, as she looks over at her iPhone, 
which is sitting on the table within reach. The screen she is referring to is facing up, a 
black screen that is currently waiting, unanimated. As she is speaking, her hand 
instinctively turns over as if it was holding the phone, in a gesture of familiar intimacy.  
‘Even if there’s nothing on it, nothing to do it with it… ’ She continues, ‘even now! It’s 
really hard not to pick it up and check.’ She laughs at this statement, as if what she has 
said, now that the inclination has passed, seems ridiculous. 
Smartphones, tablets and other mobile digital devices spend much of their lives, and 
ours, pressed close to us. Their surfaces are marked by our fingerprints; we learn the 
feel of their weight in our pockets and every day we are embedded in routines and habits 
where we find ourselves reaching for the device. Both academic and popular debate are 
dominated by accounts of the impact of these technologies that defer to a specific image 
of the ‘social’. These accounts are motivated primarily to determine what new forms of 
interaction are sedimenting now that objects like the iPhone are commonplace. Yet, as 
we approach ten years since the release of the iPhone, it seems that little is ‘settled’ 
about these things. Smartphones and other mobile digital devices are charged with 
alienating us from the intimate encounters with others that are said to constitute human 
sociality, distracting us from places our gaze ‘ought’ to go. Our inability to come to terms 
with these devices is nowhere more apparent than in the contrast between our 
prescribed practices and our actual relations. Popular narratives stress the need to 
reduce ‘dependence’ on these devices in order to retain intimacy with each other 
(Turkle, 2011, 2015; Rosen, 2012; Powers, 2010), yet our appetite for them seems to 
have no relation to these concerns. Academic analysis has traced changing social norms 
and practices of interaction (Ling, 2004, 2012, 2016; Mascheroni and Vincent, 2016; 
Vincent, 2010; Castells et al., 2009; Katz, 2006; Sørensen, 2006; Ito, 2005; Katz and 
Aakhus, 2002) but such explanations offer little insight into the transformative habitual 
entanglements with devices, which have radically altered contemporary sociality, in 
ways that seem to exceed our control. 
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Within academic discourse, questions asked about these objects have predominantly 
focused on communication and mediation. More specifically, questions have been 
preoccupied with discerning the kinds of interactions that mobile digital devices make 
possible and the moments of connection they might cut off between social actors 
(Mascheroni and Vincent, 2016; Cumiskey, 2011; Ling and Campbell, 2011; Ling, 2008). 
Importantly, these analyses are situated within a specific understanding of social life, 
one that is constituted by the intentional actions of conscious subjects, and in which 
these devices serve to facilitate and mediate human communication. These analyses are 
oriented towards determining how mobile digital devices fit into an already determined 
notion of the social as constituted by meaningful human interaction. 
These devices are, however, much more than conduits of human communication, and 
the rise of smartphones and tablets has further emphasised the limitations of such 
understandings. Embedded in daily routines and practices, mobile digital devices 
become a constant presence which can call forth our attention, not with a ring or alert 
but with their proximity and familiarity. An Australian survey found that more than half 
the population now checks their smartphone within 15 minutes of waking, with 44% of 
18-34 year olds checking their device often without the prompt of calls or alerts 
(Deloitte, 2015). Indeed, it is precisely because mobile digital devices are increasingly 
drawing our attention beyond the lure of human communication that they are troubling. 
Even more than this, these intimate moments of familiar inclination in which we find 
ourselves reaching for the device sit at odds with popular and academic discourse that 
orients discussion about how we ought to manage their place in our lives. 
One of the central claims of this thesis is that seeking to determine how we should use 
the mobile digital device poses a false problem, and one that lacks an understanding of 
the conditions in which the reach for the device takes place. This problem is based on a 
humanist understanding of action as arising from free will, a notion social theory is 
increasingly calling into question (Hynes, 2016). Indeed, within sociology this 
understanding of ‘the social’ as constituted by the intentional acts of human subjects is 
being rethought in light of a call for an ‘expanded empiricism’, which seeks to broaden 
the scope of sociological analysis to relations and forces beyond that which human 
consciousness has characteristically apprehended (Lury and Wakeford, 2012a; Adkins 
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and Lury, 2009; Clough, 2009; Fraser, 2009). This expanded view of the social challenges 
the once seemingly firm and familiar categories of sociological analysis (Lash, 2009). 
Rather than seeking to organise and render social relations coherent, this expanded 
empiricism is more attuned to the complexity and open-endedness of the relations that 
constitute a world, which is always in excess of our grasp of it. Such analyses seek to 
attend to the multitude of forces that modulate capacities, without necessarily rising to 
the level of conscious awareness or resulting from human intention (Clough, 2009).  
It is with an eye to attending to these forces beyond and beneath human consciousness 
that I take up this expanded empiricism to explore the perpetual reach for the mobile 
digital device. Our habitual encounters with these objects are poorly grasped by existing 
frameworks, to the extent that these remain oriented towards an understanding of 
social life as constituted by intentional interactions. The ‘problem’ of the mobile digital 
device has been largely framed as a moral issue, concerning the need to balance 
mediated interactions available via the device with the needs of physically present social 
actors (Ling, 2016; Mascheroni and Vincent, 2016; Turkle, 2011, 2015; Ling and McEwen, 
2010). Yet, calling the sovereignty of human will into question also renders such a 
problematisation limited in its explanatory power. 
 
1.1 Confronting a world of devices 
Devices such as smartphones and tablets, despite the rapidity with which they have 
been taken up and their privileged position within constant reach, sit in a morally 
precarious position, shifting between adoration and demonization from moment to 
moment. Even more than their predecessor, the mobile phone, mobile digital devices 
have elicited an anxious response in public and academic discourses for their ability to 
draw our gaze. Mobile phones have drawn ire for their sudden disruptive and intrusive 
ring, which has been seen to place physically present social interaction on hold whilst a 
mediated interaction takes place (Okabe and Ito, 2005; Ling, 2004; Plant, 2001). 
However, the mobile digital device hardly needs to call out to be looked at; rather it is 
we who seek it out, or perhaps it is that its call upon us is far more subtle and insistent 
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than a single ringtone. Mobile digital devices are characterised by an ever-present 
potential that draws us in when the inclination strikes. Empirically, there has been a 
general trend away from voice calls to asynchronous communication in the form of 
instant messaging (Deloitte, 2015). It is the capacity of mobile digital devices to 
command attention at any moment, without direct human sociality as its objective, 
which renders them a threat to human intimacy. 
Mobile digital devices are characterised by multiplicity and hybridity, bringing together 
elements of the mobile phone, laptop, and personal organiser (Hjorth, Burgess, et al., 
2012). In addition to functions traditionally associated with phones, these devices allow 
access to the internet, to social media, and to a variety of applications (apps) that can 
perform a vast array of different functions and open up the potential of the device 
(Goggin, 2009). I use the term ‘mobile digital device’, following Kirsty Best (2009), 
throughout the thesis to include a range of handheld and portable, digital devices 
including smartphones and tablets. This term is deliberately inclusive of both popular 
technologies, as the boundary between the two is increasingly blurred. Importantly, 
following Best (2009), I seek to distinguish my focus on the device itself from the content 
or capabilities of devices. By this I mean that I wish to examine relations with mobile 
digital devices, rather than with any functions they have access to (e.g. social media). 
Though these functions play a significant role in shaping the habitual practices of device 
use, it is with the practices themselves that this thesis will primarily be concerned. 
It is precisely through an opening up of what the device can do, the drawing in of 
different facets of life, that these seemingly mundane digital devices can come to be 
deeply embedded in the daily routines of their users. Studies of ‘phantom vibrations’, 
when vibrations of the device are imagined and felt by regular users but are not ‘real’ 
(Rosenberger, 2015; Drouin et al., 2012; Rothberg et al., 2010), demonstrate the close 
familiarity between user and device. However, as I will discuss later in this chapter, this 
familiarity and habitual ‘awareness’ is increasingly pathologised. The phenomenon of 
‘smartphone addiction’ or other related disorders (Darcin et al., 2016; Bian and Leung, 
2015; Billieux et al., 2015; Y. K. Lee et al., 2014; Kwon et al., 2013; Oulasvirta et al., 2011) 
suggest that the ‘checking’ habit has become central to anxieties around the 
transformations these devices elicit. 
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It is with these habits, and with this reach for the device that this thesis will be 
concerned. Such habitual relations have been charged with alienating human beings 
from one another, distracting us from the concerns of co-present sociality and even 
constituting a form of addiction in the way that they draw our attention. However, as I 
will explore, this response to the mobile digital device is predicated on a notion of the 
social that is out of step with a rapidly changing and increasingly technological world 
and offers little insight into precisely what transformations these devices make possible. 
These and other dominant themes in the literature on mobile digital devices will be 
examined in this chapter, as well as the ways that some of these issues have emerged in 
popular discourse. In the second part of this chapter I will examine recent shifts in 
thinking within sociology that aim to broaden the notion of the social beyond its current 
focus on the interaction between social actors. I contribute to a growing literature in 
sociology, which calls for attention to be paid to the forces beyond and prior to human 
conscious experience. I argue that such literature brings fresh insights into debates 
about the mobile digital device. I will then return to some of the underlying themes of 
the mobile digital device literature to consider how an approach attuned to these forces 
can move existing debates beyond moral questions about what we ought to do with 
these objects. The last section of this chapter provides an overview of the trajectory of 
the thesis. 
An overarching concern of the thesis is to understand the specific intimacy associated 
with the mobile digital device. Though some attention will inevitably be given to the 
infiltration of its predecessor, the mobile phone, it is worth noting, as Jon Agar (2013, p. 
180) does, that there is something distinct about the culture of contemporary ‘smart’ 
devices that this thesis speaks to, which arises from their hybridity and capacity to draw 
in a wide range of information and practices into one device. This involves a shift not 
only in the device itself, in terms of its capacities, but, through its portability, constitutes 
a transformation in the experience of physically proximate space through the 
production of telepresence (Richardson, 2005). Telepresence here refers to the 
mediated experience of an environment that is either temporally or spatially distant, or 
virtual and synthesised (Steuer, 1992). While using the mobile digital device, the 
telepresent and present environment coexist, which some scholars contend leads to 
16 
distraction from co-present social actors and disruption to social interaction (Turkle, 
2011, 2015; Cumiskey, 2011; Ling and McEwen, 2010; Ling, 2008). Related to concerns 
about distraction from social actors, is the anxiety about the allure of the device itself. 
The Blackberry, an early form of the smartphone, was nicknamed the ‘Crackberry’ to 
refer to the way that users of the device would constantly check it (Agar, 2013). It is 
through the expanded functionality of mobile digital devices, and an environment 
conducive to embracing this expanded functionality that our intimacy with these devices 
has intensified. Indeed, as Agar (2013) argues, mobile digital devices call out to us, 
literally through alerts, but more importantly, through their capacity to draw our 
attention at any moment through the mere inclination to reach for the device. 
Mobile digital device users are by no means insignificant in number. The median global 
smartphone ownership amongst adults reached 43%, with Australia reporting 77% of 
adults owning a smartphone (Poushter, 2016), and forecasts suggesting that in 2017, 
75% of all internet traffic will come from mobile devices (Zenith, 2016). The rise of 
smartphones and tablets has also significantly impacted the field of mobile phone 
studies. The once explicit purpose of the device for communication is now much less 
clear, as the popularity of voice calls declines (Deloitte, 2015), along with the 
proliferation of other functions through the use of additional downloadable applications 
(apps) (Goggin, 2011a). Gerard Goggin (2009) describes the iPhone, one of the most 
popular smartphones, as ‘haptic’ rather than aural, as much of the content is accessed 
through the use of a touch screen and the world of the device is navigated this way, with 
the user’s hand movements taking them through menus and different screens to 
different apps. This is a stark contrast to the more basic functions of making and 
receiving phone calls associated with the mobile phone, which used buttons that had a 
static utility. Mobile digital devices are also more personalised than the mobile phones 
that preceded them, with customisable menus and app creation open to anyone 
(Vincent, 2013; Goggin, 2009).  
Despite the notable shift in use, much of the existing literature continues to focus on 
communication as the primary capacity of mobile digital devices. In their introduction 
to an edited collection, Rich Ling and Scott Campbell (2011) ask the question that 
pervades both academic and popular discourse on mobile digital devices alike; namely, 
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does mobile communication bring us together or tear us apart? The answer offered by 
the collection concurs with much of the existing literature in suggesting that the devices, 
in fact, do both. The capacity of mobile digital devices to facilitate and transform human-
to-human communication, allowing connections that were not possible without the 
device, has been widely asserted (Cui, 2015; Lasén and Casado, 2012; Ling, 2008; Hjorth, 
2005; Licoppe, 2004; Katz and Aakhus, 2002). Whilst the device is said to produce new 
capacities and new moments for connection, it is also charged with disrupting and 
disturbing familiar sites of sociality (Cumiskey, 2011; Ling and Campbell, 2011; Ling and 
McEwen, 2010; Ling, 2008). From the erosion of co-present, face-to-face connection 
(Turkle, 2011, 2015; Gergen, 2002) to giving rise to ‘smartphone addiction’ (Bian and 
Leung, 2015; Rosen, 2012; Walsh et al., 2008; Bianchi and Phillips, 2005) it is the often 
labelled ‘insidious’ creep of these devices that heralds a significant degree of discomfort 
with their uptake. Agar (2013, p. 9) argues that ‘you can tell what a culture values by 
what it has in its bags and pockets’ and certainly it could be argued that you can find in 
these pockets the objects with which we have the most fraught relations, which most 
transgress bodily boundaries and trouble our sense of agency and control. 
Accompanying us everywhere, always within reach, the intimate closeness of the mobile 
digital device represents a significant shift in the way the technology is used, even from 
earlier mobile devices. In the 1980s the mobile phone was initially marketed to business 
people who travelled for work, with early adopters seen as ‘yuppies’ or high flyers (Agar, 
2013). In the 1990s the device started to make its way into mainstream use as the 
technology became more affordable (Agar, 2013; 2006; Okabe and Ito, 2005). Just as the 
landline telephone transformed perceptions of distance and communication, the mobile 
phone pushed these changes further, making everyday life more flexible and fast-paced, 
by facilitating rapid communication between mobile, temporally and spatially separated 
individuals (Green, 2002; Katz and Aakhus, 2002). However, unlike the telephone, Agar 
(2013, p. 177) argues that there is something distinct about mobile digital devices like 
smartphones and their predecessors, mobile phones, which has allowed them to 
penetrate what he calls the ‘inner ring’ of intimate technologies that we hold close to 
our bodies. He contends that few technologies in human history have achieved this, 
noting that ‘those that do date from the earliest periods of human existence’ (2013, p. 
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180), referring to clothing, shoes and glasses. As I will go on to explore, the unique 
intimacy shared with the mobile digital device is one that has characteristically elicited 
anxiety, and specifically the concern that human beings are increasingly alienated from 
one another, as the mobile digital device distracts their attention from physically 
present social actors. 
The mobility of the device itself — its portability and its capacity to overcome distance 
— has been identified as the cause of significant social change. The impact of the mobile 
phone has been substantially explored in mobility studies within a body of literature that 
Christian Licoppe (2016) has termed ‘Digital Mobilities’, a literature that attends to the 
increasing connectivity of mobile bodies, facilitated by mobile digital devices and other 
portable digital technologies. Mimi Sheller and John Urry (2006), in outlining the 
‘mobility turn’ in the social sciences, argue that mainstream social research has failed to 
acknowledge not only the patterns of movements but also the flow of information 
through communication technologies. Further, Sheller (2004) argues for attention to be 
paid to new forms of mobility made possible by mobile digital devices, to the new 
dynamics of connectivity and new temporalities that arise. Sheller (2004, p. 41) contends 
that old notions of mobility tied to the idea of the network have been made redundant 
in the light of these significant social changes. She argues that outdated organising 
concepts need to give way to a more ‘fluid’ grasp of increasingly ‘liquid social dynamics’, 
suggesting that this admittedly ‘messier’ model of social reality can more adequately 
apprehend the role of mobile devices in producing the constant flux of mobile publics. 
Anthony Elliott and Urry (2010) describe mobile digital devices and other portable 
technologies as ‘miniaturised mobilities’, through which there is always the capacity to 
be ‘elsewhere’. The capacity of the mobile device to facilitate an ever more liquid and 
dynamic mobile world has thus been identified as a key component of its transformation 
of social life. 
In spite of an apparent focus on the transformation of social life, scholars have 
predominantly focused on the device’s impact on familiar forms of interaction, rather 
than examining the radically new forms of sociality emerging from relations with the 
mobile digital device. Ling and Birgitte Yttri (2002), for example, argue that the 
availability of mobile communication has led to a ‘softening’ of time with respect to daily 
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sociality, insofar as the device enables users to change or confirm meeting arrangements 
proximate to the time of a social interaction. These devices are also said to transform 
the nature of transit time, waiting times and other spare moments, which become 
productive moments that device use can occupy (Wajcman, 2008; Sheller and Urry, 
2006; Katz and Aakhus, 2002). It is significant that the emphasis here is on the 
transformation of traditional norms of interaction and social experience, while the 
transformation of the very constitution of these moments remains unanalysed. 
This attachment to familiar frames is also evident in the orientation of analyses of mobile 
devices to the conscious experiences, interpretations and meaning-making of the user. 
Mobilities scholars have argued that the equipping of smartphones with GPS and other 
location-situating capacities has impacted on the way that users understand and 
interact with the spaces they navigate (Frith, 2015; e Silva and Frith, 2010). Adriana de 
Souza e Silva and Jordan Frith (2010, p. 492), for example, suggest that device users can 
now ‘digitally annotate physical space’, as when users of a geosocial networking app 
look up restaurant reviews while walking around looking for somewhere to eat. Frith 
(2015) argues that smartphones draw together virtual mobility and physical mobility to 
produce a hybrid space in which the digital and physical converge. In his in-depth study 
of the new forms of sociality and mobility facilitated in these hybrid spaces, Licoppe 
(2016) examines encounters with strangers connected through locative dating apps like 
Grindr. He concludes that apps that facilitate connections between strangers for the 
purposes of romantic or sexual encounters give rise to new interaction rituals of 
‘glances’ and ‘timid encounters’, as strangers attempt to identify app users in public 
(Licoppe, 2016, p. 114). Licoppe also argues that the use of mobile devices breaks down 
the divide between the private and public spheres and that new norms are thus required 
to navigate these new hybrid spaces. 
This attention to the disruption of accepted norms of social interaction is a common 
theme in literature on mobile devices. According to Ling (2004), as mobile phones began 
to accompany users throughout their day, public spaces began to host private moments 
as these social interactions were mobilised. Mobile phones, and later smartphones and 
tablets, have been charged with contributing to the intrusion of the private into the 
public sphere (de Souza e Silva and Frith, 2012; Sørensen, 2006; Ling, 2004; Brown, 2002; 
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Gergen, 2002). The ringtone, Goggin (2011b) argues, signals a reconstitution of the 
boundaries of public space, as it draws attention to a restructuring of accepted practices 
due to the new forms of communication made possible by access to telepresent spaces. 
Analyses of changing micro social interactions via mobile phones characteristically 
identify the intrusion of mobile phones into public space through both the sound of their 
ring (Castells et al., 2009; Licoppe, 2008; Okabe and Ito, 2005; Murtagh, 2002; Plant, 
2001), and through ‘coerced eavesdropping’, when physically present actors are subject 
to intimate conversations carried out in public spaces (Licoppe, 2008; Morley, 2006; 
Fortunati, 2002a, 2005; Ling, 2004; Brown, 2002; Murtagh, 2002). 
The changing norms of private and public sociality have also been explored in relation 
to the question of who demands the attention of the mobile device user. Mobile digital 
devices have, some scholars contend, largely severed the possibility of social interaction 
between strangers in public spaces, with the device offering ways to communicate with 
those not physically present but with whom the individual has a stronger connection 
(Lee, 2012; Cumiskey, 2011; Fortunati, 2002b, 2005; Ito, 2005; Geser, 2004). As 
smartphones draw in more virtual stimuli with social media and apps, concerns have 
focused more on the disengagement of social actors from co-present interactions with 
strangers, preferring telepresent ones with more intimate connections (Hatuka and 
Toch, 2014; Gergen, 2010). Kenneth Gergen (2002, p. 227) has argued that the 
proliferation of mobile devices in public space has resulted in an ‘absent presence’, 
where the user ‘is physically present, but is absorbed by a technologically mediated 
world of elsewhere’. Whilst he considers the potential benefit this may have for pre-
existing relationships, which are ultimately reaffirmed through telepresent contact, 
Gergen (2010) cautions that these forms of interaction are insular, lack diversity, and 
erode participation in local communities.  
The impact of mobile devices on processes of meaning making is a common theme in 
microsociological evaluations of their significance. Ling (2008, p. 106) argues that the 
mobile digital device is a ‘request for civil inattention’, following Erving Goffman’s (1963, 
pp. 83–111) description of the capacity of social actors in the urban sphere to occupy 
the same space without recognition or even the obligation to initiate social interaction. 
Similarly, de Souza e Silva and Frith (2012) argue that since modernity and the growth 
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of cities, humans have searched for objects that perform the important role of filtering 
out social interaction in public space, such as paperback novels and newspapers. They 
cite Georg Simmel’s (2002) analysis of the blasé attitude of the city dweller, in which he 
contends that in the metropolitan setting the social actor must desensitize themselves 
to cope with the increase in external and internal stimuli. For de Souza e Silva and Frith 
(2012), then, the introduction of mobile digital devices does not signal a disconnection 
from social interaction but rather it constitutes another form of necessary social 
filtering. Tali Hatuka and Eran Toch (2014), also drawing on Goffman’s theory of civil 
inattention to argue that mobile digital devices allow users to construct a dynamic 
‘portable private-personal territory’ (PPPT), which does not dictate but reconfigures 
social relations, reducing contact with, and awareness of, the space and actors outside 
of it. The device, they contend, increasingly disassociates privacy from place, allowing 
the production of private space anywhere. 
The perpetual contact afforded by mobile digital devices and its impacts on 
interpersonal relationships has elicited anxieties about a general shift away from face-
to-face engagement towards telepresent or ‘mediated’ engagement. Turkle’s (2015) 
recent book, Reclaiming Conversation, expresses precisely this concern, arguing that the 
‘flight from conversation’ in favour of more manageable and predictable communication 
through mobile digital devices is producing a generation of children who cannot 
empathise. Turkle’s account draws on philosopher Emmanuel Levinas’ (1979, p. 199) 
contention that when we are confronted with a human face we are called into an ethical 
relation with the Other, ‘in the total nudity of his defenceless eyes.’ The principle issue 
for Turkle (2015) and others concerned about the increasing turn towards mobile digital 
devices, is that if face-to-face interaction is of such ethical significance, children are now 
socialised with fewer and fewer opportunities for these ethical encounters, because 
their attention is devoted to mobile digital devices and computers.1 Again, the centrality 
of face-to-face, physically present interaction is emphasised here, as Turkle (2011, 2015) 
contends that while technologically mediated interactions can supplement face-to-face, 
relations they cannot and should not act as a replacement for them. The prime concern 
                                                      
1 These concerns are seemingly confirmed by psychological studies that seek to chart a decline of empathy 
in young people (Uhls et al., 2014; Konrath et al., 2011). 
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here is technology disrupts the ‘virtuous circle’ between solitude and conversation, 
during which solitude allows time for self-reflection and conversation provides the 
material for self-reflection. Turkle (2011, 2015) argues that mobile digital devices 
damage our capacity to develop intimate connections, by providing the illusion of 
connection without the ethical and social value of connection and empathy.  
Turkle’s argument certainly accords with the analyses found in popular discourse 
regarding the negative impact of smartphones and tablets on social life (Brody, 2017; 
Arlington, 2016; Walters, 2015). A recent New York Times article titled ‘Hooked on Our 
Smartphones’ paints a pessimistic picture quite literally; alongside Jane Brody’s (2017) 
article about the importance of limiting our digital connects so as to nourish our human 
ones is a cartoon of glum looking city-dwellers, their gazes downcast upon their glowing 
devices. These concerns about our decreasing sociality are echoed in now familiar calls 
for a ‘digital detox’, described as a process of ‘disconnecting from technology in order 
to reconnect with yourself and others’ (Edrich, 2014). In an article for Forbes, Frances 
Booth (2014) describes one of the benefits of digital detoxing as a ‘chance to get back in 
tune with our own rhythms and the rhythms of nature’. These popular engagements 
with mobile devices again presuppose a hierarchy of attention and engagement in which 
human face-to-face communication is invariably placed at the top, with digital code and 
screen displays figuring as impoverished translations of experience. 
Undoubtedly, the assumption that devices are necessarily destructive of intimacy has 
been challenged by some mobile digital device scholars, who are keen to explore the 
new avenues for connection and intimacy that such devices offer. Amparo Lasén (2004) 
argues that the physical proximity of mobile phones to bodies allows for more 
immediate expressiveness, and notes the facilitation of asynchronous contact through 
instant messaging. Licoppe (2004, p. 154) argues that SMS practices can constitute a 
‘connected presence’ with another through the ‘continuous flow of small 
communicative acts’. In this respect Licoppe (2004) challenges the hierarchy of 
interaction in which face-to-face interaction serves as the ‘unmediated’ standard to 
which others are compared, suggesting that the challenge is to understand the specific 
capacities associated with different forms of communication shaped by the precise 
material conditions in which they form. Similarly, de Souza e Silva and Frith (2012) argue 
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that the assumption of an ‘unmediated’ communication completely neglects the role of 
language, interpretation and bodies in mediated spoken communication. De Souza e 
Silva and Frith (2012) draw on the concept of the interface, a cultural device that 
mediates experience, to stress that all communication is interfaced, to the extent that 
it involves filters that shape information exchange and the communication process. 
With new forms of interaction made possible by mobile digital devices, and others 
limited by the popularity of the device, many mobile communications scholars have 
seen the key project of their discipline as a consideration of the way in which these 
changes impact upon social cohesion. Ling (2008) argues that, with the rise of mobile 
devices, routine interactions become mediated and transformed as we develop new 
methods by which to manage our everyday life, bringing into being new forms of social 
cohesion and rendering others less relevant. Ling and co-author Rhonda McEwen (2010) 
note that the management of co-present interactions and the demands of perpetual 
contact afforded by the device can cause conflict, but argue that this is the result of the 
relative newness of these technologies and that it can be resolved through adaptation 
of etiquette. Ling (2016), however, warns that the expectation of constant availability 
can operate as a form of ‘soft coercion’ which facilitates strong ties amongst groups but 
can generate stress when an individual fails to meet expectations (See also: Mascheroni 
and Vincent, 2016; Hall and Baym, 2012). Lasén and Elena Casado (2012) add that the 
expectations of constant availability can cause conflict in romantic relationships both 
through negotiations around ‘private’ time and conflicts over mismatched expectations 
about responsiveness to mobile communication. Ling (2016) argues that these kinds of 
expectations are part of a range of new norms and social rituals that accompany the 
domestication of the device and that they continue to be negotiated. 
The ways in which actors react to and negotiate changing interaction norms has thus 
functioned as a point of focus for those communication scholars concerned to 
understand the impact of mobile devices on the normative dimension of human 
interaction (Licoppe, 2016; Mascheroni and Vincent, 2016; Ling, 2004, 2012; Sørensen, 
2006; Plant, 2001). This is evident in the widespread popularity of the domestication 
theory, discussed in greater detail in Chapter 2, which takes the process of adoption, 
adaptation and negotiation of norms around a new technology as its focus (Silverstone 
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et al., 2005). With the difficulty of managing the demands of both present interactions 
and mediated communication through the mobile phone, scholars have examined the 
gestures, bodily language and phrases that mobile phone users adopt in order to 
communicate to those around them that they are temporarily unavailable for 
interaction (Ling, 2004; Plant, 2001). Knut Sørensen’s study (2006) found that mobile 
phone users would talk at length about the moral rules that govern mobile phone 
practices, such as the importance of prioritising conversation with a physically present 
person or not wanting to disturb others on public transport. However, their behaviour 
did not reflect these rules and many admitted to breaking them. Sørensen (2006) 
concluded that such new technologies need more time to enable social practices to 
adapt and the development of more solid norms to guide their use. Yet, over ten years 
later little seems ‘solid’ about these practices. Perhaps it is the case that the very 
question of normative behaviour is an ill-posed one in this circumstance, in as much as 
it fails to address the specificities of device use in anything other than negative terms. 
As users continue to break their own rules, the habitual relations with the mobile digital 
device surely demonstrate the inadequacy of an understanding of social life that can 
only think of action as the outcome of actors’ will. 
This question of habit as it relates to the mobile digital device has been raised in a 
number of ways in the literature. Some see the habitual nature of the device’s use as a 
kind of insidious process, in which the user’s energies, time and specifically leisure time, 
become more and more directed toward work. This is evident in debates around the 
increasing fluidity between work and leisure (Broadbent, 2016; Gregg, 2011; Wajcman, 
2008; Gant and Kiesler, 2002; Green, 2002; Katz and Aakhus, 2002). Even before the rise 
of mobile digital devices, and the mobility of email associated with them, the mobile 
phone was seen to extend the realm of work into personal time as the phone facilitated 
working on-the-go (Katz and Aakhus, 2002). A more generalised bleed between work 
life and home life is often attributed to communication technologies like mobile digital 
devices and the internet, as these break down the barriers that prevent our access to 
work at home (Broadbent, 2016; Gregg, 2011). Where once the physical building of a 
workspace contained the materials with which we work, changing modes of work, 
coupled with these new technologies, allows this bleed to take place (Agar, 2013). 
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Melissa Gregg (2011) contends that the flexibility afforded by internet connected 
devices has led to this increasing creep of work into personal life. The role of ‘always-
on’ devices such as smartphones is particularly significant. Gregg (2011) contends that 
‘function creep’ sees their purported use (to manage absence from the workplace for 
travel and generally facilitate communication across distance) shift, as email 
communication becomes favoured over voice calls, which ultimately facilitates 
increased work in personal time. For Gregg (2011) the rise of the mobile digital device 
encourages us to see work as a source of satisfaction and as a central part of one’s 
identity. Giving rise to practices of checking, it is through these internet-connected 
intimate devices, Gregg (2011) argues, that coercive and unhealthy habits develop. 
These habits also arise in a context in which the importance of taking pleasure in work 
is now commonly espoused, which Gregg (2011, p. 172) identifies as a part of an 
increasing ‘corporatization of intimacy’. These habits are thus understood by Gregg as a 
symptom of a broader structural problem of contemporary office culture, characterised 
by what she terms ‘presence bleed’, referring to the loss of firm boundaries between 
personal and professional identities, which she believes to be disruptive and damaging 
to personal relationships. Larissa Hjorth (2012) agrees, noting the gendered dimension 
of this presence bleed in her interviews with women who were smartphone users. 
Hjorth found that those that had children often used the device to increase their multi-
tasking and productivity, in order to manage the already excessive demands of their 
work and domestic responsibilities. She characterises this kind of work as ‘all pervasive’, 
suggesting that it is and is ‘squeezed into micro-moments between other activities in 
the home’ (2012, p. 206).  
Other scholars have argued that the fluidity between work and private life brought 
about, at least in part, by mobile devices, has also allowed the personal to encroach 
upon work time. Judy Wajcman, Michael Bittman and Judith Brown (2008) surveyed 
mobile phone users and asked them to log their communications with the device, finding 
that work communications were less common than personal ones. They argue that the 
softening of boundaries around work and personal time may be welcomed by workers 
as ‘rather than fearing work intrusion, they are seeking deeper contact with family and 
friends’ (Wajcman et al., 2008, p. 649). Stefana Broadbent (2016) similarly contends that 
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more of the communications that mobile digital devices facilitate are personal, even 
those occurring during work hours, allowing employees to maintain a constant link with 
loved ones and transforming the definition of the work setting as isolated from personal 
life. However, Broadbent (2016) notes the significant impact of social class on whether 
workers will have access to their mobile devices or time to use them. Wajcman et al 
(2009) also argue that gender roles and expectations are an important factor, finding 
men more likely to use their device for work-related communication and women more 
likely to be using it to contact children and other family members. Though there is 
disagreement about whether mobile digital device extends work into private time, or 
private time into work time, the focus of the debate remains on the communication 
facilitated by the device, rather than the relations with the device itself. And the habitual 
reach for the mobile digital device here is understood as merely symptomatic of more 
significant structural concerns, rather than approached on its own terms. 
I have been suggesting that, despite the radical changes taking place as a result of 
emerging intimacy with the mobile digital device, much of the existing literature 
attempts to reappropriate this intimacy into existing understandings of the social. 
Scholars have argued that the connections made possible through smartphones and 
tablets has facilitated changing norms and expectations around privacy, which have in 
turn given rise to new intimacies and new forms of connection. According to Hjorth, 
Wilken and Gu (2012) maintaining presence via social networks involves an emergent 
form of intimacy, which they term ‘ambient intimacy’, an intimacy that they believe the 
smartphone makes possible through location-based social media apps like Foursquare 
and the GPS capacities of the device. Kate Crawford (2009) argues that this kind of 
ambient intimacy is built on the mundane, on the sharing of insignificant details about 
daily life. Examining Twitter and the phenomenon of micro-blogging2 and the ‘listening 
in’ that is done on social media sites, Crawford (2009) argues that while these spaces 
might not be conducive for deep analysis, the ongoing ‘chatter’ still constitutes forms of 
intimacy (see also Bayer, Ellison, et al., 2016). Di Cui (2015) draws on Licoppe’s (2004) 
concept of ‘connected presence’ to consider the role of mobile instant messaging (MIM) 
                                                      
2 Microblogging refers to the size of the communication, in the case of Twitter being limited to 140 
characters (Crawford, 2009). 
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in maintaining close relationships amongst young people in China. Cui (2015, p. 32) 
argues that MIM contributes to an enhanced sense of connection between users 
because it ‘provides a richer communicative repertoire’, which include text, images, 
video, audio, emoticon and location-based information. From this perspective, the 
mobile digital device becomes yet another tool by which human sociality is managed, 
even altered or extended, but ultimately it acts only as a facilitator. 
What is clear is that the mobile digital device has become embedded in everyday 
routines. The mobile digital device does not merely accompany us about our day, as the 
mobile phone did, making interjections when we should receive a call or message. 
Instead it infiltrates daily practices, from lying next to a user as they sleep, waiting to 
wake them, to providing an app that tells them what the weather will be like that day, 
giving them access to a wide range of social media applications, alerting them to a range 
of possible interactions with a system of notifications, tracking their movements 
throughout the day and providing them access to map apps to help them locate their 
destination. The mobile digital device is ready at hand for the many moments 
throughout the day when the user will reach for it, navigating the screen with swift 
familiarity, seeking the answer to a question or browsing a social media site, looking up 
the times for the bus, or simply doing something. 
Though much analysis of the mobile digital device remains focused on its relation to 
human sociality, the habitual aspects of device encounters are emerging as an area of 
concern for scholars. This examination of the inclination to reach for the device and the 
incorporation of the object into bodily habits demonstrates a significant shift in thinking. 
However, as I will go on this discuss, much of the scholarship examining these habits 
retains an understanding of these inclinations as the mechanical repetitions of once-
conscious actions. Consequently, there is considerable anxiety about the potential for 
these actions to be ‘unquestioned’ or ‘thoughtless’, with habit in the social sciences long 
being associated with ‘an abandonment of proper judgment and a suspension of moral 
life’ (Bissell, 2011, p. 2651). Despite this negative focus, these accounts do demonstrate 
the important role these habits play beyond merely facilitating human sociality. 
The habitual reach for the device, the ‘checking’, is a central concern voiced in relation 
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to claims the device is addictive. In his book iDisorder (2012), psychologist Larry Rosen 
recalls a dinner at a restaurant where he notices that his fellow diners have all placed 
their smartphones on the tables with them. Throughout the meal patrons periodically 
pick up their phones, press buttons, scroll for a while and then put them down, ‘…only 
to repeat the same action again and again’ (2012, p. 1). Rosen characterises their 
behaviour as mindless and anxious; as an addiction. Central to contemporary panic 
around mobile digital devices and device addiction is a lack of control over our use or 
lack of conscious awareness of what we are doing. There is a growing body of literature, 
especially within the discipline of psychology, that argues for considering ‘problematic’ 
smartphone or mobile phone use as behavioural addiction (Bian and Leung, 2015; Y. K. 
Lee et al., 2014; Kwon et al., 2013; Rosen, 2012; Walsh et al., 2008; Bianchi and Phillips, 
2005).  
Though the requirements for classifying a behaviour as addiction vary across the 
literature, the most dominant is R.I.F. Brown’s (1993) criteria for behavioural addiction. 
The criteria for addiction are salience (the activity dominates the individual’s thoughts), 
conflict (caused by the activity), loss of control, tolerance (the activity, over time, fails to 
produce the same enjoyment without increasing use), withdrawal, relapse and 
reinstatement (Brown, 1993). Studies of mobile phone addiction compare what 
individuals report of their mobile digital device practices with these criteria in order to 
identify a kind of threshold, beyond which usage is considered excessive (Bian and 
Leung, 2015; Y. K. Lee et al., 2014; Walsh et al., 2008). Additionally, Shari Walsh, 
Katherine White and Ross Young (2008) have argued that reliance on the device to 
reduce negative mood states or produce positive mood states is an indicator of 
addiction.  
Within debates about the rise of mobile digital devices culture, another central aspect 
of determining mobile digital devices addiction is negative impact on the lives of both 
the individual who is addicted and others who encounter them. Mengwei Bian and Louis 
Leung (2015, p. 73) identified similar symptoms of addiction: a disregard for harmful 
consequences, preoccupation, inability to control cravings, productivity loss and anxiety. 
Other studies, like Michael Vacaru, Robin Shepard and Janie Sheridan’s (2014) 
qualitative study of New Zealand youth mobile phone users focused on the interference 
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of the phone in ‘real’ social life, uncontrollable need for the device. The ‘harmful 
consequences’ of mobile digital devices addiction can vary from the dangers of driving 
while using the device (Oviedo-Trespalacios et al., 2016; Cooper and Strayer, 2008; 
Strayer and Drews, 2004, 2007; Horberry et al., 2006), physical injuries of the hands and 
neck (Xie et al., 2016; İnal et al., 2015; Shan et al., 2013), sleep disturbance (Lemola et 
al., 2015; Thomée et al., 2011), to more personal and interpersonal threats like low self-
esteem, depression, anxiety and technostress (the inability to cope with new 
technologies in a healthy way) (Vacaru et al., 2014; Y. K. Lee et al., 2014; Bianchi and 
Phillips, 2005). Though these accounts do pathologise habitual action, they nonetheless 
highlight the important ways these inclinations transform the capacities of mobile digital 
device users. 
Seeking to bring together the sociological and psychological accounts of smartphone 
habits, more recent social psychological accounts have turned to the concept of 
‘automaticity’ to explore habitual smartphone use. ‘Automaticity’ refers to social-
cognitive processes that are automatically undertaken, characterised by the fact that 
they are effortless, unintentional, autonomous, involuntary and the person is not aware 
of these processes (Bargh, 1989). Social psychologist John Bargh (1989) argues that 
these automatic processes may not need to possess all these qualities, and the presence 
of any one of these qualities may indicate automaticity. Bargh (1989) stresses that 
automaticity provides a way to challenge the assumption that automatic and controlled 
processes are mutually exclusive, instead arguing that the degree of awareness, 
intention, effort and control is variable. Within studies of mobile digital devices, Bargh’s 
notion of automaticity has recently been taken up by Joseph Bayer, Scott Campbell and 
Rich Ling (2016) as a way to understand the habitual practices of mobile digital device 
users (see also: Bayer, Dal Cin, et al., 2016). Bayer et al. (2016) argue for an approach 
that brings together psychological and sociological accounts of habitual smartphone 
use, drawing on sociological explanations of the internalisation of social structures in 
the form of social norms to explain the conditions in which this form of automaticity 
occurs. They contend that the normalisation of perpetual availability operates as a social 
structure internalised through microinteractions (Ling and McEwen, 2010), which 
provides situations in which mobile device checking habits take place, in turn activating 
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habit automaticity (Bayer, Campbell, et al., 2016).  Bayer et al. (2016) see smartphone 
habits as having their origin in social practices and shifting away from deliberate 
initiation as mobile phone domestication became intensified. Whilst they do not see 
these habits in themselves as problematic, Bayer et al. (2016, p. 143) note that they are 
performed with ‘less critical awareness’. 
Beyond these negative understandings, a number of scholars have engaged with the 
habitual with an eye to understanding the bodily capacities opened up by these relations 
with the device (Burchell, 2014; Moores, 2014; Licoppe, 2010; Richardson, 2005, 2007). 
Richardson (2007), for example, argues that habitual encounters with mobile digital 
devices are constituted by complex relations between the material dimensions of the 
device, bodily habits and somatic memory in which the mobile phone becomes 
incorporated into the hand. Richardson (2007) argues for greater attention to be paid 
to the embodied nature of everyday mobile device practices, given that their access to 
virtual space is often conceptualised as disembodied. Shaun Moores (2014) focuses 
closely on the hand and the “doubly digital” quality of the smartphone as both an 
interface with the digital online world but also reliance on the manual movements of 
fingers on screens to achieve this. Moores (2014) draws on David Sudnow’s (2001) 
account of learning to play jazz on the piano in which Sudnow establishes his 
phenomenological theory of bodily knowledge. Moores (2014) argues the same 
orientation and habituation occurs when users become accustomed to their devices, 
and that these movements are central to the close familiarity developed with the device 
over time. Kenzie Burchell (2014) examines the role of notifications (see also: Licoppe, 
2010) and their role in the embodied habituation of mobile digital devices, which he 
argues is constituted by constant connection and attention to multiple technical objects. 
Burchell’s (2014) qualitative study of 30 users of mobile phones and online 
communication, found individuals felt a need to ‘clean’ notifications, which he argues 
constitutes not only a significant effort to manage but manifests as sustained habitual 
anxiety.  
I seek to contribute to and extend this literature by examining the intimacy formed 
between device and user, not from the perspective of its influence on human sociality, 
but by attending to the habitual relations that afford such intimacy. While existing 
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scholarship acknowledges the important role habits and habituation play in facilitating 
encounters with the mobile digital devices, their accounts still see habits as the outcome 
of a conscious intention that has transitioned away from awareness over time. Such 
analyses continue to understand the social as constituted by actions of wilful actors, 
even if those actions eventually leave conscious intention. However, a space is opened 
up here to consider the capacities of action beyond intention. 
 
1.2 Rethinking the social: beyond interaction 
As the first part of this chapter explored, existing literature on mobile digital devices 
remains preoccupied with the device as a communication tool, exploring its capacities 
to enable, or disrupt, human-to-human contact. However, given they are capable of 
much more than merely communication between human beings and also give rise to 
new forms of sociality beyond mere interaction, seeing these devices as primarily tools 
for communication offers limited insight. Similarly, much of the literature remains 
focused on the problems of alienation and intimacy, with the new forms of connection 
and disconnection facilitated by the rise of these devices being overlooked or devalued 
relative to more normative understandings of sociality (Turkle, 2011, 2015; Ling, 2008, 
2012; Gergen, 2002, 2010; Katz and Aakhus, 2002). The key concern of such approaches 
is to examine the impacts of mobile digital devices on social cohesion, as that is 
conventionally understood. Though many scholars within this focus have argued that 
the integration of these technologies into new social practices leads to different forms 
of intimacy (Hjorth, Wilken, et al., 2012; Lasén and Casado, 2012; Wajcman et al., 2009; 
Hjorth, 2005; Okabe and Ito, 2005; Licoppe, 2004), the primary concern remains the 
evaluation of the impact on human sociality as we know it. Whether scholars lament the 
alienation from one another that device culture brings or seek to trace new ways these 
devices rekindle connections, insight is limited by comparative reference to this pre-
existing notion of the social. Indeed, the intimacy between device and user cannot be 
conceptualised in this framework, as the grounding perspective on the social is oriented 
towards human-to-human sociality. 
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One of the reasons for this limited perspective is that questions posed by sociology in 
relation to the mobile digital device remain influenced by early scholarship on 
technology, which sought to determine where the boundary of the social was in relation 
to the world of material things. Some scholars argued that it was the material qualities 
of technological objects that determined their impact on social life and it was with these 
qualities that analysis should be concerned (McLuhan, 2001; Mumford, 1974). Social 
constructivist accounts critiqued these arguments as putting technology in a ‘black box’, 
excluding the material from social and cultural forces, which they argue, in fact, 
constitute them (Grint and Woolgar, 1997). As I will discuss in greater depth in Chapter 
2, the question of where the ‘boundary’ of social construction lies in relation to material 
objects is one that persists in mobile digital device scholarship in the two dominant 
approaches. Scholars have attempted to reconcile the perspectives of constructivists 
and determinists by developing approaches that consider technologies to have material 
properties but also locate the interpretations and uses of these technologies within 
social and cultural practices. Within the literature on the mobile digital device, the 
domestication approach and affordance theory are the most commonly used theoretical 
frameworks. The domestication approach has focused on the ways in which 
technologies become integrated into systems of meaning and social norms (Ling, 2004). 
In contrast, affordances theory focuses more on understanding and accounting for the 
ways in which the peculiar capacities of technological objects are conducive to specific 
uses (Hutchby, 2001). More recently, approaches like Actor Network Theory challenged 
the distinction between subjects and objects, extending agency to objects and using the 
concept of the network to understand relations between technologies, social systems, 
human and nonhuman actors (Akrich, 1992). Thus, debates around the mobile digital 
device continue to focus on questions of the construction of meaning and the attribution 
of agency. In doing so, I argue, these debates address a false problem. As I go on to 
argue, the notion of agency remains too tied to an attributive distribution of powers, 
which does not adequately capture the variation of powers and their productivity. 
I have suggested that within the literature on mobile devices, the question of whether 
such devices bring us together or tear us apart remains a defining one. Yet this is a 
profoundly conservative question, which rests on the implicit assumptions that social 
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cohesion is an invariable good (Lash, 2009). Such thinking stifles complexity, Lash (2009) 
argues, as it assumes social order to be a self-evident value. In contrast, I argue that new 
forms of intimacy arising from our habitual encounters with the mobile digital device 
call for a revaluation of the social, which does not assume cohesion and order as moral 
or social virtues. Existing scholarship examining the mobile digital device, has attempted 
to reconcile familiar forms of social interaction with emerging forms, to determine 
similarity or difference through comparison and recognition. I argue that such an 
analysis offers a reductive account of the qualitative differences that have emerged, as 
difference here is reduced to similitude. I argue that this model of thinking needs to be 
displaced by one more concerned with the encounter itself, which can consider new 
modes of sociality without seeking to organise them into existing schemas. 
Despite the focus within existing literature on the capacity of these device to facility or 
disrupt communication and social interaction, the mobile digital device should not be 
reductively characterised as a communicative tool. Concerns around the habitual reach 
for the mobile digital device (Bayer, Campbell, et al., 2016; Turkle, 2011, 2015; Rosen, 
2012), demonstrate the need to look beyond the effects of the mobile digital device on 
interaction and instead at the conditions in which intimacy with the device is formed. I 
argue that for these habits to be examined, existing understandings of the social need 
to be expanded. While the interactions between conscious subjects and objects have 
been seen to constitute the stuff of social reality, the expanded empiricism I call for 
acknowledges that the social world is constituted by barely perceptible forces, which 
deserve to be conceptualised as more than mere by-products, but rather as the 
conditions from which the more readily perceptible emerges (Gregg and Seigworth, 
2010; Clough, 2007, 2009). In establishing this ontology, I draw primarily on the work of 
influential French philosopher Gilles Deleuze, as well as Baruch Spinoza, Henri Bergson, 
Friedrich Nietzsche and Gilbert Simondon. Deleuze (1994) argues that in order to 
establish an ontology of difference, it is necessary to dismantle what he terms the 
‘dogmatic image of thought’, a set of presuppositions that pervade Western philosophy, 
as well as much of sociology. This image of thought, which I discuss in greater detail in 
Chapter 4, affirms the unity of the senses in the knowing subject and takes as its focus 
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what consciousness can recognise, relegating all that cannot be recognised to the status 
of error (Deleuze, 1994). 
In calling for an ontology of difference, I am responding to a broader shift in social theory 
that seeks to attend to forces beyond human perception. The ‘affective turn’, as it was 
named by sociologist Patricia Clough (2007), has insisted on the need for attention to 
relations between entities rather than merely to entities themselves (Clough, 2008). It 
is important to note that here affect does not refer to emotion but rather to ‘bodily 
capacities to affect and be affected’ (Clough, 2007, p. 2). Indeed, as Maria Hynes (2013, 
p. 561) explains, ‘an approach to affect that extends beyond the more subjective ideas 
of feeling or emotion enables an analysis of those dimensions of our social experience 
that are difficult to grasp, precisely because they provide its generative conditions.’ 
These capacities are preindividual, which is to say that they are prior to individuation 
(Massumi, 2002, p. 9). This approach radically destabilises the notion of a subject acting 
upon an object or even an object acting upon a subject. This is not a matter of giving 
agency to the object, or of extending human status to nonhumans. Instead I seek to 
explore the conditions of individuation, ongoing composition and decomposition (Gregg 
and Seigworth, 2010). The question need not be ‘is social cohesion still possible with 
mobile technologies?’ but instead, ‘what conditions make a technological-body 
possible?’ and ‘what can this technological-body do?’. 
The mobile digital device does not merely offer a useful empirical site, but it is precisely 
the intimate quality of these things to elicit our attention and to cultivate inclinations 
that calls for a new ontology. Mobile devices are charged with dividing our attention 
from co-present interactions; once called by their chirp to attend to virtual interaction 
(Gergen, 2002; Plant, 2001), we now reach for them without a call or notification 
(Deloitte, 2015; Agar, 2013; Oulasvirta et al., 2011). This has increased concerns that 
human intimacy and connection are being lost and that we are distracted from each 
other as our attention is redirected to the device. It is a very specific ordering of 
attention that is presented and naturalised here, one in which it is implied that normal 
human sociality necessarily involves attending to physically co-present faces before 
objects. Though scholars have argued that device-mediated interactions, especially in 
public space, facilitate the strengthening of ties between close connections (Ling, 2008; 
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Wajcman et al., 2008; Fortunati, 2002b), the tendency is still to preserve intimate human 
connection, with the key question debated being the measurement by which this 
intimacy should be determined. Distraction understood in these terms is always already 
negative as it disrupts the proper direction of attention crucial to the stability of human 
intimacy. 
Similarly, anxieties about growing preference for mediated interaction over face-to-face 
interaction, the increasing desire to reach for devices, has led to concerns about 
dependence and addiction. Whilst much of the research into mobile phone, smartphone 
and other digital device addiction has been from a psychological perspective (Bian and 
Leung, 2015; Khang et al., 2013; Rosen, 2012; Ha et al., 2008; Bianchi and Phillips, 2005), 
the influence of this kind of thinking can be seen within sociological literature in analyses 
of ‘checking’ habits and ‘bad manners’ (Burchell, 2014; Sørensen, 2006; Lemish and 
Cohen, 2005) or in accounts that focus on attachment to the device (Plant, 2001). 
Habitual behaviour associated with mobile digital devices, especially given its lack of 
conscious awareness, is associated with ‘mindlessness’ and uncreative action, even for 
some scholars being classified as addiction. As I have been arguing, these analyses 
depend on a normative understanding of the social as constituted by wilful conscious 
actors who generate social reality through interaction. Existing approaches to mobile 
device culture and technology more broadly, limit the kinds of questions that can be 
asked to the nature of technology or the nature of human beings. In contrast, I argue for 
an ontology of difference that is concerned with exposing those relations often obscured 
by the focus on identities. This new theoretical approach offers a way of exploring 
technology without seeking to attribute cause to the objects or subjects of experience. 
Criticism of mobile digital devices is connected to deeply held assumptions about human 
intimacy and interaction and the necessity to protect and preserve personal connection. 
Yet, these criticisms deny the complexity of an encounter with these devices. In light of 
recent theoretical shifts, I have been outlining here that consider the world beyond the 
limitations of human perception, it seems timely to reexamine our attitude towards 
mobile digital devices and technology in general. If what constitutes our social world 
remains defined by a human-centred view of relations, our continued desire for, and 
entanglements with, devices can be understood only in so much as they either facilitate 
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or deteriorate social interactions. In this thesis, I will argue that an expanded 
understanding of the social, attentive to impersonal and preindividual forces, can 
provide insight into our habitual entanglements with mobile digital devices that have 
often been written off as dysfunction, distraction, confusion or failure. 
It is a very particular imagining of the social that is being defended in much of the 
existing literature and popular discourse, one that is constituted by social actors and the 
objects. As I will argue, there is much that is obscured through this analytic lens and such 
an approach is out of step with contemporary theoretical shifts that urge an 
attentiveness to shifting potential rather than imagining fixed entities, such as human 
and object. While existing debates, as I will go on to explore, offer a rich understanding 
of human sociability through devices, what is absent from such an analysis is the capacity 
to conceptualise what other kinds of intimacies and relations emerge when conscious 
interpretation and interaction are not posited as primary. It is precisely to these 
relations that recent calls for a ‘live sociology’ (Back and Puwar, 2012a) that sees the 
social as ‘relational, emergent and open’ (Michael, 2012a, p. 168) or ‘new empiricism’ 
in sociology are attuned (Clough, 2009). For Clough (2009, p. 48), conscious perception 
is the ‘narration of affect’, not the origin. Clough here is drawing on Deleuze’s work, as 
well as on recent secondary scholarship by Brian Massumi. Deleuze (1988) developed 
the concept of ‘affect’ from the work of Spinoza, and uses the term to refer to the 
capacity to affect and be affected. Shifts in capacities to affect and be affected may not 
reach the level of conscious awareness. Most significantly, Deleuze (1988) rejects the 
ontological significance afforded to consciousness, which he argues is a symptom of 
transformations at an affective level, that is to say, at the preindividual level of 
capacities. The ‘turn to affect’ in the social sciences, as it has been termed, refers to 
recent renewed interest in Deleuze’s work and other associated thinkers who seek to 
attend to these preindividual shifts in capacities which constitute the conditions of 
emergence (Clough, 2007; Massumi, 2002). This thesis will seek to cultivate an 
attentiveness to the ‘infra-empirical’, as Clough (2009) calls it, to the multiple and 
relational sociality excessive to conscious awareness.  
The turn to affect has been critiqued by some scholars within the social sciences as 
bearing some resemblance to neuroscientific or biological explanations of social 
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behaviour (Wetherell, 2013, 2015; Leys, 2011). Ruth Leys (2011) contends that affect 
theorists, by arguing for attention to be paid to forces prior to conscious awareness, 
support primarily reductive biological explanations for emotions, beliefs and intentions. 
However, as William Connolly (2011) argues, Leys neglects the nuanced relationship 
between theories of affect and the pre-subjective, and the difference of such accounts 
from neuroscientific accounts of subjectivity. Rather than, as Leys would suggest, there 
existing a simplistic explanation of behaviour offered by pre-existing biological 
processes, theorists have been critical of such reductive explanations and instead draw 
on biological examples to demonstrate the limitations of a model of thought that sees 
consciousness as the origin of action (Connolly, 2011). 
Other scholars express the concern that the challenge the theoretical shift toward affect 
makes to the long-held focus on meaning renders social scientific research 
unsustainable (Wetherell, 2013, 2015). Margaret Wetherell (2013, 2015) argues that 
attending to the affective dimensions of the social ultimately goes too far in 
disconnecting preindividual capacities from discourse. That is to say that in attending to 
the ‘felt’ dimensions of social life affect theory neglects how we ‘know’ the world 
through meaning-making. Wetherell (2015, p. 152) also expresses concern that a focus 
on these aspects of the social would present ‘a methodological nightmare and creates 
some formidable and unnecessary blocks for empirical research’. While scholars such as 
Ben Anderson (2014) have sought to respond to these critiques by reconstituting affect 
as ‘transpersonal’ rather than presubjective, I argue that such a response fails to 
challenge the dominant modes of thinking that currently privilege subjectivity and 
discourse. As I will discuss in greater detail in Chapter 4, Deleuze (1994, pp. 129–167) 
argues that practices of meaning-making and recognition have conventionally been 
taken as the model of thought for Western philosophy. This is a model of thought that 
cannot make sense of the social as emergent and relational because it is oriented to the 
recognition of sameness. I will argue that the ‘methodological nightmare’, as Wetherell 
puts it, that arises from a reorienting of sociological research towards affects occurs 
precisely because underpinning much of our existing understandings of what constitutes 
research are representational modes of thought, which presuppose conscious 
recognition as primary. Rather than seeking to reject the place of representation as a 
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social process, Deleuze’s challenge of representational identifies the ways in which our 
focus on discourse and meaning-making continue to limit our capacity to think the social 
world. 
 
1.3 Rethinking distraction: new habits, new intimacies 
In this thesis, I propose three shifts in thinking that can better enable us to attend to 
emerging forms of intimacy with the mobile digital device. Firstly, I argue for an 
understanding of habits as generative of new capacities. The concept of habit provides 
a useful way of considering relations with these devices that operate beneath conscious 
awareness. In the social sciences, habit has conventionally been associated with 
mechanism and with the loss of originality and creativity in an action (Malabou, 2008). 
Often contrasted with wilful contemplation, habit is characterised as ‘unthinking’, 
‘docile’ and not subject to conscious evaluation, and therefore morally questionable 
(Bissell, 2011). However, as I will discuss in Chapter 3, these understandings of habit rest 
on the presumed primary importance of conscious contemplation. As I will argue, this 
presumption mistakes consciousness for the cause of action when it is really only an 
awareness of more primary transformations. A movement does not follow from 
conscious deliberation, but rather is a result of competing forces that act upon the body. 
Habits then, are not the loss of creativity and novelty, which would be to mistakenly 
attribute causal power to consciousness. I also challenge the understanding of habits as 
a mechanical return of the same. I take up philosopher Félix Ravaisson’s (2008) work on 
habit, in which he argued that the development of habit involves a tension between a 
tendency towards permanence and capacity for change. Ravaisson notes that the 
movement of a habit is not the same movement each time; rather, each movement 
decreases the sensation and effort of the action, whilst increasing its efficiency, as well 
as cultivating an inclination towards the action. Deleuze (1994) also provides an 
important reframing of the concept of repetition so crucial to habit, as he contends that 
repetition performs an ontological function of generating difference. Habitual and 
repeated actions then, can be understood as generative of new capacities and 
inclinations. 
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Secondly, in reconsidering intimacy with the mobile digital device, I argue that the 
privilege afforded to conscious experience and intention must be challenged. This 
challenge has particular significance with regards to the problem of distraction, as it is 
presently understood. Attention and inattention are often understood through the 
metaphor of a beam of light that focuses on one area at a time (Arvidson, 1996), but this 
understanding again relies heavily on the privileging of consciousness and the human 
subject’s ability to command their senses. It dismisses the possibility of a more complex 
distribution of attention in which our awareness is not limited to that which we 
consciously observe, but extends also to the minute transformations beneath 
consciousness, which take place from moment to moment at the level of bodily 
capacities. Given the generative capacity of habits I have just alluded to, and the 
associated challenge to consciousness as the origin of action, that which is consciously 
perceived is seen as a reduction of the multitude of forces that contribute to an action. 
As such, consciousness awareness and intention cannot be the entry point at which 
intimacy with the mobile digital device is understood. 
Thirdly, I argue for an impersonal approach, one that challenges the privileging of human 
intimacy and takes as its object the preindividual forces prior to the organising of 
subjects. Mobile digital devices have primarily been seen as objects taken up by human 
subjects, yet this reduction fails to capture the forming and reforming of subjectivity 
that is continuous during these encounters. Sociological approaches to technology have 
largely assumed conscious engagement to be the primary mode of experiencing the 
world, and this assumption has persisted in their analysis of mobile digital devices. 
However, this neglects the vast presubjective and impersonal dimensions of these 
experiences, without which, conscious experience would not be possible. Whilst an 
analysis that displaces human conscious interpretation may seem antithetical to the 
project of sociology, recent scholarship (Michael, 2012a; Gregg and Seigworth, 2010; 
Adkins and Lury, 2009; Clough, 2007) has urged a broadening of what has conventionally 
constituted the scope of sociological enquiry. Exploiting this enlargement of the 
sociological lens, I will argue that everyday mobile digital device practices arise out of an 
impersonal intimacy. This is a kind of intimacy that does not pertain to personal 
connection between humans and objects but ‘belongs’ instead to the impersonal. By 
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reference to the impersonal, I mean us to look beyond individual subjects and objects, 
as calls for an expanded empiricism urge, and take seriously their preindividual 
conditions. It is in these preindividual forces that we might start to find insight into 
messy and in some ways unintelligible moments. 
In this thesis, I will argue that habitual and repetitive encounters with mobile digital 
devices open up new capacities, gestures, and flows of attention or inattention. Indeed, 
as Massumi (2009) argues, habits, inclinations, and willings are all patterns of repetition 
that form the lived past of the body and form part of the present process of becoming. 
Demonstrating the limitations of a sociology that seeks only to examine the effects of 
the device within a narrow scope of the social, this thesis argues for an expanded notion 
of the social (Adkins and Lury, 2009), which is attuned to these impersonal forces. Using 
such a framework shifts the kind of questions that can be asked about our close 
entanglements with the mobile digital device. Rather than asking why we continue to 
reach for our devices or why we fail to alter our behaviour despite professing a desire 
to do so (cf. Sørensen, 2006), sensitivity to these impersonal forces allows a 
consideration of what else cultivates inclinations. Unpacking the open-ended relations 
that constitute an encounter with a mobile digital device involves considering not only 
that which we identify consciously (such as ‘wanting to’ check Facebook), but also the 
corporeal sensations, bodily tendencies and habits, environmental and social layers that 
fold into actions. So, whilst picking up a smartphone might seem to be a simple and 
deliberate act, I argue that analyses of user's actions are not the outcome of a 
deliberation but rather bodily habits, reinforced by repetition and sensory pleasure that 
encouraged the fingers to reach. 
In the next chapter, ‘Inhuman’, I will provide an overview of the key debates within 
sociological inquiry into technology and how these debates have shaped scholarship 
within mobile communication studies. In this chapter I will also provide a more in depth 
exploration of dominant theoretical perspectives within the literature on mobile digital 
devices and how this is currently applied within the field. I argue that theoretical debates 
about the mobile digital device continue to be focused on questions of the status of the 
object, either as having agential capacity or not, which ultimately fails to address the 
underlying limitations of a subject/object paradigm. 
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In Chapter 3, ‘Intervention’, I explore in more depth the three central theoretical shifts 
that I propose in this thesis, in order to re-examine digital device relations beyond an 
interest only in their effects. Firstly, I will argue for repetition to be understood not as 
the same action returned with less awareness but instead as creative force, which 
repeats difference and creates the capacity for novelty. Secondly, I argue for an 
understanding of action that does not locate the origin of action in a conscious intention. 
As I have outlined, this follows Deleuze’s reading of Spinoza (1988, p. 19) in which he 
argues that consciousness is mistaken as the cause of action, as wielding power over the 
body, when consciousness is merely a secondary awareness of the transition, and not 
the cause.  Finally, I introduce some of the key elements of a shift from the personal to 
the impersonal. This shift is twofold, in that it rejects the narrow focus in mobile 
communication literature on the emotional and interpersonal effects of technologies, 
emphasising instead the attention to preindividual relations and their productive 
effects. 
Chapter 4, ‘Impersonal’, will examine two methodological challenges to which this thesis 
responds. The first of these is the challenge that digital technologies and digital culture 
pose to traditional sociological methods, as well as the threat that new digital data 
collection methods pose to the authority of the discipline to make knowledge claims 
about the social world (Back, 2012). The second of these challenges relates to the 
reconsideration of methods in the pursuit of expanded empiricism that attends to the 
processual, indeterminate and relational dimensions of social life (Lury and Wakeford, 
2012a). In Chapter 4, I draw on Deleuze’s (1994, pp. 129–167) critique of the dogmatic 
image of thought to examine the ways in which existing presuppositions about the 
nature of thought and its relation to method limit our capacity to think difference. Here, 
I argue for ‘inventive methods’ (Lury and Wakeford, 2012a), and by this I do not 
necessarily mean new methods but rather methodologies that challenge these dogmatic 
assumptions, so as to facilitate an encounter with difference. I outline too the empirical 
elements of this thesis, which involved qualitative interviews as well as the use of the 
‘anecdote’ as a method (Michael, 2012b). This method, developed by sociologist Mike 
Michael (2012b), offers a way to capture my own experience with my mobile digital 
devices without falling into the presumptions of personal experience more readily 
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associated with traditional autoethnography. Michael (2012b, p. 29) describes 
anecdotalization as ‘an “irritant” within the process of doing research’, and the anecdote 
is defined by its capacity to disrupt. My anecdotes throughout the thesis are encounters 
in which my awareness was drawn to my intimate connection to the mobile digital 
device, usually only for a moment, facilitated by some form of disruption. Finally, I argue 
in this chapter that the empirical material in this thesis is aims to be generative of an 
encounter, which is transformative both in the moment and in its retelling in the text. 
Drawing on this empirical material, Chapter 5, ‘Intertwined’, examines the device-user 
encounter, with an eye to considering the capacity of habits and distraction beyond their 
negative connotations. It underscores the underlying moral hierarchy of attention that 
underpins arguments about the importance of face-to-face attention, arguing for an 
understanding of the inattention of distractedness and habitual behaviour. Here, I 
challenge the dominant understanding of distraction as a loss of attention or as a 
quantitatively low amount of attention, suggesting that it is, rather, a qualitative 
difference of attention. 
Chapter 6 ‘Intimacy’, explores the concept that I have termed ‘impersonal intimacy’. In 
this chapter, I examine the way that intimacy has been understood within mobile digital 
device literature, either as under threat from the technology or potentially facilitated by 
the technology. In either case, intimacy is understood as personal. What is absent from 
such accounts is a consideration of intimacy beyond the terms of human perception, 
and thus of that more impersonal intimacy that is not oriented by human sociality. 
Impersonal intimacy, I suggest, involves the kind of habitual, visceral and intimate 
familiarity that is generated through repetition between device and user, which 
produces a qualitative difference in attention. Finally, I conclude by considering the 
implications of this rethinking towards a sociological understanding of mobile digital 
devices, as well as making connections to broader debates about human-technological 
relations and agency. Encountering these excessive and intimate relations with mobile 
digital devices forces us to confront the limitations of our human centred and intentional 
purview, as we find ourselves in the midst of a swipe, click or tap without intention. 
Familiar movements are not thought, but felt. They are inclinations that only later reach 
our notice but reconstitute our attention in such a way as to produce new modes of 
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awareness. I argue that these moments, often regarded as distractions from social 
interaction, are not a mere error in attention but an emerging form of sociality in their 
own right.  
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Chapter 2: Inhuman  
‘Some people really look down on phones as antisocial. Everyone always has their face 
down in their phone in public. I don’t know if I’d really act any differently if I didn’t have 
a phone. But who knows, right? It’s not like we can go back and see what would happen.’ 
He says, looking cautiously, perhaps as if he’s trying to read my reaction. He pauses but 
I say nothing, and then he goes on. 
‘Everything is always ‘the worst’ at the moment. And I completely disagree I think 
everything is the best! I mean I wouldn’t want to live a hundred years ago and die of 
Cholera!’ 
The relationship between sociology and the technological object has always been a 
fraught one. Addressing fully the capacities of technologies calls into question the very 
object of study of the discipline and its claims to particular expertise.  Mobile digital 
devices are not merely a convenient example, plucked from countless technologies, 
from which to begin this discussion of how we might conceptualise the social without 
starting with the common sense image of the human being; namely, a discrete being 
with a potential for autonomy, thanks to its capacity for conscious deliberation and 
action. Rather, the response to the widespread adoption of mobile devices, both in 
academic and popular discourse, encompasses many of the key tensions within debates 
around technoculture and transformation. As such, a consideration of the place of 
mobile technologies in contemporary life has both specific and general significance. In 
this chapter, I will trace dominant theories of technology within sociology, connecting 
these with the more specific literature on mobile digital devices. While there is not the 
scope in this thesis to explore the entire sociological literature on technology, I draw on 
sociological theory that goes beyond the mobile phone, in order to draw out broader 
themes that have influenced this discourse and continue to shape it. I begin with some 
of the earliest debates, which sought to locate responsibility for change either in the 
human use of technology or in the qualities of technologies themselves. I then move on 
to explore some of the more contemporary and experimental approaches, which 
rethought the capacities of objects and the status of the human. I will demonstrate the 
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necessity of extending existing critiques beyond merely affording agency to the 
technological object, with the idea of radically destabilising the foundations upon which 
agency itself is understood. Building on these contemporary theories, the final part of 
this chapter will explore more precisely the contribution that this thesis makes, both to 
the specific debates around the mobile digital device and concerning technosociality 
more broadly. 
 
2.1 Redrawing the boundaries of the social 
Early inquiry into technologies and technological change within the social sciences has 
predominantly been concerned with the degree to which technologies influence our 
behaviour and whether they do so positively or negatively (Lister et al., 2009). Early 
debates were characterised by disagreement between those who were extremely 
optimistic about the emancipatory capacities of new technologies, and those who were 
more anxious about the influence of technology (Murphie and Potts, 2003). Whilst 
mobile phone research emerged well after most of these debates, it is useful to briefly 
examine some of its key aspects, as these significantly influenced later scholarship, in 
particular, those theories that attempted to avoid the essentialism of earlier approaches 
(Ling, 2004). Crudely speaking, early debates about the role of technology in sociology 
fall between technological determinist perspectives and social constructivist 
perspectives, though, as I will suggest, truly technological determinist perspectives are 
rare (Grint and Woolgar, 1997). I will spend some time discussing these perspectives to 
demonstrate the dominance of what could be considered a false problematisation, in 
which the attempt to attribute causality to either the technological object or human 
sociality has prevented an analysis of the in-between: of those forces prior to the 
individuation of subject and object that condition the genesis of these structures. 
Technologically determinist theories consider technology to be the key agent of social 
change and attribute such changes to the determining material qualities, and 
structuring, of a given technological system (Murphie and Potts, 2003). A Marxist 
conceptualisation of technology, notably, the determining relationship Karl Marx 
46 
posited between industrial technologies and social relations, has characteristically 
determinist elements (Winner, 1980). Marx’s (2000, pp. 219–220) statements on the 
relationship between changing modes of production and changing social relations 
clearly locate technologies as central agents of change: 
In acquiring new productive forces men change their mode of production; 
and in changing their mode of production, in changing the way of earning 
their living, they change all their social relations. The hand-mill gives you 
society with the feudal lord; the steam-mill, society with the industrial 
capitalist. 
However, some scholars insist that Marx’s understanding of technology should not be 
misconstrued as determinist, especially as it relates to his understanding of the forces 
of production, which involved, but were not limited to, industrial technologies (Bimber, 
1990; MacKenzie, 1984). Steve Matthewman (2011) argues that Marx located the source 
of the problems of industrial technologies firmly with the social, political and economic 
system of capitalism, not in the capacities of technologies themselves, and that in this 
sense he departs significantly from determinist logic. 
More recently, Lewis Mumford’s (1974) at least partly determinist analysis of 
technologies of mass production and automation suggests that processes of 
mechanization and automation arising from technological changes have inevitable social 
consequences. Mumford (1974, p. 186) criticises the naive acceptance of technological 
change as ‘progress’, arguing that now ‘society meekly submits to every new 
technological demand and utilizes without question every new product, whether it is an 
actual improvement or not’. Mumford urges for a consideration of alternative modes of 
technological development, seeing the implications of the current trajectory as 
unavoidable (Murphie and Potts, 2003). 
Considered perhaps the most determinist of modern theorists of technology, media 
scholar Marshall McLuhan traces the rise of mass media forms such as television and 
radio, which he sees as representing a shift away from print technologies and from 
linearity and rationality more generally (Murphie and Potts, 2003). As indicated by his 
well-known phrase, ‘the medium is the message’, McLuhan (2001) argues that focus 
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should be directed not to the meanings or content expressed through technologies, but 
rather to the material thing itself. The content, McLuhan (2001, p. 19) maintains: 
is like the juicy piece of meat carried by the burglar to distract the watchdog 
of the mind. The effect of the medium is made strong and intense just 
because it is given another medium as “content”. 
McLuhan (2001, p. 8) argues that each new technology or medium offers a novel 
extension of human capacities but this induces a ‘change of scale or pace or pattern’ in 
human life. In a somewhat similar vein, Jean Baudrillard’s theory of hyperreality 
emphasised the determining influence of technologies of reproduction with respect to 
cultural life. Famously, Baudrillard (1988) suggests that we now live in a world of 
simulacra, which become indistinguishable from, and ultimately replace, the real. 
Differences aside, both McLuhan and Baudrillard afford technological change a central 
role in the key shifts in the social world that they identify and hold to varying degrees of 
determinism in suggesting that it is the qualities of new technologies that give rise to 
novel social arrangements. 
In response to technologically determinist arguments, an approach to technology which 
could be broadly understood as social constructivist (sometimes called the ‘social 
shaping’ approach) emerged from the 1970s onwards. This approach critiqued the 
causal role afforded to technology and the simplistic understanding of social change it 
implied, arguing that technology should be seen as constituted by the social conditions 
in which it is embedded (MacKenzie and Wajcman, 1999). As Wiebe Bijker (1997, p. 3) 
explains, the primary point for social constructivists is that technology and society are 
both constructed and neither exist prior to this process of co-constitution; technologies 
are shaped by engineers, designers, marketers and consumers (Bijker, 1997). Keith Grint 
and Steve Woolgar (1997) argue that constructivists sought to bring the same 
interpretative approach that sociology had applied to gender, class, ethnicity and power 
to technology, which had previously been treated as curiously beyond social analysis. 
Technologies, from this perspective, have no inherent properties, and indeed could 
operate differently, since their expression comes from their context, not their qualities. 
As Bijker and John Law (1994, p. 3) put it we ‘get the technologies we deserve.’ This kind 
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of analysis seeks to question the underlying social conditions that give rise to specific 
kinds of technologies, with an eye to creating the conditions in which different 
technological arrangements could flourish (Bijker and Law, 1994). 
Social constructivist scholars characteristically emphasise that their approach goes 
beyond merely arguing that technologies are socially moulded, seeking rather to grasp 
the complex and interconnected social factors that shape technological innovation 
(MacKenzie and Wajcman, 1999; Williams and Edge, 1996). Though scholars who adopt 
this view are heterogeneous, in their influential edited collection Bijker and Law (1994, 
pp. 8–10) suggest that they share several significant assumptions: that technology is 
contingent on social change, which involves conflicts and resistance rather than unified 
‘progress’; that these conflicts are managed through strategies by those involved in the 
dispute; that these technologies stabilise only if the heterogeneous relations they must 
necessarily form a part of also stabilise; and finally that all these arrangements must be 
treated as emergent, rather than pre-existing. Bijker and Law’s (1994, p. 8) ‘social 
shaping’ perspective argues that ‘[t]echnologies do not have a momentum of their own’. 
Whilst technological determinist accounts had stressed the qualities of technologies as 
primary in shaping associated social formations, social constructivists contend that 
technologies have no inherent qualities or constraints that do not originate from a 
human context, such that technologies and their relationships with humans cannot be 
explained by reference to any qualities pre-existing social interaction (Grint and 
Woolgar, 1997). 
Despite these shared assumptions, there is significant disagreement within social 
constructivist approaches about the extent to which the material capacities of specific 
technologies should be considered, and this disagreement has shaped later theories that 
have attempted to reconcile not only technological determinism and social 
constructivism but also these constructivist disputes over the causal power of the 
material (Hutchby, 2001). Grint and Woolgar (1997) support a constructivist 
understanding of technology that refutes the notion of pre-given properties particular 
to technological forms, insisting that these are all socially situated. They are critical of 
Langdon Winner’s (1980) claim that technologies can have political qualities in their 
specific designs or in the systems they could encourage, asserting that these qualities 
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belong not to the technology itself but to the social circumstances of its production 
(Grint and Woolgar, 1997). Grint and Woolgar (1997) argue that ‘social shaping’ focused 
accounts like Donald Mackenzie and Judy Wajcman’s (1999) and Bijker and Law’s (1994) 
continue to attribute significance to material attributes of technologies themselves. 
What is common to both determinist theories of technology and social constructivist 
accounts is an effort to determine where the boundaries of the social are. Technological 
determinist accounts have placed technology outside of the social as a cause of social 
arrangements not an effect of them, by focusing on the material qualities of the 
technology as determining its use. Social constructivist scholars have located technology 
within the bounds of the social by arguing that technology is constituted by social forces, 
rather than being the cause of these forces. Constructivists contend that the material 
qualities of the technology are not objective or determining but rather socially 
constructed through shared meaning and interpretation. Social constructivists have 
been critical of determinist approaches for putting technology in a ‘black box’ that is not 
open to sociological analysis, neglecting the role of the social in the development of new 
technologies and the interpretation of their capacities (Grint and Woolgar, 1997). For 
others, however, social constructivist accounts run the risk of neglecting the material 
differences between technologies, their different qualities and what these properties 
facilitate (Hutchby, 2001). While the terms of these debates have focused on whether 
the material qualities of technologies are determining or socially constructed, both sides 
of the debate are attempting to discern what constitutes the realm of the social and 
what is not subject to social forces. For determinists, the social is shaped by the material 
properties and conditions of technology. On the other hand, constructionists have 
argued that there is nothing that operates external to the social world, understood as 
constructed through the production of shared meaning generated through interaction 
between social actors (Harris, 2008). 
 
2.2 Distinguishing the social and the material 
In the field of mobile communication scholarship, these early debates have continued 
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to shape the kinds of questions posed about the mobile digital device. The two dominant 
theoretical frameworks within the literature, the domestication approach and 
affordances theory, though both seeking to avoid the essentialist arguments of the early 
technological determinists and social constructivists, share many of their concerns. As I 
will go on to explore, both theories seek to determine the extent to which mobile 
technologies are defined both by socially constructed meaning and by the material 
elements of the technologies themselves. The domestication approach, I will argue, 
shares more in common with social constructivist accounts, as it focuses on everyday 
practices of meaning making. Affordances theory, by attending to the capacities of the 
technological object, considers technology to have some properties beyond social 
practices of meaning making, though it is not technologically determinist in any 
straightforward sense. 
The ‘domestication’ approach has been widely taken up in both studies of technology, 
and more specifically in studies of information and communication technologies (ICTs), 
particularly within the communication studies literature. Roger Silverstone, Eric Hirsch 
and David Morley (2005) contributed some of the foundational concepts of 
domestication theory, arguing that an understanding of how technologies come to be 
part of domestic life is crucial to understanding their embeddedness in social practices. 
The household, they contend, is a moral economy involved in the dynamic production 
and exchange of meanings with the public world. The social constructivist influence is 
clear here, however, within this approach technologies are both shaped by social forces 
and operate to shape social life (Silverstone et al., 2005), as domestication scholars 
locate technologies within the grounds of the social while acknowledging the role of the 
material capacities of the object. The adoption of technologies then, according to the 
domestication approach, is negotiated, rather than deterministic. 
Silverstone et al. (2005) propose that there are four elements of this system of 
domestication: appropriation, objectification, incorporation and conversion. Through 
appropriation, a commodity owned by an individual or household becomes significant 
as a result of meanings attributed to the object. Objectification involves the aesthetic 
qualities of technologies as objects but also their arrangement and display within the 
home. Incorporation refers to all the ways that these technologies are used, including 
51 
intended uses and unintended ones, as well as the different capacities these uses 
provide for the user. Finally, conversion, much like appropriation, indicates the external 
object’s appropriation within the domestic setting, but refers specifically to the 
relationship between the household and the wider social world, and the ways in which 
the domestication of the object expresses meanings about the household to wider 
society (Silverstone et al., 2005). Of note is the contention that there is a ‘double 
articulation’ in the way that communication technologies participate in these processes, 
by virtue of their status as objects and as vehicles of media consumption (Silverstone et 
al., 2005). Silverstone and Leslie Haddon (1996) emphasise that although the 
domestication approach takes the home as its initial focus, it has broader implications 
for thinking about the ways in which technologies become familiar and adapted within 
daily life. One of the acclaimed strengths of a domestication approach is the drawing 
together of design and user appropriation in the consideration of both the intended 
purpose and the actual practices of technical objects (Silverstone and Haddon, 1996). 
Thomas Berker, Maren Hartmann, Yves Punie and Katie Ward (2006, p. 2) also note that 
the term ‘domestication’, with its associations with the taming of animals, is appropriate 
given that ‘technologies have to be house-trained, they have to be integrated into the 
structures, daily routines and values of users and their environments.’ Domestication 
theories thus highlight the newness and adaptation of technologies, as well as their 
becoming-mundane, emphasising that this is an ongoing process that is never complete 
(Berker et al., 2006). 
Within research focusing specifically on the mobile digital device, the domestication 
approach has been highly influential, though some adaptation of the theory’s key 
tenets has been required, given that the conventional focus on the household 
inadequately captures the mobile nature of these devices and their ownership by 
individuals rather than families (Haddon, 2007). Prominent mobile communication 
scholar Ling (2004, p. 26) argues that the domestication approach to mobile devices 
avoids the pitfalls of technological and social determinism, whilst offering a more 
balanced perspective than the ‘affordances’ approach, discussed later in this chapter. 
Ling (2004) stresses that by attending to the always incomplete and negotiated process 
of domestication that occurs both between user and device, but also between 
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individuals as part of social interaction, a more holistic understanding of the way a 
technology becomes embedded into social life can be gained. Like many other 
domestication theorists, Ling turns to microsociological accounts of the social to make 
sense of ongoing negotiations of new technologies and the establishment of new social 
norms, most notably Goffman’s (1967) work on face-to-face interaction (see Ling, 2004, 
2012). For example, in focusing on the way that the adoption of mobile devices has 
altered practices of co-ordination of social engagements, Ling (2004) argues that there 
has been a rise of what he calls the ‘micro-coordination’ of social life, in which device 
users organise loose social engagements and then make minor adjustments with 
regards to time and place closer to face to face meetings. Ling (2004) argues that the 
mobile phone has become ‘intrusive’ upon social situations, insofar as we need to 
extricate ourselves from a given context in order to attend to a call, while those not 
receiving the call must redirect their attention appropriately so as to not seem as 
though they are listening in on the conversation. In this sense, something about the 
immediacy of face to face social interaction is, according to Ling, lost. Yet while Ling 
(2004) suggests that mobile phone use can cause social discomfort and loosen some 
social ties, he believes it also facilitates new social connections. In any case, Ling 
suggests, mobile phone use clearly impacts on conventional norms, values and 
practices and the incorporation of the devices into an increasing number of people’s 
lives has a significant impact upon patterns of human sociality overall. 
For his part, David Morley (2006) argues that the mobile phone disrupts boundaries 
between public and private, and, as such, mobile phones can represent a disruptive 
force that imposes private interactions on strangers in public space. In his effort to 
understand the process of the domestication of mobile phones, Sørensen (2006) 
conducted a study in which mobile phone users in Norway were interviewed about their 
adoption of the technology, with a focus on why people decide to purchase or obtain a 
device and how their use changed over time. Sørensen’s (2006, p. 53) study concluded 
that ‘mobile phones seem to carry the seed of their own diffusion’, as participants felt 
that it was the presence of others having mobile phones that necessitated their own 
possession of the device. Sørensen (2006) observed that although people discussed 
different moral codes governing social behaviours and norms concerning mobile phone 
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use in public space, these norms took time to become stabilised. Significantly, Sørensen 
(2006) noted that participants in the study would suggest ‘common sense’ rules around 
mobile phone use, yet admit to breaking these rules. Sørensen attributes this 
disjuncture between norm and practice to a need for further domestication and 
solidification of norms; as norms and practices solidify around a technology, practices of 
re-domestication shift the meanings attached to these technologies and the routines in 
which they are embedded (Bertel and Ling, 2014). Similarly, Troels Fibæk Bertel and 
Ling’s (2014) study of Danish youth concludes that a process of re-domestication has 
altered the meanings attributed to different forms of communication, with SMS being 
reserved for more close connections and Facebook now being used to maintain looser 
social ties. While Ling (2012) argues that the changing process of domestication has led 
to mobile communication reaching a point in which it is taken for granted, Giovanna 
Mascheroni and Leslie Haddon (2015) insist that smartphones and other mobile digital 
devices, including their additional functions, are still in the very early stages of 
domestication and will continue to require adaptation. 
What is evident in such accounts of the domestication of mobile technologies is the 
assumption that we know what the foundations of the social are, even if we are faced 
with the task of tracing the shifts in day to day sociality. Mobile technologies are seen 
to constitute an object, much like any other, which is incorporated into human life. Much 
like technological determinist and social constructivists, domestication theory takes as 
self-evident the social’s constitution through the interactions of intentional social 
actors. The question taken to be primary then for a domestication approach is where to 
distinguish the influence of social forces over material ones, again redrawing the 
boundaries of the social, albeit through a more nuanced approach. Yet, there is much 
that such an analysis can only regard as error. This is evident, for instance, in Sørensen’s 
(2006) dismissal of those moments in which behaviour contradicts expressed values as 
merely evidence of a need for more solid norms. Yet, as I go on to argue in subsequent 
chapters, it is in fact these moments of disconnect between self-prescribed action and 
actual practice that most draw our attention to the limitations of conceptualising social 
action, and indeed the social more broadly, as we currently do. For all its rich 
descriptions of the early discomfort that can occur when unfamiliar technologies are 
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thrust into new social settings, the domestication approach offers little to the analysis 
of the intimacy that increasingly characterises our relationship to mobile technologies. 
To put it in the terms that a ‘live sociology’ seeks to cultivate, we could say that the 
devices in these analyses are lively only insofar as they are animated by the intentions 
of conscious actors, either in the form of design or use and adaptation (see for example 
Silverstone et al., 2005).  
In significant ways, the approach commonly known as ‘affordances theory’ departs 
from the domestication perspective, though as I will suggest, its efforts to think the 
relationship between human beings and mobile devices remain posed in rather human 
centred terms, such that the genuine novelty of this relational intimacy is still somewhat 
opaque. Like the domestication approach, affordances theory has been proposed as 
offering a way to explore the link between social and technological change, which 
reconciled technological determinism and social constructivism. As I explored earlier in 
this chapter, technological determinism has been criticised for seeing technological 
impacts as inevitable consequences of the inherent properties of specific technologies, 
and for its neglect of the unexpected uses of technologies, social conditions and design 
(MacKenzie and Wajcman, 1999; Grint and Woolgar, 1997; Bijker and Law, 1994). 
Similarly, social constructivist perspectives have been challenged for neglecting the 
materiality of technologies and the arrangements to which they are conducive 
(Hutchby, 2001). The theory of ‘affordances’, which examines the capacities an object 
‘affords’, not intrinsic properties of an object, has been offered by many as a way to 
avoid the pitfalls of deterministic approaches (Arminen et al., 2016; Schrock, 2015; 
Hutchby, 2001).3  
The concept of affordances originated from psychologist James Gibson’s (1986) 
influential work The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception, in which he outlined a 
new approach to understand the way that humans and other animals perceive their 
environment. Gibson’s work offered a substantial challenge to dominant cognitivism 
                                                      
3 The term ‘affordance’ has become widely used within sociological studies of technology though the 
specificity with which it is used varies greatly and in many contexts it may be employed somewhat 
interchangeably with terms like ‘properties’ or ‘qualities’. For the purpose of understanding the use of the 
theory in the context of mobile phone research, I will focus here on uses of the term that draw that 
explicitly on the affordances theory. 
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within psychological studies of perception, which had emphasised perception as an 
essentially mental activity, a practice of knowing achieved through reference to 
conceptual categories (Ingold, 1992). Gibson (1986) is critical of existing explanations of 
perception, which are based on the notion that we interpret raw sensory input that is 
then organised and given meaning through pre-existing mental schema. These 
explanations fail because ‘in order to perceive the world, one must already have ideas 
about it…[w]hether the ideas are learned or innate makes no difference; the fallacy lies 
in the circular reasoning’ (Gibson, 1986, p. 304). Gibson rejects the notion that 
perception involves value-free physical objects, which are then invested with meaning. 
He contends that what is in fact perceived are value-rich ecological objects, imbued with 
value relative to their affordances. Here the distinction between the affordances 
approach and domestication approach is most apparent, as the materiality of the object 
in affordances theory is central to the perception of meaning, rather than meaning being 
ascribed through social practices. 
An affordance, Gibson (1986) explains, is what an environment or object offers a human 
or other animal, with respect to the capacity for action that it affords. Perception is a 
process of gaining this practical knowledge, which is not organised through reference to 
meaning, since in some senses meaning already lies in the objects perceived (Ingold, 
1992). These affordances of the environment or objects in the environment are not 
abstract physical properties but are unique to the perceiver. That is to say, they are 
relational as different animals will perceive different affordances in their environment. 
However, affordances do not simply change with the observer, but rather which 
affordances are perceived will change (Gibson, 1986). For example, a tree affords 
climbing to a monkey but not to a dog. These affordances are perceived visually 
(something that can be climbed will look ‘climbable’), but they are not a means of 
classifying objects. In Gibson’s work the challenge to social constructivism is clear, as he 
firmly rejects any approach that would reduce the materiality of the social world to mere 
stimulus for meaning making (Ingold, 1992). As anthropologist Tim Ingold (1992, p. 47) 
puts it: 
Sociality is rather given from the start, prior to the objectification of 
experience in cultural categories, in the direct perceptual involvement of 
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fellow subjects immersed in joint action in the same environment. 
Although the affordances theory seems to reject a constructivist analysis, Ian Hutchby 
(2001) argues that it also does not exclude the material from the social world, as 
determinist accounts had done. The material properties of technologies enable and 
constrain the ways in which technologies can be interpreted and socially constructed. In 
this sense Hutchby (2001) argues that the concept of affordances allows a consideration 
of the specific material qualities of technological objects whilst still locating these 
qualities within the social world and open to social forces. 
The emphasis on visually perceiving affordances has represented a significant 
contribution to the field of design, most notably in the work of Donald Norman, who 
adopted Gibson’s concept of affordances in his book The Design of Everyday Things 
(1990) and whose own analysis of affordances has been influential with sociological 
analyses of technology that draw on the affordance theory. Norman (1990) argues that 
affordances play a key role in good design and when we encounter a new object, our 
perceptions of its affordances provide indications of how we might make use of it. 
However, in a recent revised edition of the same text, Norman (2013, p. xv) explains that 
the concept of affordances has been updated in light of the increasing presence of 
virtual objects, in which the presence of ‘signifiers’ is increasingly important. This seems 
somewhat contrary to Gibson’s original argument, as these ‘signifiers’, which are 
‘perceptible signals of what can be done’, would seem to operate as a kind of symbolic 
reference point (Norman, 2013, p. xv). Norman’s approach opens up space for user-
learning, which has been a criticism of the affordances approach (Ling, 2004), however 
his engagement with the concept contradicts Gibson’s claims about the materiality of 
perception, reducing the notion of affordances to something comparable to properties 
or material capacities.  
Scholars interested in mobile digital devices have drawn on the affordances approach 
because it facilitates a dynamic understanding of the capacities of the object, rather 
than seeking to define its essential characteristics, which are, given the nature of apps, 
open to change (Goggin, 2011b; Best, 2009). As Gibson’s notion of affordances 
conceptualised both what is made possible and what possibilities are closed off by 
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certain material arrangements, the language of affordances allows a rich 
conceptualisation of the transformations mobile devices elicit, focused at the level of 
capacities. It is worth noting here that within the literature that adopts the concept of 
affordance to explore the mobile digital device, Norman’s design-focused interpretation 
of Gibson’s concept has been significantly influential, meaning that Gibson’s claims 
about the materiality of meaning are less substantially engaged with. The focus within 
much of the literature remains on the capacity of the device as a tool for communication. 
Communicative affordances have been the focus of much inquiry into the affordances 
of the mobile digital device (Ranzini and Lutz, 2017; Arminen et al., 2016; Mascheroni 
and Vincent, 2016; Schrock, 2015; Helles, 2013). Andrew Schrock (2015) contends that 
the particular affordances of the mobile digital devices, such as smartphones and 
tablets, are portability, availability, locatability and multimediality, and these afford 
unique communicative practices. His understanding of communicative affordances, 
influenced by Hutchby’s (2001) interpretation, differs from the original Gibsonian focus 
on ‘needs’ perceived in the environment. As Schrock (2015, p. 1233) explains, 
‘[c]ommunicative affordances likely do not create the goal an individual is trying to 
achieve. Rather, they enable a new way to accomplish it.’ Like Norman (2013), Hutchby 
(2001) and Schrock (2015) consider affordances as able to be learned by users, a 
departure from Gibson’s focus on affordances as an aspect of perception rather than 
interpretation.  
While there are key differences in focus between the affordance and domestication 
approaches, many analyses retain a similar conception of what constitutes the proper 
object of study in the device-user encounter and often arrive at similar conclusions. For 
example, Mascheroni and Jane Vincent (2016), adopting an affordance approach in their 
study of children and teenagers’ use of smartphones in nine European countries, argue 
that a key communicative affordance of the smartphone is a ‘perpetual contact’ in which 
the capacity for constant availability affords an ongoing interaction between young 
people and their peers. As affordances are both enabling and constraining, they contend 
that the pressures of maintaining this perpetual contact can cause anxiety for the 
smartphone users, finding that children seek other ways to ‘re-work the boundaries and 
the norms of perpetual accessibility and avoid the constraints of real-time 
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communicative exchanges’ (Mascheroni and Vincent, 2016, p. 18). Like Bertal and Ling’s 
(2014) domestication-based examination of young Danes’ SMS practices, Macheroni 
and Vincent’s (2016) retains a sense of the social as constituted by the intentional 
actions of social actors in the form of interaction, even if the particular affordances of 
the device give rise to specific arrangements of interaction. And, like Sørensen’s (2006) 
examination of the domestication of mobile phones Macheroni and Vincent’s (2016) 
exploration of affordances similarly concludes that what is needed is the development 
of new norms to manage these new social practices.  
The adoption of affordances within the sociological literature exploring technology and 
its claims to address the essentialist problems of early debates, have been met with 
considerable critique. In a response to Hutchby’s (2001) paper, Brian Rappert (2003) 
argues that Gibson’s concept and its adaptation within sociological literature obscures 
complex social processes and presents technological objects as if their meanings and 
uses were self-evident. Further, Rappert (2003) asserts that attending to what a 
technology affords closes off interrogating and interpretation, especially when there are 
multiple and contested meanings subsumed within a technological object. Similarly, 
Brian Bloomfield, Yvonne Latham and Theo Vurdubakis (2010, p. 417) argue that ‘the 
“affordances” of technological objects need to be understood in terms of the 
sociohistorically contingent folding(s) of the body and the artefactual world into one 
another.' Bloomfield et. al. (2010) conclude that re-workings of the concept 
demonstrate the need for affordances to be understood as ambiguous socio-material 
relations rather than residing in objects. Bloomfield et. al. (2010) see a more productive 
adoption of the concept in Michael’s (2000a) exploration of walking boots, which adapts 
Gibson work and draws on Ingold’s (1992) substantial extension of it, to consider the 
way that affordances are modulated by co-present humans and nonhumans. Michael 
(2000a) argues that technologies such as shoes and socks extend the affordances of the 
body through ‘cascades of affordances’, as when socks afford the easier wearing of 
boots. However, this approach has not been influential in mobile communications 
studies or in the literature on mobile digital devices, where the majority of work relies 
on Hutchby’s (2001) interpretation and Schrock’s (2015) later adaptation. 
The domestication approach and affordance theory, while both highlight important 
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aspects of the device-user relationship, ultimately preserve a narrow view of the social 
as constituted by the interaction between intentional social actors. As early scholars 
sought to locate technology either within or outside the boundary of the social, the 
debates between domestication and affordance scholars retain a concern for what 
belongs to the social and what is not impacted by social forces, because its causal 
properties lie in its materiality. Domestication approaches emphasise the micro-
sociological interactions through which meanings are ascribed to technological objects 
by social actors and here the production and interpretation of meaning are taken as the 
primary ground of the social. The affordance theory, in the form it has most commonly 
been taken up in mobile digital device scholarship, considers what capacities these 
objects afford users in a given setting. While this theory is far less concerned with 
meaning as interpretation, it nonetheless makes the interactions of subjects with 
objects central to its analysis. While the material capacities of objects constrain the 
capacity of these interactions (Hutchby, 2001), there is little positivity to the human-
device relation beyond the object’s qualities as determined by, and determining of, use.  
 
2.3 Bodily entanglements, nonhumans, and posthumans 
Whilst earlier debates focused on locating the boundary between the social and 
technical, and considering the extent to which material objects determine human 
capacities or are open to social forces, the influence of what some have termed ‘post-
cognitive’ (Frith, 2015) approaches to technology has seen a significant challenge to the 
distinction between humans and objects and organic and inorganic (Matthewman, 
2011). Post-cognitive approaches challenge the ‘intellectual division of labour that cedes 
nature, creatures and things to the natural sciences’ (Matthewman, 2011, p. 165).  Here 
I will examine the most prevalent theoretical frameworks within post-cognitive 
approaches: Actor Network Theory and posthumanism, as well as their influence within 
mobile digital device literature. These perspectives, as I will demonstrate, contribute to 
an imagining of the social beyond a humanist framework by destabilising distinctions 
between humans and nonhumans, subjects and objects. However, as I will argue, the 
gesture of extending human-status or agency to objects ultimately fails to address the 
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limitations of the existing understanding of the social. I will demonstrate the need to 
interrogate key assumptions about what constitutes the social, calling not for ‘lively 
objects’ but for an attention to the lively forces from which entities form. 
Turning first to Actor Network Theory (ANT), which sought to redress the lack of agential 
capacity afforded to nonhumans in traditional sociological literature, there is a clear shift 
from earlier constructivist approaches concerned predominantly with the meaning 
actors attach to objects. Primarily associated with the work of Bruno Latour, Michel 
Callon and John Law, Actor Network Theory has been influential within science and 
technology studies (STS) and sociology more broadly (Matthewman, 2011). Actor 
Network Theory is, Law (2009) stresses, not a theory as it does not seek to explain why 
but instead how relations assemble or do not. Law (2009, p. 141) defines ANT as: 
a disparate family of material-semiotic tools, sensibilities and methods for 
analysis that treat everything in the social and natural worlds as a 
continuously generated effect of the webs of relations within which they are 
located.  
Law (2009) argues that the term ‘material semiotics’ better captures the openness and 
relational nature of the approach, however, the term ‘Actor Network Theory’ is much 
more widely used and, as Latour (2005, p. 9) jokes, ‘so meaningless that it deserves to 
be kept’.  
As its name suggests, Actor Network Theory is motivated both by questions of agency 
and structure. Madeleine Akrich (1992) argues that ANT seeks to address the problems 
of both determinist and social constructionist accounts of technology. She suggests that 
by tracing the heterogeneous networks that technological objects participate in 
establishing, ANT solves an underlying problem technological determinism has failed to 
consider, which is how networks change as they form structures. A primary error of 
social constructionism, Akrich notes, is that it neglects to afford ‘actant’ status to 
objects. ANT corrects such an error, Akrich (1992, p. 206) argues, by contending that 
‘networks that bring together actants of all types and sizes, whether humans or 
nonhuman.’ For ANT scholars, ascribing agency to nonhuman actants, including 
technological objects, disrupts the distinction between the technological and social, and 
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allows a consideration of agency beyond human intention. 
Akrich (1992) identifies problems with those familiar vocabularies that re-establish 
distinctions between the technical and the social. Challenging the intentionality often 
afforded to the designers of technological objects, that is to say, the world inscribed in 
the object, Akrich argues that actor network theory allows a consideration also of the 
world de-scribed by the reshaping done when objects are used. Here some similarities 
can be drawn to the domestication approach in terms of adaptation, with some key 
differences in the location of agency beyond the boundary of human intentionality. 
Stronger similarities can be seen with affordances theory, and the term ‘affordance’ is 
adopted by ANT scholars Akrich and Latour (1992, p. 261) to refer to ‘what a device 
allows or forbids from the actors — humans and nonhuman — that it anticipates; it is 
the morality of a setting both negative (what it prescribes) and positive (what it 
permits)’. 
While earlier debates around technology in social life have focused on negotiating the 
boundary of the social, discerning what is and is not subject to social forces, ANT rejects 
such a distinction. Latour (1992, p. 239) critiques the tendency of sociology to see the 
‘social’ and the ‘technological’ as easily distinguishable, arguing that ‘actors at any point 
may be human or nonhuman’, and the social is no more constituted of human relations 
than the technique is constituted of nonhuman relations. Latour (1993) draws on the 
notion of hybrids operating in-between categories and dichotomies, suggesting that 
they are an inescapable byproduct of modern society. He rejects the humanist 
conceptualisation of technologies as tools manipulated by man, noting that when we 
take up a tool or technology it opens us up to a multitude of potential actions, of which 
some may be unintended.  
The shift from actors to ‘actants’ is crucial within ANT, as an actant ‘shifts action’, but 
this is distinguishable from an ‘actor’, which is endowed with ‘character’ (Akrich and 
Latour, 1992, p. 259). This definition facilitates the distribution of agency within a 
network, without requiring an actor as the locus of the agency, though it is also 
important to note that actors in ANT are not distinctly human, and can include 
nonhuman actors. Indeed, it is the practice of ‘following’ actors that is commonly 
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referred to in ANT theory as a way to attend to the innovative and collective 
transformations that arise from a specific assembling network (Latour, 2005). This is a 
claim Latour makes explicit in his (2005, p. 71) book Reassembling the Social, when he 
states that ‘anything that does modify a state of affairs by making a difference is an actor 
— or if it has no figuration yet — an actant.’ More specifically, human and nonhuman 
actors may be determining, Latour explains (2005, p. 72), in varying degrees that may 
not be readily recognisable as action in terms with which we may be familiar, but instead 
may act by constraining, permitting, authorising, inclining and affording. 
Philosopher Michel Serres’ (1995) concept of the ‘quasi-object’ offered Latour (1996) a 
way to conceptualise the hybridity of the object and subject. Quasi-objects are neither 
subject nor object but a ‘bond’ (Matthewman, 2011). Serres (1995, p. 87) emphasises 
the significance of quasi-objects for the social world as he argues that quasi-objects 
stabilise and ‘slow down’ relations between subjects. Latour (1996, p. 213) takes up the 
term to consider technologies as ‘a continuous passage’ between ‘what humans inscribe 
in it and what it prescribes to humans’. For Latour, these quasi-objects demonstrate the 
impossibility of defining the boundaries of what constitutes the ‘social’, exclusive of 
technology, and the material properties of technology, instead repositioning 
technological objects as co-constitutive of social reality. 
ANT has been highly influential in many areas of sociological research, though impact in 
the literature around mobile digital devices has been less substantial, especially 
compared with the continuing influence of domestication and affordance-focused 
approaches. However, there have been several studies adopting an actor-network 
framework as a way to attend to the agential capacities of smartphones and tablets as 
a part of the networks which constitute the user-device interaction. Goggin (2006, 
2011b) draws on ANT, arguing that smartphones, and technological objects more 
broadly, are constantly in flux: a ‘work in progress’. For Goggin (2006) the ANT concept 
of the ‘network assemblage’ provides a way of considering the complex, interconnected 
and open-ended material and social forces that constitute technological systems. He 
uses the approach to examine the growth of SMS (short message services) on mobile 
phones, using the ANT approach of tracing the connections of a network and examining 
how the different material capacities of the technology interacted with the desires, 
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interests and practices of the different social groups who adopted and modified it. 
Similarly, Neil McBride (2003) traces the global uptake of mobile communication 
technologies, conceptualising interconnected social and technical networks of fibre 
optical infrastructure, telecommunications companies, specific cultural contexts of the 
mobile phone user’s local environment and many more. 
ANT has also been adopted for more microsociological analyses of encounters with 
devices, such as Chris Chesher’s (2007) rich ethnography of the rituals of mobile phone 
use at a U2 concert, attuned to moments of rearrangement and transformation in which 
connections between human and nonhuman actors are formed, lost and reestablished. 
Chesher identifies moments before the concert begins in which the assemblage of the 
noisy environment, waiting crowd interacted with the capacity for sms-interactions, 
facilitated by the phones, as a way for audience members to fill the time. Such ANT 
inspired analyses can offer a way to examine the mobile digital device practices that is 
attentive to the intended uses inscribed into devices by designers but also how these 
are transformed and modified by users in their practices (Thompson and Cupples, 2008). 
Eric Laurier’s (2001) exploration of why people say their location (e.g. I’m on the train) 
during mobile phone conversations, also draws on ANT thinking to change the way 
action is identified in his analysis to attribute moments of rupture (like the sudden 
ringing of a phone) to the object rather than only to human actors. 
While ANT provides a way to conceptualise actions without necessarily attributing their 
origin to the intention of a human agent, it does this by essentially extending the agential 
status afforded to the human to objects and other nonhumans. Though the quasi-
objects of ANT challenge earlier debates that focused on the dominance of social or 
material forces, ultimately by only broadening the category of the actor, ANT fails to 
challenge the underlying assumptions from which human agency was afforded 
significance. As I will discuss in greater detail in Chapter 3, action does not have its origin 
in consciousness; that is to say, extending the status of actor to objects does not go far 
enough. The preindividual is not concerned with subjects and objects; whether those 
objects have agency is irrelevant. When I refer to the preindividual or presubjective, I 
speak of the forces prior to the organising of subjects and objects, and thus to the 
conditions of possibility from which these entities emerge in the encounter. Accounts 
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that seek to extend agency to objects are concerned with a notion of the social that 
remains constituted by the interactions of actual entities, and even if the distinctions 
between categories of subject and object become blurred, the ontological privilege 
afforded to the individual rather than to its individuation remains (Simondon, 2009). 
Like Actor Network Theory, posthumanism acknowledges the importance of the 
nonhuman. Yet, while ANT remains more microsociological in focus, posthumanism 
tends to be more macrosociological (Michael, 2000b). Though what constitutes 
‘posthuman’ thought is still contested, it refers broadly to work of thinkers who explored 
the intermingling of man and technologies, nonhumans and objects. Posthumanist 
thought is both a development of and reaction to humanist ideas of the rational human 
subject in light of technological progress (Hayles, 1999). Eugene Thacker (2003) 
distinguishes between two strains of posthumanism, one which he terms extropian 
posthumanism and the other critical posthumanism. The former heralds a new age of 
technological advancement that transcends the limitations of our biology, producing a 
new social order. Extropian posthumanism reaffirms the notion on the rational human 
mind, tending towards a utopian view of technological advancement and progress 
(Thacker, 2003). Critical posthumanism, on the other hand, could be seen as a reaction 
to both extropian posthumanist and humanist thinking, examining the way in which the 
boundaries of the human are constantly contested, reconfigured and, in some cases, 
demolished by the transformative connections established with the technological 
(Simon, 2003). Similarly, Cary Wolfe (2010, p. vx) distinguishes between transhumanism 
and posthumanism, with the former being associated with technological enhancement 
of human bodies which has its roots in humanism, and the latter being concerned with 
the ‘embeddedness of the human being not just in its biological but also its technological 
world.’ N. Katherine Hayles (1999) makes a distinction between earlier posthumanist 
thinking and later posthumanist thinking. Early posthumanist thinkers, she argues, were 
preoccupied with the notion of the human as informational code, thus capable, through 
technological advancement, of being transferred to a nonorganic form to attain 
immortality. Later posthumanist thinking was more critical of this disembodiment, 
instead exploring the hybrids and nonhumans that are born from man’s union with the 
technological world and the way these interact at the corporeal level. For the purpose 
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of this discussion, I will be focusing on later posthumanism, which focused on 
destabilising the boundaries between organic and inorganic, and was attentive to the 
embodied nature of beings in the world. 
Like Actor Network Theory, posthumanism sought to acknowledge the importance of 
the nonhuman. Yet, while ANT remains more microsociological in focus, posthumanism 
tends to be more macrosociological (Michael, 2000b). Though what constitutes 
‘posthuman’ thought is still contested, it refers broadly to work of thinkers who explored 
the intermingling of man and technologies, nonhumans and objects. Posthumanist 
thought is both a development of and reaction to humanist ideas of the rational human 
subject in light of technological progress (Hayles, 1999). Thacker (2003) distinguishes 
between two strains of posthumanism, one which he terms extropian posthumanism 
and the other critical posthumanism. The former heralds a new age of technological 
advancement that transcends the limitations of our biology, producing a new social 
order. Extropian posthumanism reaffirms the notion on the rational human mind, 
tending towards a utopian view of technological advancement and progress (Thacker, 
2003). Critical posthumanism, on the other hand, could be seen as a reaction to both 
extropian posthumanist and humanist thinking, examining the way in which the 
boundaries of the human are constantly contested, reconfigured and, in some cases, 
demolished by the transformative connections established with the technological 
(Simon, 2003). Similarly, Cary Wolfe (2010, p. vx) distinguishes between transhumanism 
and posthumanism, with the former being associated with technological enhancement 
of human bodies which has its roots in humanism, and the latter being concerned with 
the ‘embeddedness of the human being not just in its biological but also its technological 
world.’ Hayles (1999) makes a distinction between earlier posthumanist thinking and 
later posthumanist thinking. Early posthumanist thinkers, she argues, were preoccupied 
with the notion of the human as informational code, thus capable, through technological 
advancement, of being transferred to a nonorganic form to attain immortality. Later 
posthumanist thinking was more critical of this disembodiment, instead exploring the 
hybrids and nonhumans that are born from man’s union with the technological world 
and the way these interact at the corporeal level. For the purpose of this discussion, I 
will be focusing on later posthumanism, which focused on destabilising the boundaries 
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between organic and inorganic, and was attentive to the embodied nature of beings in 
the world. 
Like Actor Network Theory, posthumanist scholarship is concerned with troubling the 
distinction between humans and nonhumans, however it is more focused on subjectivity 
than agency. Posthumanism should not be constructed as 'rejecting' humanism, but 
would be more accurately characterised as a 'refusal to take humanism for granted' 
(Badmington, 2000, p. 10). The project of critical posthumanism is to examine the 
assumptions that reinforce the humanist subject and the Enlightenment notion of 
progress, and to shed light on the role of nonhumans, hybrids, and machines (Didur, 
2003). Central to a rethinking of humanism is a critique of the rational thinking human 
subject and the dichotomies that have been constructed around it to preserve its 
humanity (Wolfe, 2010). Prominent posthumanist scholar Donna Haraway's (1991) 
imagining of the ‘cyborg’ can be understood as an embodiment of the posthuman 
challenge to the human subject. Characterised by hybridity, fluidity and indeterminacy, 
the cyborg transgresses the boundaries between human and nonhuman, organic and 
machine, nature and culture, and mind and body, which humanism had sought to 
defend (Prins, 1995). Hayles (1999, p. 3) describes the posthuman subject as ‘an 
amalgam, a collection of heterogeneous components, a material-informational entity 
whose boundaries undergo continuous construction and reconstruction.’ This 
represents a significant rethinking of the rational humanist subject based on clear 
distinctions and dichotomies, fixed rather than fluid and firmly established as the centre 
of life. As such, posthumanism approaches relations with nonhumans with this 
posthuman subject in mind, allowing for connections that would not otherwise have 
been considered. 
Like Actor Network Theory, posthumanism approaches objects with a view to 
acknowledging their transformative capacities. Posthumanism is interested in not only 
the material effects of objects on other objects and bodies but the very fleshy openness 
of bodies, both organic and inorganic (Haraway, 2008). In this sense posthumanism 
departs from ANT’s focus on tracing actors and actants, and on the question of agency. 
In particular, the influence of phenomenological and postphenomenological literature 
on Haraway’s work sees a greater engagement with the body and embodiment. 
67 
Influenced by Maurice Merleau-Ponty and later Don Idhe, Haraway (2008, p. 249) 
posited technologies as organs that played an active role in ‘infoldings of the flesh’, 
ongoing embodiment in the world which was always historically and culturally situated. 
In this sense Haraway conceptualised technologies not as mediators of social life but as 
embedded in and inseparable from the environment they inhabit (Matthewman, 2011). 
Technological objects, from a posthuman perspective, are never fixed as singular 
objects, as they are always altered by and altering the environment they are embedded 
in. As Haraway (2008, p. 250) explains: 
technologies are always compound. They are composed of diverse agents of 
interpretation, agents of recording, and agents for directing and multiplying 
relational action. These agents can be human beings or parts of human 
beings, other organisms in part or whole, machines of many kinds, or other 
sorts of entrained things made to work in the technological compound of 
conjoined forces. 
The posthuman project, and Haraway’s in particular, is focused on a challenge to the 
bodily boundaries of the subject, such that technologies through their ‘infoldings of the 
flesh’ transgress these boundaries, whilst at the same time drawing out the ‘fleshiness’ 
of machines. 
Posthumanist approaches in mobile phone and mobile digital device literature offer a 
way of examining device practices beyond the object as a mediator and instead consider 
what new forms of subjectivity might be made possible through its transformations. 
Some approaches tend to adopt Haraway’s concept of the cyborg as a way to 
conceptualise the transformation of human capacities but ultimately retain humanist 
frameworks in which human actors are agents. For example, in their examination of 
mobile phones on trains in Japan, Daisuke Okabe and Mizuko Ito (2005) argue that 
mobile phones and their user constitute ‘cyborg-couplings’ in which new forms of 
sociality and norms must arise from their altered capacities, including new sounds which 
impact the space (see also Shingo, 2005). Okabe and Ito (2005) use the concept to refer 
to the close entanglement of the device with its user, however, in concluding that the 
outcome of this intimacy is eventually stability in new norms, such an analysis ultimately 
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does not destabilise the subjectivity of the user. Others have drawn on posthumanist 
thought as a way to make sense of our increasingly close connections with technology. 
Turkle’s (2007a) work on ‘evocative objects’ also draws on Haraway’s cyborg to explore 
the intimate connections formed with everyday objects, including mobile digital devices. 
Turkle (2007b) explores the way that objects like laptops or Blackberrys come into 
‘intimate couplings’ with their users, beyond prosthetic to a point where distinction 
between the boundaries of the two bodies is arbitrary. This profound entanglement and 
intimacy, Turkle (2011) argues, can become problematic when it becomes an easy and 
controllable substitute for human contact. In contrast, Judy Ehrentraut (2015) argues 
that viewing “real” world connections as purer, while seeing mediated ones as 
“disconnected”, is precisely what calls for a posthuman approach. Humans and 
machines, she reminds us, have always been entangled. Ehrentraut (2015) argues that 
the smartphone-body encounter creates a hybrid space which draws in both the physical 
and digital, one that is no less real and embodied. 
Beyond explorations into cyborg couplings, the influence of posthuman scholarship in 
mobile device literature can also be seen in the renewed interest in phenomenological 
and postphenomenological theory. These analyses focus on the corporeal dimensions 
of the device-user relationship, demonstrating a significant shift in focus from much of 
the literature on mobile digital device, which is concerned with mediated social 
relationships between actors. Ingrid Richardson’s (2005, 2007) work has been most 
influential in establishing this approach. Drawing primarily on Ihde and Merleau-Ponty, 
Richardson (2005) argues for attention to be paid to the corporeal intimacy with the 
mobile handset, focusing on what she terms the ‘technosomatic relation’ between the 
hand and the mobile phone. This relation is constituted by ‘tactile and kinaesthetic 
familiarity’ (Richardson, 2005, p. para 21), to the extent that the device becomes 
incorporated into the body as a part of the hand. Richardson’s (2005) phenomenological 
approach argues that the human-technology relation, in this case the mobile digital 
device becoming part of the hand, produces ways of knowing and being in the world. A 
transformation in attention and inattention arises from this technosomatic relation with 
the device in which attention is distributed between actual and telepresent space 
(Richardson, 2010). Like posthumanist scholars, Richardson (2007) emphasises that 
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experiences with mobile devices, though they connect us to digital spaces, are not 
disembodied but rather made possible by particular bodily arrangements and co-exist 
with actual embodied space. 
The role of bodily habits raised by Richardson is explored further by Shaun Moores 
(2014) who explores the manual actions of fingers on touch screens and the way users 
become habituated to their devices. Adopting David Sudnow’s (2001) notion of ‘ways of 
the hand’, which refers to the ways in which habitual practices become embodied in 
movements of the hands, and Merleau Ponty’s (2012) account of playing an organ, 
Moores (2014, p. 196) argues for attention to be paid to the ‘doubly digital’ quality of 
the mobile digital devices as an achievement of an intimate connection between fingers 
and screen. Moores (2014, p. 203) argues for a ‘non-media-centric’ approach to mobile 
devices, which moves beyond understanding devices only as mediators of media and 
instead is attentive to the ways that we dwell with them. Both Moores and Richardson 
demonstrate a shift away from the dominant focus in mobile digital device literature, 
which has predominantly seen the realm of the social, as it pertains to the device, as 
being constituted only in human-to-human interaction. 
Posthuman and phenomenological approaches to the question of technology, and the 
mobile digital device more specifically, are attentive to the fluidity of bodily boundaries. 
From Haraway’s (1991) concept of the cyborg to Richardson’s (2005) notion of the 
‘technosomatic relation’, these approaches emphasise the openness of bodies to other 
bodies, including nonhuman ones. While Actor Network Theory is more focused on the 
question of agency as it pertains to objects, posthuman approaches seek to more 
explicitly destabilise the categories of subject and object, organic and inorganic, human 
and nonhuman. When it comes to the question of technology, the boundary between 
the social and the material cannot be sustained as such a binary is challenged by a 
posthuman analysis. However, the focus of posthuman analysis remains on the 
interactions of actual entities. By this I mean that posthuman scholarship challenges 
distinctions between subjects and objects, users and their device, demonstrating the 
porous nature of these boundaries, but ultimately such an analysis does not extend what 
constitutes the social to include the virtual forces prior to, and subsisting within, the 
actualisation of these entities. As Simondon (2009) contends, starting with already 
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constituted individuals, whether human or nonhuman, invariably involves a reduction 
of the preindividual forces from which they individuated, which inhere in any 
individuation and push them forward toward new individuations. Posthuman analysis, 
though challenging the distinction between subjects and objects, remains focused on 
actualised individuals, and thus with the nature of being, rather than with becoming. 
Posthuman and phenomenological approaches to the mobile digital device remain 
concerned with reframing our interactions with the device to draw attention to cyborg 
or hybrid identities, however, such analysis does not challenge the underlying 
assumptions that privilege the actual rather than the virtual and differential forces that 
give rise to it and future individuations. 
In this chapter, I have traced some of the key shifts in sociology’s conceptualisation of 
technology and how these have influenced mobile device literature. At the heart of this 
narrative has been the question of what constitutes the social. Technological 
determinists and social constructivists negotiate the extent to which objects are part of 
the social world, and therefore subject to social forces. For staunch constructivists like 
Grint and Woolgar (1997), technological objects are the outcome of social practices of 
interpretation and meaning making, possessing none of their own inherent qualities. In 
contrast, for technological determinists like McLuhan (2001), it is the characteristics of 
technologies that give rise to social practices and structures. Later scholarship 
attempted reconcile these positions by seeking to more precisely identify the complex 
social and material forces that contribute to socio-technical arrangements. 
Domestication theory focuses on examining the everyday practices and negotiations 
involved in the adoption and adaption of new technologies, with an interest in the way 
that the object becomes imbued with meaning and emotion (Ling, 2004). In contrast, 
the affordances approach is concerned with the specific capacities that the technological 
object renders possible for the actor and the perceptible physical aspects of the object 
that afford these capacities (Hutchby, 2001). Both approaches seek to identify aspects 
of our daily practices with technologies that involve both the material capacities of the 
object and the socially embedded meanings through which these are interpreted and 
constructed. 
As I have argued, such analyses, despite their significant differences, arrive at similar 
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conclusions about the mobile digital device. Their analyses identify a need for the 
development of norms to regulate socially disruptive behaviour facilitated by the 
different capacities of the mobile digital device (Mascheroni and Vincent, 2016; Ling, 
2004, 2012; Ling and McEwen, 2010; Sørensen, 2006). These accounts consider the 
social to be constituted by the interactions of subjects and objects, from which meaning 
is generated, and norms and values emerge. Given the significant shift in the way that 
mobile digital devices are used, cultivating in the user an inclination for the device such 
that a ring or alert is not needed to draw their attention (Deloitte, 2015), these analyses 
offer limited insight. Reducing these inclinations to a question of adjustment to new 
norms, certainly does little to attend to the transformations taking place here. 
Actor network theory and posthumanism offer another significant shift in thinking about 
technology, challenging the distinction between subjects and objects, humans and 
nonhumans. These approaches reject these categories in favour of shifting hybrids, 
loosely assembled in ever-changing networks. Whether it be the hybrid of the sms-
device-user-concert-crowd-assemblage at a U2 concert (Chesher, 2007) or the hybrid 
hand-mobile-device embedded in intimate habitual relations (Richardson, 2005). Actor 
Network Theory argues that the role of agential social actor should be extended to 
objects and other nonhuman forces. However, as I have outlined, extending human-like-
status to objects not only fails to challenge the underlying logics that deny objects 
proper consideration but ultimately continues to support an understanding of action as 
originating from an ‘actor’ or, in the case of ANT, an ‘actant’. As I will go on to discuss in 
the next chapter, it is this understanding of action as originating in an actor that mistakes 
the effect of action as it is felt as the cause. If we return to some of the key anxieties 
around the rise of smartphones and other mobile digital devices posed in the first 
chapter of this thesis, it becomes clear that extending human status to the nonhuman 
offers limited insight into the new forms of sociality in mobile digital device culture. 
Anxieties about intimacy between devices and humans, in which devices become 
entangled with nonconscious inclinations, may become recuperated into familiar terms 
of subject-to-subject intimate connections rather than offer insight into the generative 
and novel forms of intimacy being formed. Objects reanimated with subject status 
become anthropomorphised and are capable of fulfilling the appropriate position as 
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subjects capable of intimacy. 
Posthumanist scholarship, much less concerned with the question of agency, has 
emphasised the fluidity of bodily boundaries. Haraway’s concept of the cyborg has 
resonated with mobile digital device scholars as it captures the intermingling of 
technologies and bodies, the co-constitution of hybrid subjectivities that are neither 
organic nor inorganic. As scholars like Richardson (2007) and Moores (2014) argue, the 
mobile digital device becomes incorporated into the body through habitual use and 
familiarity, and as such rejects any distinction between the technological and the social. 
However, as I have discussed, these analyses destabilise distinctions between subjects 
and objects, technologies and humans, but fail to challenge the underlying assumptions 
that attempt to impose this stability in the first instance. The ontological privilege 
afforded to the individual, rather than to the conditions of its individuation, cannot be 
contested only by interrogating the boundaries of subjects. I argue that it must be with 
the conditions prior to the formations of subjects and objects that such analysis is 
concerned. 
In this thesis, I argue for a focus not on subjects, objects or hybrid entities but on the 
preindividual conditions and forces through which these entities form and new 
individuations become possible. In doing so, I propose three shifts in relation to how 
mobile digital devices are theorised, which the next chapter will explore in greater detail, 
which respond to the problems I have highlighted within existing mobile digital device 
literature and sociological approaches to technology more broadly. As I will go on to 
discuss, existing debates in sociology about the mobile digital device, and indeed 
technology more broadly, are based on a very specific notion of the social, one that is 
constituted by the actions and interactions of subjects. Yet, increasingly our intimate 
connection with mobile digital device, reaching for the device before the thought has 
occurred, is not one that belongs to the subject who reaches. These encounters cannot 
be made sense of as moments of ‘discomfort’ as new norms must be formed, but rather 
this constitutes an emerging form of intimacy, that I have termed ‘impersonal intimacy’. 
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Chapter 3:  Intervention 
‘And how often would you say you’re checking it throughout a normal day?’ I ask, though 
I immediately wished I had phrased the question differently. I know I would never be able 
to add up the number of times I checked my own device. 
‘Ummm… pretty often. Like if I have class… and the teacher’s not there then I’ll check it. 
And I’ll check it after class.’ She pauses and considers her answer. Then adds. ‘So now 
that I think about it… probably too much. Too frequently.’ 
I wait for a moment. ‘You think it is too much?’ I ask. 
‘Ummm… I think it’s a bit scary,’ she replies, ‘like, if I get to class and I’m just standing 
there on my own I can’t… not get my phone out. Like it just feels weird to stand there 
without… ’ She pauses, searching for an explanation. ‘I dunno… it’s strange.’ 
Only a few minutes earlier, while waiting for her to arrive for the interview, standing in 
front of the building as people walked past, I too had reached for my device because it 
felt too strange to just stand there. 
Our relations with mobile digital devices are constituted by an intimacy that cannot be 
understood within familiar sociological organising concepts. It cannot be understood 
within the macrosociological logic of social constructionists, as the product of systems 
of subjective meaning and interpretation. Such an analysis fails to grasp new intimacies 
that do not originate from a conscious individual subject, but instead manifest in the 
habitual and precognitive. Contemporary sociological considerations of technology have 
sought to respond to earlier debates by take the capacities of objects seriously, whilst 
locating these objects within the social world and open to social forces. However, as I 
have argued in the previous chapter, extending agency and ‘human-like’ status to 
objects addresses a false problem, just as technological determinists and social 
constructionists did in seeking to locate where the technological object sits in relation 
to the boundary of the social. 
What must be challenged is not only the boundary between the subject and the object, 
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but the notion that it is subjects and objects themselves that constitute the stuff of social 
reality. Thinkers that have attempted to resist binary opposition between subject and 
object have considered the openness and hybridity of bodies in relation to technological 
objects (Moores, 2014; Latour, 2005; Richardson, 2005; Akrich and Latour, 1992; 
Haraway, 1991). These analyses extend agential capacity to objects and conceptualise 
our entanglement with them as productive of new forms of subjectivity. However, if we 
take subjects and objects or hybrids as the cause of action in the world, and posit this as 
the stage of social life which sociology ought to attend, we remain tied to the question 
of agency as located within an agent, even if that agent is no longer strictly human or 
even strictly an object. This limits our capacity to understand contemporary digital 
sociality and indeed contemporary society more broadly, which is increasingly 
constituted by uncertainty, ambiguity and the unexpected modulations of a material 
world, which is always more than a human centred perspective can grasp (Clough, 2000). 
I argue that what constitutes the social must be broadened such that the analysis of an 
encounter with a mobile digital device does not presume a pre-existing subject that 
encounters it, but is attentive to the bodily and environmental forces that pre-exist the 
subject. 
This chapter will explore the key theoretical shifts this thesis proposes, in order to 
explore the new forms of intimacy made possible with mobile digital devices. I propose 
three shifts in thinking around the mobile digital device that are crucial to moving 
beyond concerns about alienation, distraction and addiction. Firstly, I argue that the 
habitual repetitions of daily mobile digital device use be understood as generative of 
new capacities, rather than as mechanical actions that return the same action. Here I 
turn to Deleuze (1994, p. 201) and his work on repetition, in which he proposes ‘clothed 
repetition’ as productive of difference rather than sameness. Building on Deleuze’s 
notion of repetition, I draw on Ravaisson’s (2008) understanding of habit as constituted 
both by a dynamic capacity for change and a tendency towards permanence, to unpack 
an understanding of habitual relations as not merely mechanical acts which return the 
same movement but as productive of new capacities. This shift in thinking about habits 
provides fresh insight into the character of everyday habitual encounters with mobile 
digital devices such as smartphones and tablets, and allows a consideration of the 
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dynamic potential of these habits in giving rise to new capacities. 
The second shift relates to the origin of action in the body, wherein I take up Deleuze’s 
(1988) reading of Spinoza, which rejects the primacy traditionally given to consciousness 
as the cause that wills the body into action. Consciousness, according to Spinoza, is the 
awareness of a change in potential, not the cause of this change (Deleuze, 1988, p. 21). 
Action, then, is not the outcome of a conscious decision, but the outcome of forces that 
act upon a body, arising from its milieu. What we perceive consciously is always a 
reduction of these forces. This rethinking of consciousness and action offers a new 
engagement with the issues of attention and distraction, which have emerged as central 
within the literature on mobile digital devices. As I will explore further later in this 
chapter, moving away from a model of action preoccupied with conscious intention and 
awareness allows a consideration of complex microperceptions and inclinations, which 
are barely perceptible but nonetheless play an important role in the unfolding of action. 
Such an approach can offer insight into those encounters with mobile digital devices 
that more cognitive-focused approaches have failed to apprehend or have rendered in 
merely negative terms.   
The third shift I propose is from a focus on the personal and individual to the impersonal 
and preindividual. By this I refer to a shift in thinking that attends to the relations in 
which subjects and objects emerge, rather than staying at the level of the conscious 
interpretations of subjects. This approach is taken up by many scholars associated with 
the affective turn as a way of reframing debates that have thus far been dominated by 
constructivist and intentional accounts of social action. As geographer Nigel Thrift (2008, 
p. 7) puts it, this approach ‘is resolutely anti-biographical and pre-individual. It trades in 
modes of perception which are not subject based’. It is important to note, as Massumi 
(2002, p. 9) does, that the preindividual does not refer to the presocial. This is especially 
important in seeking to distinguish this approach here from earlier arguments made by 
technological constructionists about the objective qualities of objects existing outside 
the social realm. Rather, the preindividual is a ‘sociality without determinate borders’ 
and exists prior to the separation of individuals from the collective (Massumi, 2002, p. 
9). Thus, this shift in thinking is a reordering which rejects the acting subject as a starting 
point, instead attending to the relations prior to the formation of subjects. If subjects, 
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objects and their interaction are taken as the grounds of the social, there is no scope for 
attending to the forces prior to the formation of these entities and the ways in which 
their potentiality persists within the domain of the actual. To merely challenge the 
boundaries between entities does not in itself alter the constitution of the social. 
Attention to the presubjective is crucial in order to move beyond more humanist 
inspired questions of agency and the reductive imagining of action with which they are 
often associated. The thesis contends, then, that considering the potentiality of 
preindividual forces is crucial to an understanding of those emerging social realities that 
human-centred and moral frameworks, with their focus on the moral exercise of human 
will, fail to adequately apprehend. This chapter will explore how new understandings of 
the will can inform analyses of the unfolding of social life beyond the anthropocentric 
lens. 
 
3.1 Habits as asymmetrical repetitions 
The image of a figure hunched over a brightly lit screen, its finger methodically flicking 
across it from top to bottom, is an image often evoked to illustrate the ‘mindless’ nature 
of our engagement with mobile digital devices. The repetitious and habitual reach for 
the device, an inclination beneath conscious awareness, is at the centre of these 
concerns. For Turkle (2015), our habitual and increasingly intimate relations with mobile 
digital devices go hand in hand with the more widespread mechanisation of human 
interaction. She argues that as ‘we treat machines as if they were almost human, we 
develop habits that have us treating human beings as almost-machines’ (Turkle, 2015, 
p. 345). Similarly, Rosen (2012, p. 5) argues that the repetitive actions associated with 
mobile digital devices ‘make us appear out of control’. Rosen’s critique makes a strong 
connection between morality and free will, as he situates control and consciousness 
clearly in the realm of the virtuous, whilst considering repetition and action outside of 
consciousness as a loss of control. He argues that the ‘technologies that we use daily 
coerce us to act in ways that may be detrimental to our well-being’ (Rosen, 2012, p. 5). 
As I have explored in Chapter 2, though much of the focus of academic discourse on 
mobile digital devices has been on their role in facilitating human interaction, there has 
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been some attention paid to the habitual dimensions of mobile device practices 
(Moores, 2014; Richardson, 2005, 2007). In examining the habitual dimensions of mobile 
digital device encounters, I seek to contribute to this literature, however I do so through 
the work of Deleuze and Ravaisson, rather than through the phenomenological 
approach that has been most influential in existing literature, for reasons that will 
become clear throughout the thesis. 
Underlying anxiety about our habits with devices are two intimately connected 
assumptions about habitual actions. Firstly, that nonconscious interactions are 
inherently problematic as they are not subject to conscious deliberation, and secondly, 
that repetition is purely mechanical and devoid of creativity. In this first section of this 
chapter I will challenge these two assumptions before proposing an understanding of 
repetitions and habits as open to creative change. I argue that a generative 
understanding of habit enables us to consider the ways that mobile digital devices 
become embedded in the daily routines of users and the transformations that this 
relationship might elicit.  
Contemporary understandings of habit remain influenced by an understanding of the 
subject as active only through conscious contemplation. Within philosophy and social 
theory, habit has conventionally been associated with a loss of free will and 
consciousness (Grosz, 2013). Habit has been denigrated as ‘(p)ure mechanism, routine 
process, devitalization of sense,’ and as ‘the disease of repetition that threatens the 
freshness of thought’ (Malabou, 2008, p. vii). Catherine Malabou (2008, p. vii) argues 
that such a notion of habit is derived from the philosophy of Descartes, and that it 
sharply distinguishes repetition, and the habitual, from the acting subject. If 
consciousness is the realm of the subject, then habit comes to signify the loss of 
conscious awareness and thus the loss of subjectivity. Habit, then, has been seen as 
antithetical to the notion of ‘critical reflection’, held sacred in philosophy and social 
theory (Carlisle and Sinclair, 2008). Philosopher Immanuel Kant (1991, pp. 207–208) 
described habit as ‘a uniformity in action that has become a necessity through 
repetition, it is not one that proceeds from freedom, and therefore not a moral 
aptitude.’ Habits, for Kant, cannot be moral because they are not freely engaged as a 
consequence of thought but arise from mechanism (1991, p. 480). Inner freedom, being 
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of primary importance for Kant (1991, p. 208), requires ‘ruling oneself’ and habits 
demonstrate the opposite of this principle. Kant thus makes a clear connection between 
conscious deliberation and morality, whilst characterising habits as morally 
questionable. 
Within sociology, habit and, by extension, repetition, remain largely characterised in 
terms of uncreative reflexes, capable only of reproducing what a subject initially 
consciously willed. Habits are conceptualised as an effect of external processes, whether 
that be a conscious decision of the individual, or the influence of social structures. One 
of the most widely influential understandings of habit comes from French sociologist, 
Pierre Bourdieu’s, concept of ‘habitus’. Bourdieu (1990) used the concept of habitus to 
better understand how external social structures were manifest in individuals through 
the repetition of practices over time. Habitus refers to the bodily manifestation of class 
structures in the form of tastes, thoughts or actions. As Bourdieu (1990, p. 54) explains: 
the habitus, a product of history, produces individual and collective 
practices – more history – in accordance with the schemes generated by 
history. It ensures the active presence of past experience, which, 
deposited in each organism in the form of schemes of perception, 
thought and action.  
Bourdieu sees the concept of habitus as way to resolve the ongoing debate within 
sociological discourse between structure and agency (Navarro, 2006). He stresses that 
habitual practices are not wholly individually willed or socially determined, but arise in 
a kind of ‘conditional freedom’ in the sense that the ‘limits are set by the historically and 
socially situated conditions’ in which a habit is produced (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 55). Here 
again habit designates those practices that do not invite reflection and are taken-for-
granted. Such a perspective is supported by Anthony Giddens (1979), who asserts that 
‘habits’ and ‘conventions’ are analogous. He contends that habits, or routine actions, 
though they arise from the repetition of action which may initially be subject to ‘reflexive 
attention’, ‘are latently accepted by the parties to that interaction’ (Giddens, 1979, p. 
218). Habits are, seen from this perspective, inherently open to manipulation because 
they operate beyond conscious interpretation and reflexive evaluation.  
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Perhaps it is not surprising, given that the underlying impetus of sociological enquiry is 
to question the taken-for-granted (Bauman and May, 2001), that sociology maintains a 
degree of suspicion toward those forms of social action that bypass conscious 
contemplation. Certainly, this understanding of habit as the loss of conscious control has 
been highly influential in contemporary discourse on technological change, and this has 
been the case at least as much in psychology as in sociology. A systematic review of 
smartphone addiction literature by Jon D. Elhai et al. (2017) found that the dominant 
measurements of smartphone addiction are the Mobile Phone Involvement 
Questionnaire developed by Walsh et al. (2010), Smartphone Addiction Scale developed 
by Min Kwon et al. (2013) and the Mobile Phone Problematic Use Scale developed by 
Adriana Bianchi and James G. Phillips (2005). Loss of control over smartphone use was 
a key factor for determining when smartphone use becomes addictive and pathological 
in all these scales. It is their operation beneath conscious awareness in the form of a 
habitual reach that sees mobile digital devices identified as socially disruptive, from a 
microsociological perspective, or potentially pathological, from a psychological 
perspective. As I have argued, central to critiques of the increasing digitisation of the 
human is a notion of the human being as a being uniquely capable of conscious 
awareness. It is consciousness that distinguishes the human being from the machine, 
just as it is consciousness that ensures our moral responsibility. The assumption here is 
that it is through conscious deliberation that we ensure that we make rational and moral 
decisions. This assumption can be seen in the way that individuals conceptualise their 
own behaviour, as I will explore in greater detail later in the thesis. 
The process of habituation is also strongly associated in the literature with the notion of 
addiction. The American Journal of Psychology defines habit as ‘a more or less fixed way 
of thinking, willing or feeling acquired through previous repetition of mental experience 
(Andrews, 1903).’ Habits are not seen as negative, in and of themselves, but are believed 
to be closely connected to addiction, as demonstrated in Rosen’s (2012, p. 94) analysis 
of the rise of the ‘iDisorder’, in which he argues that ‘technology addiction presents the 
problem of habituation or tolerance.’ Such habituation involves diminished sensation 
associated with the action over time, resulting in a compulsive need for the action. The 
language of increased ‘tolerance’ through habituation is drawn directly from traditional 
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addiction discourse associated with substance abuse, which forms the foundation for 
much of the literature on mobile digital device addiction (Bian and Leung, 2015; Vacaru 
et al., 2014; Y. K. Lee et al., 2014; Walsh et al., 2008). Such discourse characteristically 
distinguishes between good habits, which are healthy and productive, and bad habits, 
which are seen as unhealthy, even pathological. The evaluation of these habits is 
established on the basis of their relationship to face-to-face, human-to-human 
interaction, and thus is founded on a hierarchy of attention, which must always 
subordinate machines and objects to human beings. For example, in their study of 
mobile phone addiction amongst youth, Vacaru et al. (2014, p. 581) drew on 
participants’ self-identification as addicts to determine that addiction, or ‘bad habits’, 
occur when individuals allow ‘their usage of mobile phone technology for 
communication purposes to escalate to such levels that it interferes with real-life social 
interaction.’ Such conclusions clearly rest on the prioritisation of face-to-face sociability 
and establish a firm demarcation between the conscious evaluations through which one 
would chose the most sociable form of interaction and habitual action, which 
demonstrates a failure to perform such an evaluation. 
The habitual dimensions of smartphone use, even beyond their explicit association with 
addiction, have been defined by their lack of conscious awareness and associated with 
deviant behaviour. For example, social psychologists interested in habitual relations 
with mobile digital devices beyond diagnoses of addiction have turned to the concept 
of ‘automaticity’ to examine habitual smartphone use and actions. The term has been 
used to refer to those automatically undertaken social-cognitive processes that require 
no effort and are unintentional (Bargh, 1989). Bayer et al (2016) argue that these 
automatic smartphone habits arise from the internalisation of social norms of 
connectedness, as well as cognitive cues that trigger a practice such as checking. Bayer 
et al. (2016) acknowledge the central role that non-intentional actions play in everyday 
life, but while they are less pessimistic in general about automatic actions they retain a 
sense of habitual action as merely a repetition of an originally conscious action. They 
also retain a sense of the nonconscious as beyond the moral evaluation of 
consciousness, noting that automatic actions are performed without the opportunity for 
the user to be critical of them (Bayer, Campbell, et al., 2016). Automaticity is also used 
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to explain dangerous smartphone use, such as texting while driving (Panek et al., 2015; 
Bayer and Campbell, 2012), thus firmly associating habitual actions beneath conscious 
awareness with irrationality and irresponsibility. 
Dominant psychological and sociological approaches use the concept of habit to explain 
the stability of behaviour over time, but what underlies these evaluations is a notion of 
habits as determined in their nature by their origin in a conscious act. In essence, what 
a habit can do, in such analyses, is to repeat a once conscious bodily movement over 
and over until it is no longer conscious. A habit may improve the ease of the action, but 
nonetheless marks a repetition defined within the order of the same. What is absent 
from such explorations of habit is a consideration of the generative capacity of 
repetition, not as a process in which a conscious act transitions to a nonconscious act, 
but as a creative opening up, which does not rise to the level of conscious awareness. 
How might the evaluation of habit change if it is no longer understood as determined by 
an origin in a willed action that becomes mechanical, but instead considered as a 
preindividual process that is generative of new capacities?  
In asking such a question, I point towards a Deleuzian understanding of habit as a ‘living 
present’ (Deleuze, 1994, p. 94), with an eye to considering bodily habits beyond that 
pattern of thinking that starts with the action of a conscious subject and proceeds from 
there and in so doing denies habits their own generative potential. I follow Deleuze 
(1994) in critiquing an understanding of repetition as the return of the same, instead 
arguing that repetition is productive and attributing it a central role in the genesis of life. 
Deleuze proposes an ontology of difference, rather than one of identity, recognition and 
representation and, in this way, he seeks to attend to the ongoing shifting capacities 
that constitute life and beings. He argues that thought has tended to follow a 
representational model that seeks to find similarity and sameness through symbols and 
meaning. Using this model, we ‘recognize’ things in their actuality and our knowledge of 
them as objects rests on a sense of their fixity and identity (Williams, 2003, p. 12). 
Deleuze argues that this approach fails to account for degrees of difference and instead 
makes a case for attending to the proliferation of minute differences, which are seen to 
constitute the constant becoming of life. It is through repetition, he argues, that we can 
see this proliferation. 
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Repetition, as I seek to define it after Deleuze, is a dynamic process that amplifies minute 
differences to produce new capacities. It is productive here to turn to Deleuze’s (1994) 
distinction between two types of repetition: bare (or material) repetition and clothed 
repetition. Bare repetition is understood in a negative sense as the repetition that a 
representational model of thought comprehends (1994, p. 186); repetition here is 
superficial and identical. Bare repetition is the repetition that we observe as mechanical 
and as a return of the same, and is associated with recognition and similarity. Clothed 
repetition, on the other hand, is the repetition of difference and asymmetry. However, 
as Deleuze (1994, p. 84) explains, the point is not that there are forms of repetition that 
are generative and others that are not, but rather that our perception of bare repetition 
is only a partial and contracted effect of a more primary differential and virtual 
operation: 
One is bare, the other clothed; one is repetition of parts, the other of the 
whole; one involves succession, the other coexistence; one is actual, the 
other virtual; one is horizontal, the other vertical. The present is always 
contracted difference, but in one case it contracts indifferent instants; in the 
other case, by passing to the limit, it contracts a differential level of the whole 
which is itself a matter of relaxation and contraction. In consequence, the 
difference between presents themselves is that between the two 
repetitions: that of the elementary instants from which difference is 
subtracted, and that of the levels of the whole in which difference is 
included. And following the Bergsonian hypothesis, the bare repetition must 
be understood as the external envelope of the clothed. 
Clothed repetition – hidden from ordinary perception precisely because of its as yet 
unactualised nature – that operates prior to conscious awareness, while forming the 
conditions of emergence from which bare repetitions are constituted. We only see the 
return of the same, not the dynamic selection of difference that produces an effect, yet 
the bare repetition is made possible only as an effect of clothed repetition. 
To understand the significance of Deleuze’s (1994) reconceptualisation of repetition as 
constituted by both virtual and actual repetition, it is important to consider how time is 
84 
rethought here. Deleuze takes up the work of Bergson, who argued that the way that 
time has been understood – as something that can be quantified and divided into 
segments – constitutes a fundamental misunderstanding of time itself. Time, Bergson 
(2001) argues, is conventionally mistaken for space. In suggesting that time is mistaken 
for space, Bergson (2001) refers to the way in which time is thought of as successive 
moments, distinct intervals that are identical but differentiated by their position in time. 
When time is understood this way, each moment can only be singular, succeeded by the 
next. On the question of the influence of Kantian thought on this historical apprehension 
of time in terms of space, Bergson (2001, p. 232) writes that: 
Kant’s great mistake was to take time as a homogenous medium. He did not 
notice that real duration is made up of moments inside one another, and 
that when it seems to assume the form of a homogenous whole, it is because 
it gets expressed in space. 
The mistaking of time itself for time as expressed in space is, Bergson (2001) contends, 
a fundamental error, insofar as it confuses the representation of time with time itself.  
For his part, Bergson distinguishes between time understood as measurable units and 
time as true duration. He does this by firstly establishing that there are two types of 
multiplicities: one quantitative and the other qualitative (Bergson, 2001). Quantitative 
multiplicities pertain to material objects that can be quantified and represented by a 
number. Bergson (2001, p. 77) gives the example of counting the number of sheep that 
appear identical in a flock. The sheep can only be differentiated by their occupying 
different locations in space, otherwise they could not be identified by number, as they 
would occupy the same space and therefore the number of sheep would be 
indistinguishable. Qualitative multiplicities, in contrast, cannot be represented by a 
number and are heterogeneous (Bergson, 2001). These multiplicities cannot be grasped 
by reference to organisation in space but rather by their duration. Deleuze (1991, pp. 
31–32) offers an example of the difference between time as a quantitative multiplicity 
and duration as a qualitative multiplicity: 
Take a lump of sugar: It has a spatial configuration. But if we approach it from 
that angle, all we will ever grasp are difference in degree between that sugar 
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and any other thing. But it also has a duration, a rhythm of duration, a way 
of being in time that is at least partially revealed in the process of its 
dissolving, and that shows how this sugar differs in kind not only from other 
things, but first and foremost from itself. This alteration, which is one with 
the essence or the substance of a thing is what we grasp when we conceive 
of it in terms of Duration. 
Deleuze (1991) emphasises that a quantitative multiplicity will allow only differences in 
degree to be discerned, rather than differences in kind. These differences in kind, 
difference shifting within the substance of the thing itself, is the difference which 
clothed repetition repeats. 
Clothed repetition, Deleuze (1994) contends, involves the repetition of a difference in 
kind and can only be grasped if time is understood, as Bergson argues, as multiple and 
heterogeneous. Crucially, Bergson’s understanding of time as duration radically alters 
the relations of past, present and future, which are of central importance to 
understanding the generative capacity of repetition. As Deleuze (1994, p. 286) explains, 
within the present moment there exists ‘the entire past at every moment but at diverse 
degrees and levels, of which the present is only the most contracted, the most 
concentrated’. In understanding the past as enfolded in the present and rejecting the 
understanding of time as incremental, Bergson and Deleuze propose a kind of layering 
that opens up difference between repetitions and generates creative moments in this 
difference. This layering takes the form of memories, which Bergson (1991, p. 33) does 
not consider as consciously ‘recalled’, but rather as part of perception itself: 
In fact, there is no perception which is not full of memories. With the 
immediate and present data of our senses, we mingle a thousand details out 
of our past experience. In most cases these memories supplant our actual 
perceptions, of which we retain only a few hints, thus using them merely as 
“signs” that recall us to former images.  
Bergson thus gives memory a new philosophical status as it is through memory that the 
past coexists with itself as present (Deleuze, 2004, p. 30).  
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I am tracing, through Deleuze’s reading of Bergson and through Bergson’s own thought, 
the production of an ontology in which the repetitious nature of habit signals, not the 
reiteration of a single action as determined by consciousness, but the productivity of 
repetition itself, within a temporality that is never reducible to the spatialised succession 
of instants that the intellect characteristically apprehends. With respect to the question 
of memory, it is significant that memory does not indicate the conscious act of cognitive 
recall for Bergson, but rather is the pure being of the past. Again, the key question here 
is what we might think when we go beyond the psychological reality of the subject who 
remembers, toward the forces that are contracted within any present. Deleuze (1991) 
emphasises that, for Bergson, memory is pure recollection without a psychological 
existence, and thus when he relates memory to unconscious forces, this is not the 
unconscious most familiar through the work of Sigmund Freud, for whom the 
unconscious signals an attribute of the subject. Bergson does not use the term to refer 
to 'a psychological reality outside consciousness, but to denote a nonpsychological 
reality — being as it is in itself’ (Deleuze, 1991, p. 56).  Memory is nonetheless real, 
Bergson argues, although it is virtual rather than actual. As Deleuze and Claire Parnet 
(2007, p. 150) explain: 
as Bergson shows, memory is not an actual image which forms after the 
object has been perceived, but a virtual image coexisting with the actual 
perception of the object. Memory is a virtual image contemporary with the 
actual object, its double… The actual and the virtual coexist, and enter into a 
tight circuit which we are continually retracing from one to the other. 
Pure recollection thus has ontological significance for Bergson rather than psychological 
significance. The virtual here refers to unactualised potential from which actual actions 
emerge (Deleuze and Parnet, 2007). The actual has its conditions of possibility in the 
virtual, but the real and actual do not resemble each other, as ‘[v]irtuality exists in such 
a way that it actualizes itself as it dissociates itself; it must dissociate itself to actualize 
itself’ (Deleuze, 2004, p. 52). 
It is through the virtual coexistence of past, present and future within the instant that 
repetition can produce difference, rather than the return of the same. When the 
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movement associated with habit is repeated, this is not a singular action that is repeated. 
As Erin Manning and Brian Massumi explain (2014, p. 91): 
every movement of the body is doubled by a virtual movement-image 
expressing its abstract form, in its unfolding. The dimension of virtuality is at 
once the movement’s potential for thought and, associated with that, its 
potential for repetition and variation. 
A virtual movement changes with each repetition, as the past continues to coalesce in 
the present inclination. The habitual movements of the body which this thesis explores 
involve a double movement, involving repetition at the level of the virtual, which is 
asymmetrical and produces difference, as well as an actual repetition. Virtual 
repetitions, prior to conscious awareness and prior to subjectification, are often 
neglected by the lens of sociological analysis but are nonetheless crucial to 
understanding the emergence of the actual. 
It is important to emphasise that apprehending the multiplicity of movement and 
nonconscious habits cannot simply be attended to by a ‘return’ to embodiment, since 
they amount to more than ‘body knowledge’, though they relate to bodily practices 
(Manning and Massumi, 2014). The notion of embodiment, while offering consideration 
of the integral role the body plays in the experience of social life, still renders the body 
dependent on consciousness for what it ‘embodies’, making consciousness a property 
of the body, without challenging the concept itself. Manning and Massumi (2014) argue 
that a genuine rethinking of the body involves challenging the distinction between 
thought and action; movement is thought, and neither thought nor movement are the 
property of a subject. Every movement is relational, such that even ‘the body’ is a mere 
phase of individuation, and thus always more than an individual body (Manning and 
Massumi, 2014, p. 43). As Deleuze (2004) emphasises, the virtual is not psychological 
and does not belong to the subject, being prior to the processes of individuation through 
which subjects are formed. 
Understanding repetition as productive of difference opens up our capacity to think 
repeated actions such as habits beyond the negative associations with inauthenticity 
and meaninglessness. I have been highlighting the crucial role played in Deleuze’s 
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thought by Bergson. Deleuze was also influenced by the work of Felix Ravaisson, who 
explored repetition in the role of nonconscious habit and emphasised the potentiality 
inherent to habit. Like Deleuze, Ravaisson was interested in the ontological role of 
repetition and habits, and explored the fluidity and potential in repetition, rather than 
considering it to be lack of creativity (Malabou, 2008). Ravaisson draws attention to the 
necessity of change in the formation of habit (2008, p. 25), stating that ‘habit is the 
consequence of a change.’ Ravaisson’s understanding of habit is derived from Aristotle, 
and figures habit not as a repetition of the same but as the law of a being subject to 
change (Malabou, 2008, p. vii). In this sense habit cannot be separated from the capacity 
to form habits, as it is only a being that experiences change that has such a capacity. 
Habit, then, is not the process through which an action becomes routine, but rather a 
way of being or disposition (Ravaisson, 2008). The capacity to form habits is intrinsically 
tied to the capacity for change, Ravaisson asserts, and it is only in a tension between 
permanence and change that habits form. This understanding sits in contrast to 
accounts that posit habit as the absence of change. 
From the point of view of a Ravaissonian conceptualisation, habit is not understood as 
mechanism, nor in terms of the loss of change, but as fundamentally creative. Habit, for 
Ravaisson (2008), is the consequence of a change that is then repeated. Whilst habit is 
dynamic rather than static, Ravaisson (2008, p. 27) argues that it must simultaneously 
involve a ‘tendency towards permanence’, and it is in this tension between change and 
permanence that habits form and reform. Through repetition, the action becomes more 
efficient, at the same time as the effort required to perform the action diminishes 
(Ravaisson, 2008, p. 51). Effort, Ravaisson explains, is constituted by the opposing forces 
of action and passion, with action signifying that which is caused by the being itself and 
passion referring to that which has an external cause. Repetition strengthens action and 
diminishes passion, resulting in the greater efficiency of the movement, at the same 
time as there is a decreased awareness of associated sensations that are external to the 
being (Ravaisson, 2008, p. 49).  
Repetition, as Ravaisson conceives it, cannot be characterised as degeneration because 
it involves the simultaneous diminution of a capacity and an opening up of other 
capacities. Habit involves the shifting of the action towards anticipation and inclination, 
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‘it excites the power of movement’ (2008, p. 53).  Here the significance of Ravaisson’s 
contribution becomes clear, as he explains that habit is generative of desires that do not 
reside in the conscious awareness of a subject, but instead are generated only from the 
repetition of the action. This generative inclination can be productively thought through 
Serres’ (2000) rereading of the clinamen, a concept that the philosopher Lucretius used 
to describe the minimal angle of deviation of an atom from a straight line. According to 
Serres (2000, p. 4), the clinamen is ‘a differential, and properly, a fluxion’, operating as 
an opening in which ‘turbulence’ can emerge. This turbulence constitutes the 
unpredictability of inclinations, which shift toward new movements and allow 
unexpected outcomes of repetitions to play out. 
Put simply, habit cannot be understood as merely the shift from a conscious deliberate 
action, to a mechanical and unconscious one. Certainly, Ravaisson’s account does still 
position thought as the origin of action. He argues that a bodily action, once willed, loses 
its association with consciousness, and the original intention instead becomes fused 
with the movement itself (2008). Despite the central role afforded to consciousness in 
Ravaisson’s understanding of habit’s formation, however, his work motivates a new way 
of thinking about habit and repetition. He emphasises that habit goes beyond 
consciousness, exceeding its capacities for action. 
As a result of the disproportionate focus on consciousness in much social scientific 
analysis, habits and other nonconscious processes are often neglected or attributed to 
broader, yet still conscious, social processes. Bourdieu’s (1990) understanding of habitus 
as accumulated past experience, which dictates to an individual, certain values, tastes 
and mannerisms, still emphasises habitual behaviour as a manifestation of social norms 
and the class system. Such a theoretical model thus orients itself to the reproduction of 
existing structures and does not explore repetition or habit at the level of becoming. 
However, a Deleuzian approach radically reimagines these seemingly automated 
moments and draws attention to their role in reconfiguring capacities. Repeatedly 
reaching for a smartphone might no longer be seen only as a failure to adhere to norms 
of proper social behaviour, but could be considered as a shift in our capacities that, 
whilst it may limit our awareness of some things, may increase our capacities in other 
ways. 
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While there has been productive work done to take seriously the material world and to 
consider the agency of bodies and things, as I explored in Chapter 2, deeply held 
assumptions about the relationship between actors and actions may go unchallenged in 
efforts to extend the notion of agency to nonhuman things. Such analyses do not 
necessarily enable us to understand the co-production and transformation of forces. As 
Tom Roberts (2014) has argued, a focus on the agency of nonhumans can come at the 
expense of attention to process, and may simply redraw categories of subject and 
object, rather than challenging them. This is especially pertinent to a rethinking of the 
productivity of repetition and habit, beyond the attribution of origins in either a subject 
or an object. 
A crucial contribution to social scientific understandings of repetition made by the 
Deleuzian understanding of repetition I have examined here is that repetition gains a 
fundamentally ontological status. It is not simply a matter of acknowledging that 
repetition is productive, rather than only potentially pathological or uncritical, but of 
appreciating that the proliferation of difference through repetition is crucial to the 
creative evolution of life. Understanding repetition in these terms allows a 
conceptualisation of habit not as an action that is repeated until it is mechanical, but 
instead as a transformation in capacities. Our everyday device habits, such as the 
inclination to reach for a smartphone, which might strike at any moment, generates new 
capacities whilst reducing others. While our capacity to direct our attention to human 
faces around us may be diminished, our capacity for different forms of pleasure may be 
increased. A focus on such transformations, made possible once the conscious 
dimensions of social life are displaced from centre stage, allows the barely perceptible 
relations between mobile digital devices and users to be interrogated in all their 
complexity, rather than being reduced to mere dysfunction or the remnants of a once 
conscious act. 
 
3.2 Beyond attention and intention 
According to the understanding of repetition that I have proposed, habitual relations 
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that operate beneath conscious awareness are not merely the repetition of a once 
conscious action but rather are reconstitutive of bodily capacities, forming new 
inclinations, actions and capacities, and it thereby follows that consciousness itself is 
rethought. Challenging conscious intention as the origin of action has significant 
implications for the way the ‘problem’ of mobile device culture has been framed. As I 
explored in Chapter 1, both popular and academic concerns about mobile digital device 
focus on issues of alienation, distraction and addiction. Even outside of the more 
pessimistic critiques, mobile devices are still predominantly understood as a tool for 
human interaction and much research has focused on understanding how the tool 
transforms relationships and interaction (Schrock, 2015; Casado and Lasén, 2014; Hall 
et al., 2014; Lasén, 2013; Ling and Campbell, 2011). Consequently, questions posed 
around mobile devices have been predominantly moral ones, about how we should use 
mobile devices and how we should not use them. These kinds of questions appeal to a 
specific image of the subject as a conscious, deliberative and intentional actor, an image 
that has fallen short in grasping what is novel about our relations with the technological 
and nonhuman (Thrift, 2008). 
Central to the privilege afforded to consciousness is its supposed elevation from or 
transcendence of the body, as systematically articulated in the Cartesian separation of 
mind and body, in which the conscious mind exercises control over the body (Blackman, 
2008; Turner, 2008). Cartesian dualism has been substantially critiqued within sociology, 
and the social sciences more broadly, for failing to attend to the embodied nature of 
lived experience (Blackman, 2008). However, despite the substantial challenge to this 
distinction between consciousness and the body, much of our foundational thought on 
the social world and social interaction rely on the notion that consciousness wills the 
body into action. The dominance of microsociological approaches in mobile digital 
device literature, notably Goffman’s dramaturgical approach (Broadbent, 2016; Casado 
and Lasén, 2014; Ling, 2008, 2012; Ling and McEwen, 2010), demonstrates the 
prevalence of this model. Goffman (1959) argues that interaction between individuals is 
based on the management of impressions and role-taking, and involves efforts by social 
actors to appropriately control their bodily language and facial expressions. Social actors 
engage in a range of rituals to maintain the stability of the social setting and avoid shame 
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(Goffman, 1967). In Goffman’s (1963, p. 35) schema the mind exercises control over the 
body to bring its expression into line with conscious intentions and social expectations: 
Although an individual can stop talking, he cannot stop communicating 
through body idiom; he must either say the right thing or the wrong thing. 
He cannot say nothing.  
Whilst Goffman’s account does not render the body wholly inert, insofar as it is capable 
of expression beyond that which the subject intends, his primary focus is on the work 
done by subjects both to interpret the expressions of others and to adjust their own 
bodily expressions according to the demands of the social setting. For Goffman, the 
social world is brought into reality through these negotiations and adjustments, and it is 
these microsocial interactions that therefore constitute an important object of 
sociological study.   
In the context of the mobile digital device microsociological approaches have been 
mobilised to consider how these devices intervene in and change social interaction 
(Casado and Lasén, 2014; Ling, 2008, 2012; Ling and McEwen, 2010; Rettie, 2009; Okabe 
and Ito, 2005; Laurier, 2001). Ling (2012, p. 110), for example, draws on Goffman’s 
theory of interaction to explore the way that actors negotiate the introduction of mobile 
phone interactions into physically present conversations. His analysis concludes that 
though ‘we have some techniques for dealing with the mobile phone’s intrusiveness, we 
are still in the process of determining how to use it in our copresent lives.’ Ling’s focus 
on the choices of actors poses a moral question here, which is something like: ‘what 
ought we to do with mobile phones to ensure we do not disturb physically present 
interactions?’ However, if, as this thesis has been arguing, consciousness is not the 
central lens through with we understand the world, nor even the primary way in which 
we make sense, this framework of decision-making is rendered problematic. If, as the 
dynamism of habit suggests, the actor’s will is not the origin of actions, then the 
customary focus of microsociological accounts leads to a discernment not of causal 
relations, but merely of the effects of actions. 
This error arises of mistaking consciousness as the cause of action is one that has far 
reaching consequences for how the social is constituted, and subsequently one that 
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much work on the affective character of our relations has sought to challenge. Deleuze 
famously draws this aspect of his work from the philosophy of Spinoza, and specifically 
his challenge to the dualist treatment of mind and body. Spinoza argued that the world 
is constituted by ‘a single substance having an infinity of attributes, Deussive Natura, all 
“creatures” being only modes of these attributes or modifications of this substance’ 
(Deleuze, 1988, p. 17). For Spinoza, there is no distinction between the substance of 
mind and body, but rather distinction exists only in the mode in which this substance is 
expressed. A single substance is expressed as thought and as extension. An action within 
the mind is an action upon the body, but there is no causal relation between the two 
expressions (Deleuze, 1988, p. 18). It is through this parallelism that consciousness loses 
its special status as the essence of the human. Spinoza argued that consciousness has 
been mistaken as the cause of action when it is in fact simply an awareness of a change 
in potential; consciousness registers a transformation that has taken place prior to 
consciousness (Deleuze, 1988, p. 19).  Consciousness, then, is not the origin of an action 
but rather the ‘narration of affect’, as Clough (2008, p. 3) puts it. If consciousness is the 
awareness of a change in potential, rather than the cause of it, it follows that by focusing 
on consciousness, we can only attend to outcomes, not causes: 
The fact is that consciousness is by nature the locus of an illusion. Its nature 
is such that it registers effects, but it knows nothing of causes. The order of 
causes is defined by this: each body in extension, each idea of each mind in 
thought are constituted by the characteristic relations that subsume the 
parts of that body, the parts of that idea (Deleuze, 1988, p. 19). 
Thus, consciousness is not the origin but the effect of bodies encountering each other, 
where ‘bodies’ may be distinct and observable physical entities, but also, and more 
generally, characteristic relations of force. Rather than subjective consciousness as the 
origin of action, instead we have force existing prior to action, prior even to individuals 
or objects or distinct units. Seen from this perspective, attending primarily to conscious 
experience, as it is registered by individuals, offers limited insight into the conditions in 
which action emerges (Deleuze, 1988). 
Given that consciousness is not the cause of action, Spinoza contends that it is in 
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relations of composition and decomposition that action finds its cause (Deleuze, 1988). 
These relations increase or decrease an individual’s capacity to act, depending on their 
outcome:  
When a body "encounters" another body, or an idea another idea, it 
happens that the two relations some-times combine to form a more 
powerful whole, and sometimes one decomposes the other, destroying the 
cohesion of its part (Deleuze, 1988, p. 19). 
The body’s power of acting increases if it is filled with what Spinoza calls ‘active 
affections’, or its power of being acted upon is increased by ‘passions’. Active affections 
are caused by compositions ‘which spring from the individual's essence’, while passions 
are external to the individual (Deleuze, 1988, p. 27). Spinoza also distinguishes between 
joyful and sad passions, with the former arising from encounters with bodies that enter 
into a composition with the individual and the later arising from encounters those that 
do not, and therefore diminish its power of acting (Deleuze, 1988, p. 27). What is 
experienced consciously is the shift in capacities, in the power of acting that is the 
outcome of these forces of composition and decomposition. 
It is important to emphasise that the purpose of this rethinking is not to strip users of 
their capacity to act but rather to take into consideration the richness of forces in the 
encounter. What I seek to challenge here is the notion that consciousness is the site of 
individual will, and I aim to reconsider will as preindividual and precognitive. Deleuze’s 
(2006) work on Nietzsche is useful here as Nietzsche’s concept of the will to power offers 
a way of understanding will outside of human intention or consciousness. He 
understands will not as possessed by individuals, as something consciously wielded, but 
as mobile, multiple and nonhuman. For Nietzsche, the will to power is an expression of 
the relations of force taking place in any moment, the differentiations of force and 
determinations of the quality of forces within such relations (Smith, 2007). Far from 
being a possession of the human subject, Nietzsche’s (1990, p. 66) understanding of will 
emphasises the role of nonconscious drives, each seeking to dominate the others, 
whose competition forms our inclinations. As Deleuze (2006, p. 47) explains ‘it is always 
through the will to power that one force prevails over others and dominates or 
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commands them.’ What is experienced as a conscious action – what we call ‘I’ – is the 
drive that wins out at a given moment. 
Thus far, I have proposed that habitual repetitive action is not only generative of new 
capacities and desires, being a proliferation of difference rather than a return of the 
same, but also that action itself does not have its origin in conscious contemplation. I 
have sought to challenge dominant understandings of habit in the social sciences as 
‘unthinking’ and mechanical, which are entirely bound up with such an understanding 
of conscious intention as the creative origin. In rejecting the privilege given to conscious 
experience, my aim is to enable questions concerning the distribution of attention and 
inattention with the rise of the device to be significantly reconsidered. Distraction, or 
the capacity of mobile digital devices to draw attention away from co-present human 
interaction, has been placed at the centre of debates about what kind of social 
organisation new technologies generate (Pettman, 2015; de Souza e Silva and Frith, 
2012; Hassan, 2012; Ling, 2008). It is distractedness, Hassan (2012) contends, that 
characterises our time and fast-paced lives, and mobile digital devices are increasingly 
emphasised in critiques that mobilise this concept, both in academic (Aagaard, 2015; 
Pettman, 2015; Ling, 2004, 2008, 2012; Gergen, 2002) and popular discourse (Carr, 
2011; Jackson, 2008). What is meant by distraction is usually the loss of attention, and 
the destruction or deterioration of conscious awareness (North, 2011). Though few have 
engaged specifically with the nature of distraction, the term has been predominantly 
understood through a dialectical opposition to attention (North, 2011). As Paul North 
(2011, p. 5) puts it, ‘[d]istraction, according to this reasoning, means the disintegration 
or misdirection of a unified, stable, directional mental force for possession of sanctioned 
objects’ (North, 2011, p. 5). It is only through distraction that attention can be 
determined. As North (2011, p. 2) explains: 
Attention intensifies most, you might say, in its loss; it becomes itself when 
one goes in search of it. Producing itself out of fear of its own unavailability, 
through this fiction, it must be pulled back continually from an unknown 
place to which it has slipped. 
Attention, then, as it is typically understood, is a directed and wilful focus that is deep, 
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rather than shallow. As North (2011) contends, attention is often explained with 
reference to vision, associated with focus that remains on a specific object without being 
redirected. Seen as fundamental to the intellect of the human, attention is desirable and 
associated with deep thinking. 
Normative criticisms of distraction are possible to the extent that conscious intention is 
mistaken for the cause of action. Yet, here again, questions about what ought to be the 
focus of attention offer little insight into what distraction itself might make possible. As 
I argue in greater depth in Chapter 5, distraction might be reconceived as something 
other than the failure of a subject to prioritise certain objects over others based on a 
rational evaluation. I contend that distraction is not the loss of attention or the lowest 
amount of attention. Instead, I propose an understanding of distraction as a qualitative 
difference in attention. Here I follow Bergson’s (2001) theory of time as duration, which, 
as I discussed earlier in this chapter, urges a consideration of the virtual and multiple 
dimensions of time. Bergson (2001) argues that time has, in our tradition, been thought 
of as quantitative and measurable, but this neglects the virtual dimension of time, which 
is qualitative and cannot be measured. Taking up Bergson’s analysis, I contend that shifts 
in attention operate at both a virtual and actual level, and thus cannot be reduced to a 
quantifiable or measurable amount of attention. I argue for distraction to be understood 
in terms of its virtual potential as well as the actual moment which we recognise or 
identify as distraction. Distraction is also embedded within routines and habits of mobile 
digital devices use, as it is through the repetition of these moments of distraction that 
these virtual potentialities transform and change, opening up new inclinations towards 
the device. 
Considering distraction as a qualitative shift in attention opens previously limited moral 
debates to new questions about what else drives us, what else pushes and pulls us, and 
allows distraction to be considered at the level of capacities, in terms of what it makes 
possible and what it reduces, rather than merely as a failure of the subject. Specifically, 
distraction emphasises the openness of the body to its milieu. Attention fluctuates with 
the pulls and pushes of the encounter. As I will go on to argue, the qualitative difference 
in attention that constitutes distraction from co-present social interaction also forms 
part of new forms of intimacy made possible with the mobile digital device. I argue that 
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attending to the forces prior to conscious awareness, to the presubjective nonhuman 
will comprised of competing drives, allows an exploration of the conditions in which 
relations with mobile digital devices emerge and new intimacies are made possible. The 
concepts of forces and drives are especially useful here for exploring these complex 
interactions. Picking up the smartphone cannot simply be understood as the interaction 
of an individual and an object but rather involves a multitude of other forces that form 
encounters, many of which may be beneath our conscious awareness. Indeed, it is the 
relations between these essentially impersonal forces that demand investigation if we 
are to more adequately account for the complexities of contemporary experience. 
 
3.3 The impersonality of preindividual relations 
I have been arguing that if we are to better grasp the relational causes of action and 
transformation, it is to preindividual relations and conditions of possibility that we need 
to direct our attention. Distinct and already formed individual entities can offer little in 
the way of insight when it comes to exploring the open-ended relations that do not 
reside in a fixed object or being. In the last section of this chapter I will argue for a shift 
in conceptualising the mobile digital device, from the personal to the impersonal. This 
shift responds to existing debates within sociological discourse on technology about the 
agency afforded to objects, discussed in depth in Chapter Two, and involves the 
proposition that there can be no subjects or objects that pre-exist the micro-events that 
constitute the encounter. This shift in thinking also responds to recent calls for an 
expanded notion of the social, which is attentive to the forces beneath and prior to 
conscious awareness (Clough, 2009; Gane, 2009). I argue for attention to be paid to the 
forces that operate at the level of the preindividual, which is ‘open-endedly social’ 
(Massumi, 2002, p. 9). In arguing for the importance of a focus on relations, rather than 
distinct entities, it is necessarily to firstly explore the historical privileging of face-to-face 
interaction, afforded particular significance in existing sociological literature on mobile 
digital devices (Turkle, 2011, 2015; Burchell, 2014; Przybylski and Weinstein, 2013; Ling 
and McEwen, 2010). While insight can no doubt be gained by examining the conscious 
experiences of social actors, as I will demonstrate, taking these events as the model for 
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thought will provided only limited understanding of the new forms of intimacy arising 
from our relations with technological devices. 
As human beings who become more and more enfolded in technological processes in 
our daily lives, we are involved in face-to-screen encounters that increasingly draw our 
attention. Indeed, Lucas Introna and Fernando Ilharco (2006) argue that we are not 
looking ‘at’ these screens so much as we are looking ‘through’ them to access a way of 
being. As I have stressed, it is this shift of attention from human faces to screens that is 
at the centre of anxieties about technology and social change. More than any other part 
of the body, the face is associated with the individual self and the inner psyche (Mules, 
2010). Encountering face-to-face interaction is attributed special significance in relation 
to the development of empathy and other important social skills (Turkle, 2015; Ling and 
McEwen, 2010). Based on assumptions about the authenticity and immediacy of verbal 
face-to-face communication, mediated forms of communication are considered prone 
to deception and generally an inferior model for social life (de Souza e Silva and Frith, 
2012). Such an assumption contributes to anxieties concerning the proliferation of 
technologies that mediate communicate and become embedded in social practices. 
The understanding of face-to-face human interaction as somehow more real or 
authentic than technologically mediated interaction is associated with an historical 
understanding of the nature of the face itself and of verbal communication through 
language. More specifically, the valorisation of face-to-face communication is associated 
with an historical rendering of human essence in terms of an immediacy of relation, an 
immediacy which diverse technologies of mediation have been seen to threaten. In his 
Essay on the Origin of Languages, Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1997) famously argues that 
although action and movement are most effective in communicating, language better 
speaks to emotion and to feeling and thus to what makes us truly human. Man invented 
language, Rousseau suggests, out of a need to communicate passions: ‘One conveys 
one’s sentiments in speaking, and one’s ideas in writing’ (Rousseau, 1997, p. 260). 
Writing, Rousseau concludes, adulterates language, removing expression and tone, 
replacing them with precision and grammatical combinations. Such analysis posits that 
immediate verbal communication possesses a kind of authentic quality that makes it a 
superior way to communicate the truth of man’s essence. Rousseau’s assertion that 
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writing, a form of communication mediated by objects, ‘adulterates’ language, positions 
speech as unmediated expression and associates mediation with a negative 
transformation. The hierarchies that sustain Rousseau’s malalignment of writing persist 
today, indicating the common legacy of representational dogmas about what constitute 
reality and its mediation. Especially in the light of general trends away from voice calls 
towards text, social media and instant messaging (Deloitte, 2015), these arguments for 
the ‘purity’ of speech posit a loss of intimacy in mobile digital device communication. 
Within sociology, face-to-face communication has traditionally been seen to play a key 
role in processes of socialisation and the production of a sense of self (Jamieson, 2013). 
George Herbert Mead (1967) emphasised interaction and play with others as central for 
childhood development, as it provides an opportunity to gain immediate feedback on 
actions by assessing the responses of others. This feedback allows reflexive 
management of behaviour through the production of a ‘generalised other’, through 
which the individual perceives themselves as a social object by seeing their actions in 
relation to generalised social attitudes. Goffman (1967) identifies the face as a key site 
of expression and the management of impressions. He conceptualises ‘face-work’ as the 
manipulation of the face to maintain consistency with verbal symbols and actions. 
Successful face-work is employed to avoid shame and embarrassment; an individual 
must manage their face to ensure that they do not reveal inappropriate feelings 
(Goffman, 1967). Goffman's understanding of the role of the face in social interaction 
supports the assumption that face-to-face communication is in some sense more 'real' 
and immediate. Goffman rejects the notion that there is an 'authentic' self; instead 
suggesting that what is thought of as authentic is simply performance that is not 
conceptualised as such (1967). However, his theorisation of the body, and the face, in 
particular, are built on the assumption that bodily movements and nonconscious shifts 
'reveal' true feelings, being something that the social individual must mask to interact 
successfully and avoid shame. Thus, Goffman’s approach suggests that face-to-face 
communication can potentially allow others to assess honesty, through observation of 
the involuntary facial movements of the communicator, a method which function as a 
check on deception. Evidently, such an approach contributes to an understanding of 
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mediated communication as less genuine, especially as it is associated with an obscuring 
of the face and thus a kind of concealment or dishonesty. 
Face-to-face encounters have also been associated with the production of ethical 
human subjects. Levinas famously explores this connection of the face to our 
fundamental humanness. According to Levinas (1979) it is through encountering the 
face of the Other that we are called into an ethical relation with the other being, a 
relation that forms an obligation to the other. There is in his thought an intimate 
connection between expression, the face, and responsibility, which is to say with the 
ethics of that encounter. Levinas argues that though the Other remains infinitely foreign, 
this ‘primordial’ expression declares ‘you shall not commit murder’ (Levinas, 1979, p. 
199). The very physicality of the face is central to its expression:  
The infinite paralyses power by its infinite resistance to murder, which, firm 
and insurmountable, gleams in the face of the Other, in the total nudity of 
his defenceless eyes, in the nudity of the absolute openness of the 
Transcendent. (Levinas, 1979, p. 199) 
It is evident from Levinas’ focus on the ‘nudity’ of the face and his description of the 
eyes as ‘defenceless’ that the face is, for him, the symbol of humanity. Levinas argues 
that the face-to-face encounter is the foundation of language, the first signification 
(Hand, 2009). The face presents a non-negotiable ethical responsibility to the Other, a 
responsibility that is not mediated or interpreted consciously, but rather is a kind of 
primordial ethical event.  
Levinas’ theorisation of the face-to-face encounter, and its role in the production of 
ethical subjectivity, is in many ways a moral one, to the extent that his use of the word 
‘ethical’ signals less a break from morality than its realisation in actual encounters. 
Levinas is concerned with the imperative for action in a meeting with the Other. Through 
his conceptualisation of the face as calling us into an ethical obligation, Levinas positions 
immediate encounters between human faces as the foundation of social and, perhaps 
more importantly, ethical life. Levinas not only emphasises the significance of an 
encounter with the face, but also considers immediate encounters with the Other as 
constitutive of subjectivity (Gutting, 2011). It is important to emphasise here, as Gutting 
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(2011) does, that Levinas conceptualises the Other only as human, and does not 
consider other encounters with ‘otherness’ or non-humans as constitutive of 
subjectivity. Consequently, encounters with objects and nonhumans, or technologically 
mediated encounters with the Other are not afforded the same ontological and ethical 
significance as a proximate meeting of faces. Here there is a clear connection between 
the immediacy of the ethical relation and the anxiety that mediation and distance 
produces. These concerns stem from the facelessness, and thus inhumanity, of 
technologies and the possibility that as our lives become increasingly intertwined in 
technological processes our humanity too could be eroded. 
The emphasis on the lack of co-presence in digitally mediated communication has been 
roundly criticised by those scholars who argue that there is, in fact, no unmediated 
communication. De Souza e Silva and Frith (2012), for example, argue that the 
assumption that there is unmediated communication completely neglects the role of 
language, interpretation and bodies in mediated spoken communication. They argue 
that a series of filters participate in communication and make it possible, and thus face-
to-face communication is as un-mediated as any other form. They draw on the concept 
of the interface, a cultural device that mediates experience, and argue that interfaces 
are by no means limited to the digital technologies with which we have associated them 
(de Souza e Silva and Frith, 2012). Certainly, they insist, these mediators will filter 
information and reshape communication in distinct ways, but they reject the idea of an 
inherently superior mode of communication. Similarly, Ilkka Arminen et al. (2016) argue 
that all acts of perception are mediated through the accumulation of earlier experiences 
and existing socially defined meanings.  
However, such critiques, by continuing to focus on communication, largely fail to 
address the primary error in attributing privileged ethical significance to the face. In 
contrast, Deleuze and Guattari (1987, pp. 167–192) challenge the symbolic significance 
attributed to the face by interrogating the process of ‘facialization’ by which the 
signification and subjectification of the face takes place. The face, they contend, is not 
inherently imbued with the kind of meaning that founds an ethical relation, as Levinas 
(1979) has argued, but rather the face is constituted by processes of deterritorialisation 
that in turn allow it to function as a ‘figure which programs the signifiers’ (Deleuze and 
102 
Guattari, 1987, p. 180). Deterritorialisation is a process by which the nature of a thing 
can be transformed and undone, removed from the structures and orderings by which 
it was territorialized. It is important to note that deterritorialisation does not refer to 
here to the return to a primitive or older form but to the formation an entire new form. 
Deleuze and Guattari (1987, p. 172) give the following example: 
the prehensile hand implies a relative deterritorialisation not only of the 
front paw but also of the locomotor hand. It has a correlate, the use-object 
or tool: the club is a deterritorialized branch. 
The face, in contrast, is formed through an unusual process of deterritorialisation that 
is absolute, rather than relative. Deleuze and Guattari (1987, p. 172) argue that the 
deterritorialisation of the face ‘removes the head from the stratum of the organism, 
human or animal and connects it to other strata, such as signifiance and 
subjectification.’ Thus, the face becomes distinct from the body and connected in a 
privileged manner to semiotic systems. 
Deleuze and Guattari (1987) argue that the organising capacities of the face for 
signification and subjectification, which microsociological accounts take as given, are in 
fact not qualities of the face itself. Indeed, this would be an error that mistakes effects 
for the cause, as they explain: 
Very specific assemblages of power impose signifiance4 and subjectification 
as their determinate form of expression, in reciprocal presupposition with 
new contents: there is no signifiance without a despotic assemblage, no 
subjectification without an authoritarian assemblage, and no mixture 
between the two without assemblages of power that act through signifiers 
and act upon souls and subjects (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, p. 181). 
The face is not the origin of subjectification and signifiance but brought about by the 
intersection of these semiotic systems. Deleuze and Guattari (1987, p. 167) contend that 
                                                      
4 Translator Brian Massumi (1987, p. viii) notes that the original French ‘signifiance’ has been retained in 
this text, rather than translated into English. Signifiance is used by Deleuze and Guattari to refer to 
signifying processes, a sense that the English word, ‘significance’ does not necessarily capture. 
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signifiance requires a ‘white wall’ to inscribe signs and subjectification requires a ‘black 
hole’ in which to lodge consciousness. The white wall operates to define the boundaries 
of normative expression and assimilates difference through internalising existing 
structures of subjectification (Bignall, 2012). The face is the intersection of these two 
systems, being both the white wall and the black hole.  
The face, then, emerges as a result of dominant systems of meaning and acts to organise 
communication, signification and conscious experience (Bignall, 2012). Deleuze and 
Guattari (1987, p. 168) argue that the face in this system serves a normative purpose:  
Faces are not basically individual; they define zones of frequency or 
probability, delimit a field that neutralizes in advance any expressions or 
connections unamenable to the appropriate significations. 
The face is not universal. Rather it is a very specific idea that does not, as Deleuze and 
Guattari (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, p. 168) attest, come to us as a ready-made thing, 
but is produced by ‘the abstract machine of faciality’. This abstract machine overcodes 
the head to create the face and in doing so constitutes an entirely distinct organisation 
from that of the body: 
We can now propose the following distinction: the face is part of a surface-
holes, holey surface, system. This system should under no circumstances be 
confused with the volume-cavity system proper to the (proprioceptive) 
body. The head is included in the body, but the face is not… The head, even 
the human head, is not necessarily a face. The face is produced only when 
the head ceases to be part of the body, when it ceases to be coded by the 
body, when it ceased to have a multidimensional polyvocal corporeal code 
— when the body, head included, has been decoded and has to be 
overcoded by something we shall call the Face. (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, 
p. 170) 
The head, no longer coded by the multiple and indistinct corporeal codes, becomes 
coded as the face, replacing complexity with the ease of expression and interpretation. 
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Crucially, what the face does is ‘cipher’ and make possible different interpretations and 
meanings, whilst concealing others (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987). 
Given the historical role that the face plays in organising and making subjects 
recognisable, its capacity to found an ethics for human interactions per se is 
questionable: ‘[w]hen everything must conform in advance to a regime of signification 
already given, then there is no room for creative divergence in the productive process’ 
(Bignall, 2012, p. 399). Indeed, Deleuze and Guattari argue, taking the face as the origin 
rather than the effect of regimes of signification and subjectification is not only 
erroneous but suggests that these regimes are inevitable (Bignall, 2012). There are, 
however, merely processes of capture and ordering in which the abstract machine of 
faciality performs a normative selection. It draws dichotomies and ‘carries out the prior 
gridding that makes it possible for the signifying elements to become discernible 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, p. 180). Though face-to-face interaction has long been 
associated with the revelation of truth, Deleuze and Guattari (1987, p. 177) argue that 
in fact it provides a much more reductive analysis: 
the abstract machine of faciality assumes a role of selective response, or 
choice: given a concrete face, the machine judges whether it passes or not, 
whether it goes or not, on the basis of the elementary facial units. This time, 
the binary relation is of the "yes-no" type. The empty eye or black hole 
absorbs or rejects, like a half-doddering despot who can still give a signal of 
acquiescence or refusal. The face of a given teacher is contorted by tics and 
bathed in an anxiety that makes it "no go." A defendant, a subject, displays 
an overaffected submission that turns into insolence. Or someone is too 
polite to be honest. A given face is neither a man's nor a woman's. Or it is 
neither a poor person's nor a rich person's. Is it someone who lost his 
fortune? At every moment, the machine rejects faces that do not conform, 
or seem suspicious. 
Taking seriously this critique of the naturalisation of a normative attribution of meaning 
to the face, we could say that the face does not in fact reveal the truth of a subject but 
rather organises and rejects that which is ambiguous and nonbinary. At the surface, this 
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analysis may be mistaken for a microsociological account of the face as both a site of 
performance and the reading of performance, not unlike that proposed by Goffman 
(1967). However, there is a crucial difference, in as much as Deleuze and Guattari seek 
to identify the ways in which the face is an outcome of a regime of thought, which 
prioritises recognition over difference. While the face is the outcome of the abstract 
machine under such dominant regimes of thought, they propose that there are 
possibilities for dismantling the face and opening up to more creative forms (Deleuze 
and Guattari, 1987). 
Deleuze and Guattari (1987, pp. 189–190) explain that while the abstract machine can 
produce deterritorialisations that have an ordering and delimiting function, such as the 
face, it also has the capacity for a different form of deterritorialisation, which produces 
new abstract machines. Instead of the face, with its signifying and subjectification, what 
can be produced by these new abstract machines is what Deleuze and Guattari (1987) 
refer to as the ‘probe-head’, which does not organise but rather dismantles. In their 
work, the concept of the ‘probe-head’ names a mode of deterritorialisation, which 
operates prior to signification and subjectification, and is concerned with non-human 
becomings (O’Sullivan, 2006). It is not a return to a primitive state prior to faciality but 
rather disrupts the dominant modes of organising and recognising in order to challenge 
this model of thought. Most significantly, a probe-head is defined by its capacity to elicit 
transformation, it is 'capable of penetrating an opaque or self-evident regime of signs 
and forcing it to transform’ (Bignall, 2012, p. 401). It is a question of opening up critical 
lines of flight from representation: 
Beyond the face lies an altogether different inhumanity: no longer that of the 
primitive head, but of "probe-heads”; here, cutting edges of 
deterritorialization become operative and lines of deterritorialization 
positive and absolute, forming strange new becomings, new polyvocalities. 
Become clandestine, make rhizome everywhere, for the wonder of a 
nonhuman life to be created (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, p. 191) 
In the concept of the probe head Deleuze and Guattari (1987) draw attention to the 
possibilities of understanding the face-to-face relation beyond its naturalisation in the 
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human subject, and the dominant modes of recognition and interpretation. Importantly, 
Deleuze and Guattari (1987) demonstrate the capacity for new becomings to be 
attended to, beyond individual human subjective experience, by challenging the 
normative ordering of faciality. 
I would like at this point to suggest that the mobile digital device can operate as 
something of a probe-head, opening up new lines of flight into the presubjective and 
prior to recognition. As Simon O’Sullivan (2009, p. 253) suggests, the concept of the 
probe-head refers to any device ‘that disrupts faciality’. It is precisely because these 
devices challenge the significance of the human face that they are troubling. As I have 
argued, the mobile digital device, through the repetitious practices of the user, comes 
to generate new desires and new capacities. In the context on the mobile digital device, 
these new desires may manifest in repeated reach for the device, in the familiar flick of 
a finger movement that anticipates a certain response, or the increased anticipation for 
the glimmer of the screen lighting up as a notification appears, for example. It is in this 
process that a generative form of intimacy with the device is created. As Simone Bignall 
(2013, p. 86) explains, a ‘probe-head describes a technique of transformation an entity 
may engage or be engaged in, when brought into proximity or intimacy with other 
structures, in ways that are receptive to the formation of new elemental connections.’ 
The mobile digital device, in its intimate proximity, in its capacity to disrupt and even 
replace forms of face-to-face communication, can act as just such a rupture to dominant 
practices of signification. As I will go on to explore in greater depth in the following 
chapters, the impersonal intimacy that is emerging in this relation goes beyond the 
intimacy of subjects to a more thoroughly relational, less human, intimacy. 
In addition to attributing symbolic significance to the face itself, thinkers like Levinas 
effectively assume a transcendent moral principle; namely, that of the ethical relation 
produced by confronting the face of the Other. Deleuze rejects any such principle that 
would exist prior to the unfolding of the event itself (Smith, 2007). Levinas (1979) and 
mobile digital device scholars (see Turkle, 2015) who argue that face-to-face encounters 
force subjects to confront the humanity of another, mistake conscious experience as the 
cause of empathy. Instead I argue that it is in the play of preindividual forces that 
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differential capacities and inclinations emerge and are renegotiated, only later in part 
becoming recognised by conscious awareness. 
Deleuze (1994) conceptualises relations to the Other as neither an encounter with a 
human subject nor an object, but rather in terms of the relation between the virtual and 
the actual. For Deleuze, an individual is not a distinct unit, nor does the term refer 
specifically to beings, but rather to an ongoing process of becoming that is defined by 
relations which produce diverse individuations. The Other-structure plays a key role in 
these defining processes through its encounter with individuals (Williams, 2003). As 
Deleuze (1994, p. 281) writes: 
In short, it is the Other-structure that ensures individuation within the 
perceptual world. It is not the I, nor the self: on the contrary, these need this 
structure in order to be perceived as individualities. 
It is in the encounter with the Other subject that individuals are affirmed in their 
individuality. In contrast, individuation, the process through which preindividual 
potentialities become actualised, indicates a rupturing encounter. Deleuze thus rejects 
the privileging of sensory organs such as the face in his explorations of encounters and 
their ethical dimensions. He posits instead an impersonal, dynamic process that is not 
fully grasped by individuals, but rather occurs at the level of sensations, intensities and 
ideas (Williams, 2003, pp. 207–208). This alternate take on the ethics of encountering 
the Other attributes significance to the encounter itself, and registers the importance of 
the virtual in shaping what is actualised. Where an account of the Other such as Levinas 
provides relies on the immediacy of a human face to call out responsibility in the 
individual, Deleuze’s concept of the Other-structure is impersonal, leaving conceptual 
space to include the inhuman within the problem of ethical encounters. 
The mobile digital device and user are in a constant state of becoming, and never are 
fully formed. It is useful here to briefly turn to Simondon’s theory of individuation, which 
was influential in Deleuze’s thinking concerning the actualisation of potential (Bowden, 
2012). Simondon (2009) sought to challenge the ontological privilege of the constituted 
individual, arguing that individuals are never fully formed but always in the process of 
individuating. Individuation is always partial and incomplete, meaning that a certain 
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level of unactualised potential always remains (Simondon, 2009). As Didier Debaise 
(2012, p. 6) explains, there is no distinct individual for Simondon:  
what arises from individuation is not a completely autonomous individual, 
which would exclude the nature from whence it came – this preindividual 
nature, source of the possible – but a hybrid shape, half-individual, half-
preindividual. 
Individuals are, for Simondon, wholly relational, as they are a product of the 
preindividual milieu in which individuation occurs (Scott, 2014). As Deleuze (2001, p. 44) 
explains, an individual ‘can only be contemporaneous to his individuation’.  Crucially 
then, it is not only with actual entities and their actions that we should be concerned, as 
these offer little insight into their cause. Rather it is with their preindividual milieu that 
our analysis should be extended.  
With respect to understandings of the face-to-face encounter as either the site of the 
creation of subjectivity (Mead, 1967) or the generation of ethical obligation (Levinas, 
1979), I have been arguing that such analyses rely on an understanding of social life as 
constituted by already formed subjects. Rather than starting with the problem of an 
ethical responsibility to the Other, I am concerned with the transformations elicited by 
the encounter and as such the terms of the debate no longer concern how we should 
act but instead interrogate what kind of shifts the encounter elicits. Instead of asking 
'how does communicating with the mobile digital device compare to the ideal type of 
face-to-face communication?’ the concern will now be with exploring the 
transformations in potential that occur as technologies become increasingly layered 
within the sedimentary habits that form our nonconscious lives. This is not to suggest 
that there is no qualitative difference between an encounter with technology and one 
with the human face. Indeed, given the attention to difference I have outlined here, I 
am arguing for an approach that can examine precisely the minute changes that are 
taking place; the inclinations towards certain actions and away from others. 
In order to examine emerging forms of intimacy with mobile digital devices, I have 
challenged three central habits of thinking that dominate existing analyses of the device, 
and sociological discourse more broadly. I have challenged the understanding of habits 
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in sociology as mechanical and as the product of consciousness. As I have suggested, this 
understanding makes a fundamental error in mistaking consciousness as the origin of 
action, and consequently sees habit as only repeating that action that took its originality 
from consciousness. However, as I have argued, consciousness does not will the body 
into action but is rather the register of the action after the fact. The creativity of the 
repetition comes not from conscious intention but from the virtual repetition that 
accompanies the actual one, which does not belong to the conscious subject but rather 
to the preindividual forces that constitute the subject. What is perceived by conscious 
awareness is a vast reduction and an inadequate entry point for analysis that neglects 
the richness of the event of individuation. What is perceived by conscious awareness is 
a vast reduction of those forms of analysis that neglect the richness of the event of 
individuation. Crucially then, ‘the social’ cannot be understood as constituted by 
subjects and objects, nor their interactions. To the extent that using a smartphone is 
seen to involve an already determined subject deciding to take up an object for its use, 
moments of distraction must be conceptualised as a failure of the subject either to direct 
their attention appropriately or to control their attention at all. It is precisely these 
moments of distraction that demonstrate the inadequacy of such a model of thought, 
as these moments constitute far more than simply error. As I will go on to explore in the 
next chapter, the kinds of questions that have been asked about our relations with the 
mobile digital device have been limited by what Deleuze (1994) calls a dogmatic image 
of thought. This image of thought has prioritised what can be consciously recognised 
and that which cannot be made sense of in this act of recognition is reduced to error. 
This image of thought has proven incapable of apprehending the preindividual forces 
prior to consciousness, and its insistence that it is a conscious subject who is the source 
of will leads to an inadequate understanding of the nature and relational origin of action. 
I have suggested that when we think of will and choice it is crucial to break these 
concepts from the tether of an actor, subject or origin of the action. There is something 
of a reversal of causality involved here, in as much as it is entities that emerge from 
competing wills in a process that allows them to momentarily congeal in a singular, 
though always transforming, body. Considering will as pre-individual and impersonal 
allows us to consider action as the outcome of force, rather than of a conscious actor. 
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Consequently, it is possible to consider those relations that we have with technologies 
that become habitual and even ‘beyond control’ as no longer inherently problematic. 
Existing debate about whether agency should be extended to objects or to nonhuman 
forces do not, I have suggested, go far enough, in challenging how we currently 
understand the social, and the mistaking of effects for causes. Instead, I have argued for 
an understanding of what contributing forces form the transformative encounter from 
which subjects and objects might form.  Only with a perspective attuned to impersonal 
forces of the event of individuation can the new capacities and new intimacies that 
emerge be adequately explored.  
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Chapter 4: Impersonal 
I’m waiting in the coffee shop where we’d agreed to meet, and it’s quiet. I recognise her 
as she comes in, and I feel myself become slightly more relaxed as I’m relieved by the 
look of recognition as she approaches me. She remembers me, even though it’s been 
quite a while since we made the arrangement. After we’ve sat down and I’ve ordered us 
some coffee, I proceed to pull out the usual things I bring with me: the consent form, my 
iPhone, which I also use as a recording device, and my notebook.  
As we’re making small talk, I’m watching her grab her phone out of her handbag. Her 
hand moves deftly, she quickly flicks it out of her handbag and slides it across the table. 
I see her eyes directed at my phone. I’ve just tapped on the Voice Memo app in 
anticipation of starting the recording. She shifts in her seat and looks immediately 
uncomfortable. I feel my face getting warm, then I realise I have now made this an 
‘interview’. 
I have been arguing that there is a need for the user-device relationship to be 
reconsidered in the light of three significant shifts in thinking: a rejection of conscious 
experience as primary, attentiveness to the impersonal, and an interest in the 
generative nature of repetitions and habits. However, an interest in the preindividual 
and processual presents a methodological challenge, given that social research methods 
have traditionally been directed firmly at understanding conscious human experience. 
This does not simply concern the question of what methods serve the purpose. Rather, 
this exploration of the impersonal starts with a new ontology, which, by its shift from 
entities to relations, inevitably generates a new methodological approach. Central to 
this exploration of mobile digital devices is an interest in asking new questions that 
consider these moments and relations beyond the terms of intention and agency, which 
have long been the mainstay of qualitative research. This chapter will draw on 
contemporary sociological debates about the status of the empirical and the role of 
experimental methods, as well as exploring the changing face of social research 
methods, in the light of technological change in the digital age. This project sits at the 
intersection of, and contributes to, both these methodological debates, considering how 
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traditional social research methods might be reinvigorated in the face of the changing 
understanding of empiricism and a rapidly changing social world. 
My argument here is that traditional research methods such as interviewing can be 
recouped in more experimental projects, despite their apparent focus on conscious 
interpretation and meaning making. In pursuing this argument, I draw primarily on 
Deleuze’s (1994) critique of the dogmatic image of thought to indicate the limits of a 
representational understanding of method. I also draw on recent methodological 
scholarship from Les Back and Nirmal Puwar (2012a), Michaels (2012a), Mariam Fraser 
(2009) Celia Lury and Nina Wakeford (2012a) to mobilise alternate ways of approaching 
empirical material. My aim overall is to cultivate attentiveness to relations often 
considered as merely secondary and symptomatic. Through this shift in attention, an 
interview offers much more than insight into the opinions and experiences of an 
individual, but instead offers an interaction in which unexpected moments, which might 
well resist existing explanations, bubble to the surface. In this sense, the interview is not 
a text to be made transparent but an encounter that is never fully captured or fixed. In 
addition to interviews, this chapter will discuss the ‘anecdote’ (Michael, 2012b), as a 
research method taken up in this thesis to examine my own intimate and habitual 
relations with the mobile digital device. Finally, this chapter will consider in a general 
sense the role of the empirical material in this thesis, which operates not as evidence 
but rather as the site of encounters. The contribution of these encounters is not what 
they represent but rather what they do, their transformative capacity both in the 
moment and in their reverberation in the thesis. 
 
4.1 Old methods, new questions 
At the centre of contemporary debates regarding the practice of sociological research 
are concerns about existing methods being out of step with an increasingly digital 
culture and failing to reflect shifts in social theory (Back and Puwar, 2012a). Back and 
Puwar (2012a, p. 6) describe this as ‘an unprecedented challenge and opportunity’ for 
sociology.  Digital technologies bring new methods for conducting research in the form 
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of mass data collection or ‘big data’ (Murthy, 2008). These technologies, like the mobile 
digital device, also constitute new social practices that merit examination in their own 
right.  Mobile digital devices sit in a particularly important position within these debates 
as both a significant site of data collection through their various sensors (Smith, 2016), 
as well as an emerging form of digital sociality that, as I have been arguing, highlights 
the limitations of how sociology has understood the empirical. It is not insignificant that 
it is because these devices generate new forms of intimacy with the user that they are 
especially rich sources of data. The question of how sociology responds to the digital 
world is one that is at the heart of this thesis.  
Within the discipline, the rise of digital research practices has presented a considerable 
challenge for researchers. Some scholars have argued that while digital data collection 
presents an unprecedented opportunity for social analysis and insight, this opportunity 
also represents a threat to sociology’s claims of expertise over the social realm (Savage 
and Burrows, 2007). As Noortje Marres (2012) argues, digital practices transform what 
constitutes ‘research’, given the rise of habitual tracking through social media, blogging 
and other forms of recording. Given how much of daily life is now filtered through 
devices such as computers and mobile digital devices, a wealth of information about 
everyday activity can now be accessed and analysed. Big data has been seen to usher in 
a new era of untold insight into human behaviour. Viktor Mayer-Schönberger and 
Kenneth Cukier’s (2013, p. 19) description demonstrates this optimism, as they declare 
that ‘[b]ig data is all about seeing and understanding the relations within and among 
pieces of information that, until very recently, we struggled to fully grasp.’ What 
distinguishes big data from other forms of data collection, as danah boyd and Kate 
Crawford (2012, p. 663) explain, is the ‘capacity to search, aggregate, and cross-
reference large data sets’. Working with this data also raises important ethical questions 
about privacy and the ethics of this data collection (Andrejevic and Burdon, 2015; boyd 
and Crawford 2012). 
The capacities of smartphones and other internet enabled devices to collect data about 
their users have predominantly been taken up for commercial purposes, and this has led 
some sociologists to argue that the discipline is facing an increasing threat to its 
expertise from the private sector (Back, 2012). Marres (2012) argues that through big 
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data research practices, social research becomes distributed across actors, public and 
private spheres, and across both academic and non-academic contexts. Susan Halford, 
Catherine Pope and Mark Weal (2013) argue that sociologists must be either be 
prepared to work with computer scientists or acquire the necessary computational 
expertise to make use of this new data, otherwise we risk being left behind in these new 
research frontiers. Roger Burrows and Mike Savage (2014, p. 5) argue that this 
redistribution of data outside of the academy serves to ‘challenge the predominant 
authority of sociologists and social scientists more generally to define the nature of 
social knowledge’. Elsewhere, Savage and Burrows (2007, p. 896) diagnose a crisis in 
which sociology’s claim to expertise is under threat, and they urge a response that sees 
sociology take up these new tools ‘coupled with renewed critical reflection’. Savage and 
Burrows (2007) argue that the lack of methodological innovation in sociology has seen 
the discipline outstripped by private sector research practices, predominantly carried 
out for the purposes of profit. Both quantitative and qualitative methods are implicated 
in this shift, which they describe as the ‘age of knowing capitalism’ (2007, p. 885). In 
outlining a response to the crisis, Savage and Burrows (2007, p. 895) caution against 
‘invoking our sophistication in relation to social theory’, insisting that sociologists be 
prepared to take up the new tools but with an eye to redirecting their focus more 
critically, beyond the mere pursuit of profit. Similarly, Linda Mckie and Louise Ryan 
(2012, p. 6) suggest that: 
The challenge for us, as sociologists, is not only to develop and teach the 
necessary skills to utilise the new opportunities presented by knowing 
capitalism, public sociology and new social media, but also to maintain a 
healthy critique and reflexivity about how these construct and present social 
realities. 
However, other scholars have emphasised the importance of theory in bringing about 
this critical approach to the analysis of big data. Ramine Tinati et al. (2014, p. 16) argue 
that sociological theories establish that ‘data are not naturally occurring or unmediated 
but are sociotechnically constructed’, a fact that many forms of computational analysis 
cannot account for. The question of precisely what sociology’s contribution to the 
analysis of big data will be remains to be settled, but, as Tinati et al. (2014, p. 16) 
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conclude, ‘the existing sociological repertoire of methods (and perhaps theories) will not 
be sufficient in this endeavour’. 
While Burrows and Savage (2014) argue that the purpose of this intervention is for 
sociology to retain a voice in the debate about how the social is constituted, it is the 
question of what constitutes the social that goes unchallenged in this response. To put 
it another way, appropriating these new methods into existing sociological 
epistemologies fails to address precisely those conditions of contemporary social life that 
call for methodological innovation. In proposing a return to the familiar language of 
social construction, Burrows and Savage fail to address the question of what changes in 
the nature of the social in the digital age. Yet, the ‘empirical crisis’ in sociology need not 
be resolved through the reassertion of authority over disciplinary territory. Rather, the 
emerging forms of digital sociality associated with the production of big data might be 
seen as an invitation to front up to the limitations of familiar ways we of figuring the 
territory of the social itself. 
As I have argued, contemporary academic debate has been dominated by questions that 
attempt to discern whether mobile digital devices have a negative impact on existing 
forms of social interaction (Lasén and Casado, 2012; Ling and Campbell, 2011; Ling, 
2008; Licoppe, 2004; Katz and Aakhus, 2002). These analyses are concerned with a 
notion of the social as constituted by interaction between actors, and a form of 
sociological analysis that seeks to understand how society is possible (Lash, 2009). This 
is an understanding that has been increasingly called into question in sociology in recent 
years, on the basis that it is reductive of the complexity of social reality (Hynes, 2013, 
2016; Gregg and Seigworth, 2010; Clough, 2009). The principle concern for scholars who 
seek to expand our understanding of the social is the limitations of the existing 
preoccupation with conscious and intentional action, which limits the scope of questions 
about the human to human intention. As I have argued, focusing analysis on conscious 
human experiences and on the interactions between human beings neglects that in-
between or relational dimension of sociality, in which human subjects and ‘their’ objects 
have not yet asserted themselves as determining structures. In contrast, I have proposed 
an approach that is attuned to nonconscious relations and provides a way to consider 
those dimensions of the human-technology relationship that cannot be characterised as 
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deliberate. This perspective prioritises relations, practices, performances and doings, 
rather than the states of mind that have conventionally been the preoccupation of the 
social sciences (Vannini, 2015a). Habits and daily routines that form through repetition 
are difficult to theorise from a representational framework, which is far better placed to 
deal with conscious and intentional action. Yet these noncognitive processes warrant 
investigation, given the foundational role they play in facilitating a great deal of daily 
actions. 
I argue for an expansion of what constitutes the empirical in sociology to consider forces 
prior to conscious awareness. In doing so, I am contributing to a growing body of 
methodological literature in sociology that has sought to stress the importance of 
attending to aspects of social life that have not been traditionally considered relevant 
to sociological discourse (Vannini, 2015b; Coleman and Ringrose, 2013a; Back and 
Puwar, 2012b; Lury and Wakeford, 2012b). What I argue for is not merely the adaptation 
of new methods for new empirical sites but rather a reimagining of sociological 
methodologies. If we acknowledge, as I have argued in the previous chapter, that the 
processual and multiple unfolding of relations is prior to distinct subjects and objects, it 
is a rethinking of what constitutes sociological questions that is needed, first and 
foremost. Increasingly, there is a need for research to go beyond the lenses of 
observation and conversation (Back, 2012), of sense-making practices, to expand 
existing understandings of what constitutes the social. As Back (2012, p. 29) puts it, ‘not 
being limited to what people say explicitly enables us to train a kind of attentiveness to 
tacit forms of coexistence’. More comfortable modes of thought can and must be 
challenged in order to shift the attentiveness of the researcher to be receptive to 
different practices.  
Importantly, this is not merely a shift in focus to attend to a previously neglected aspect 
of social life but indeed a new ontology; namely, an ontology of difference. As I explored 
in the previous chapter, this ontology has an entirely different orientation towards 
understanding the social world. The orientation towards difference is a critical point 
here and one worth considering more closely. Repetition in research methods is more 
commonly associated with the production of universal truths and reproducible 
outcomes, which aid in establishing the legitimacy of a method to make claims about 
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empirical reality. However, the kind of repetition to which I suggest we need to attend 
does not appeal to the universal or identify principles that represent the whole. Rather, 
from the point of view of a different ontology, repetition is the engine of the production 
of change and novelty. 
Given the shifts that I have outlined in the previous chapter, what constitutes the 
empirical ground of this thesis sits outside of what sociology has conventionally 
understood as ‘the social’. It is not simply a matter of developing new methods to 
‘reveal’ these dimensions of social life, but rather requires a rethinking of the very 
nature of what constitutes the empirical in sociology. In order to approach problems in 
new ways, deeply held assumptions must be challenged and modes of thought critiqued. 
In proposing new questions and challenging long held values, the point is not to deny 
the productive capacity of more conventional sociological framings, but rather to disrupt 
their dominance and open space for new methodological approaches which have 
hitherto been unexplored. It is to this end that this thesis has drawn on thinkers such as 
Deleuze, Guattari, Spinoza, Bergson, and more recent scholarship associated with the 
‘affective turn’ (Clough, 2007), as well as ideas on ‘live sociology’ and 
‘nonrepresentational’ approaches in human geography. However, to be clear, I am not 
merely suggesting that such perspectives provide a different lens through which to 
examine existing problems, but rather critique what Deleuze (1994, p. 148) has called 
the ‘dogmatic image of thought’, which limits our capacity to think the social world 
beyond the terms of subjects and objects. While Deleuze speaks from this perspective 
of his discipline of philosophy, the implications of his critique of the dogmatic image are 
far broader in scope, pertaining to the constitution of the very activity of thinking as it 
has been conceived by the Western representational tradition. 
For Deleuze (1994, pp. 129–167), there is a fundamental error in the presuppositions of 
our representational tradition, which pertains to its understanding of thought. The error 
arises when this philosophical image, in seeking to establish its concepts, interrogates a 
presupposition such as rationality, but fails to interrogate the presuppositions upon 
which such a ground is established. There is a dogmatic image of thought in operation, 
Deleuze (1994, p. 130) contends, that determines and limits our understanding of 
thought itself and of what it means to think: 
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Everybody knows, no one can deny, is the form of representation and the 
discourse of the representative. When philosophy rests its beginning upon 
such implicit or subjective presuppositions, it can claim innocence, since it 
has kept nothing back — except, of course, the essential — namely, the form 
of this discourse. 
Thus, the presuppositions that ground the dominant image of thought itself are never 
challenged. In this respect, Deleuze identifies a series of assumptions that limit our 
capacity to think difference, before it is captured within what Deleuze calls the ‘four 
pillars’ of representation; namely, identity, opposition, analogy and resemblance, which 
work together to reduce difference to a merely secondary effect of a more primary 
identity. In this respect, Deleuze’s critique of the dogmatic image recalls Nietzsche’s 
(1990) polemical argument that the process of reasoning and seeking truth through 
which philosophy reaches its conclusions is one that relies far more on desires and drives 
than it discloses. For Nietzsche (1990), true understanding requires a revaluation of that 
mode of thinking that, while claiming to be based upon reason, betrays a commitment 
to inherited notions of good and evil, truth and untruth; thus, essentially, a commitment 
to the moral image of thought. For Deleuze, if we are to truly think difference, these 
implicit assumptions about the nature of thought itself must be undermined and 
interrogated, to determine precisely what they conceal and protect, and at what 
expense they do so.  
It is important to examine carefully the impact of this image of thought and the 
persistence of such assumptions in contemporary sociological scholarship on the mobile 
digital device and more broadly. To this end, I have argued for three shifts in thinking, 
outlined in the previous chapter, which seek to challenge this image of thought. Firstly, 
I have argued for an understanding of repetition as the production of difference rather 
than of sameness, with an eye to understanding the generative capacities of habits. 
Secondly, I have argued for consciousness to be understood not as the origin of action 
but rather as the register of these actions, which can offer only limited insight into their 
cause. Thirdly, I have urged that attention be paid to the impersonal and preindividual 
forces prior to the formation of distinct subjects or objects, rather than attending only 
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to the reduction of these forces as perceived by conscious awareness. These shifts 
respond to the dogmatic image of thinking that prevails in existing discourse. 
Deleuze (1994) argues that the presuppositions that limit our understanding of thought 
are moral ones, as it is only morality that proposes such an affinity between thought and 
truth. Again, the affinities with and influence of Nietzschean thought are noteworthy. In 
Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche (1990) challenges foundational and naturalised 
evaluations and considers what potential an unravelling of such presuppositions might 
hold for thought. Beginning with the valorisation of truth above untruth and certainty 
above uncertainty, he argues that these concepts are far less antithetical than we hold 
them to be. The unquestioning maintenance of these distinctions has become enfolded 
into our evaluative moral systems. These systems are far from natural, though they are 
experienced as such, but merely confirm their own values, whilst claiming a kind of 
innocent connection to reason and truth:  
What in us really wills the truth? In fact, we paused for a long time before 
the question of the cause of this will — until we finally came to a complete 
standstill in front of an even more fundamental question. We asked about 
the value of this will. Granted, we will the truth: why not untruth instead? 
And uncertainty? Even ignorance? The problem of the value of truth came 
before us, — or was it we who came before the problem? (Nietzsche, 1990, 
p. 5) 
Nietzsche (1990) argues that morality is based not on any kind of truth or understanding 
of the world, but rather on what he considers to be the fundamental misunderstandings 
that underpin philosophical thought and thought in general. Nietzsche challenges our 
naturalization of evaluations like the preference for truth over untruth, certainty over 
uncertainty, arguing that these valorised values like truth and certainty are far more 
intermingled, and indeed similar to, the antithetical values we condemn. 
This naturalisation of thought’s relationship to truth founds the common sense 
assumption of the dogmatic image of thought.  In his critique of established modes of 
thought, Deleuze (1994, pp. 129–166) explores these habits of thinking in the form of 
‘common sense’ and ‘good sense’. Good sense and common sense complete each other 
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in the image of thought, as two halves of the whole. Common sense refers to the ‘norm 
of identity from the point of the view of the pure Self and the form of the unspecified 
object which corresponds to it’ (Deleuze, 1994, p. 133). Deleuze argues that common 
sense is the bringing together of different senses in the form of a unified conscious 
subject and stresses that the dogmatic image of thought does not consider sense beyond 
this subject (Somers-Hall, 2013). Good sense, which reinforces common sense, is 
concerned with the judgement of the proper order of things and the creation of 
hierarchies (Williams, 2003). Whilst common sense relates to the unification of sense, 
good sense relates to the normative distribution of sense (Deleuze, 1994, p. 134). 
Common sense, according to Deleuze (1994, p. 226), is defined by ‘the process of 
recognition’. Recognition involves a reliance on sameness, in that we recognise any 
present encounter through similarities to the past and use that recognition to deduce 
truths about the present moment. Deleuze (1994) argues that our capacities are 
inhibited by our desire for sameness and an absolute, universal sense of what is good, 
rendering us incapable of thinking the difference and complexity which truly 
characterises our world. In addition to their inability to think radical difference, these 
concepts remain unchallenged assumptions within the dominant image of thought. 
Indeed, Deleuze argued that philosophy ‘flatters’ itself to have rediscovered these ideas, 
which are embedded in the first instance in its common sense presumptions. 
The dogmatic, moral image of thought founds itself on the forms of representation and 
recognition, and relies on the presumption of a thinking subject who, through the 
harmonious union of the subjective faculties on the object, naturally seeks truth in the 
act of thinking. Deleuze (1994) has the Kantian theory of the faculties in view when he 
argues that the reduction of thought to the act of recognition is understood to be an 
harmonious exercise, in which memory, perception and imagination are drawn upon to 
deduce that it is the same object that is remembered, perceived and imagined. The 
recognition model of thought thus presupposes that thought is the act of a thinking 
subject, in whom the faculties are unified to produce a coherent sense of the object of 
recognition (Somers-Hall, 2013). Recognition must assume a distinct, coherent and 
conscious subject as the perceiver of the object, in order to determine the resemblance. 
Whilst this process can serve a purpose, it should not, Deleuze (1994, p. 138) 
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emphatically insists, serve as a model for thought, because surely in thinking so much 
more is at stake. He explains:  
Recognition thus relies on a subjective principle of collaboration of the 
faculties for ‘everybody’ — in other words, a common sense as a concordia 
facultatum; while simultaneously, for the philosopher, for the form of 
identity in objects relies upon a ground in the unity of a thinking subject, of 
which all the other faculties must be modalities (1994, p. 133). 
To take common sense and recognition as the basis for thought is to construct an 
understanding of thought with a genuine hostility to that which is not recognisable, 
precisely because it is radically different. In the context of this project, when an object 
such as the mobile digital device has produced such a rupture and such an unfamiliar 
intimacy, efforts to reappropriate this intimacy into our existing understandings of the 
social do so within this recognition model. In contrast, and following Deleuze, I argue 
that such an approach cannot understand the radical difference of these new encounters 
with devices. It is not a question of ascertaining, so as to judge, the difference of new 
modes of technological intimacy from the existing state of affairs, which is again to 
relegate difference to a secondary phenomenon with respect to identity (difference as 
opposition or ‘difference from’). Rather, it is a question of attending to a primary field of 
difference as it differentiates itself, and for this, the dogmatic image will not do. Indeed, 
as Deleuze (1994, p. 135) argues, it should rather be on the basis of creativity and 
difference that our model of thought should be established: 
the criticism that must be addressed to this image of thought is precisely that 
it has based its supposed principle upon extrapolation from certain facts, 
particularly insignificant facts such as Recognition, everyday banality in 
person; as though thought should not seek its models among stranger and 
more compromising adventures.  
It is the banality of recognition, in that it seeks only to identify sameness through the 
already reductive perception of conscious awareness that stifles difference. Moments 
that exceed this awareness because they do not belong to existing frames of reference 
have no place in such a model of thought, except as confusions or errors.  
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As I have been arguing throughout the thesis thus far, what is needed in order to address 
and examine the emerging forms of intimacy made possible from our entanglements 
with the mobile digital device is not merely an extension of existing sociological concepts 
but rather a radical rethinking of what constitutes the social. I seek to attend to these 
transformations without erasing real differences through recognising only their 
resemblance to existing organising concepts. Difference, the point of departure, 
unlimited qualitative becoming, cannot be lost for the sake of reaching for familiar 
concepts. As Deleuze (1994, p. 138) explains, when the fundamental understanding of 
what it means to think and know empirical reality is founded on a model of recognition, 
‘difference becomes an object of representation always in relation to a conceived 
identity, a judged analogy, an imagined opposition or a perceived similitude.’ 
I have been suggesting that what is of primary importance is an approach to the empirical 
that is open to the radical difference of the encounter. What Deleuze’s (1994) critique of 
the dogmatic image of thought challenges is the underlying presuppositions about 
thought, which lead to the posing of what, after Bergson, can be called false problems. I 
will have more to say about this shortly. For the moment, the important point is the 
distinction that I am drawing from Deleuze’s (1994, p. 139) critique of the dogmatic 
image between thinking as a banal exercise in recognition and thought as an encounter: 
Something in the world forces us to think. This something is an object not of 
recognition but of a fundamental encounter. What is encountered may be 
Socrates, a temple or a demon. It may be grasped in a range of affective 
tones: wonder, love, hatred, suffering. In whichever tone, its primary 
characteristic is that it can only be sensed. In this sense, it is opposed to 
recognition. 
Difference must be sensed in its affective tones through this encounter, rather than 
discerned through comparison. Importantly, this is not the conscious sense-encounter 
that takes place between a subject and an object, as this is understood from the 
perspective of common sense. Rather this is an encounter prior to consciousness, of 
which recognition can only ever be a reduction.  
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Deleuze’s (1994) emphasis on sense here is significant, as he contends that sense is the 
faculty through which pure difference can be encountered. Deleuze (1994, p. 146) 
challenges Kant’s account of the synthesis of the faculties, instead proposing that there 
is only a ‘discordant harmony’ in which each faculty communicates to the other only 
their difference. Of the faculties, Deleuze (1994, p. 144) identifies sense as primary, 
claiming that ‘on the path which leads to that which is to be thought, all begins with 
sensibility.’ However, he emphasises that it is only a transcendental sensibility that can 
sense difference: 
This element is intensity, understood as pure difference in itself, as that 
which is at once both imperceptible for empirical sensibility which grasps 
intensity only already covered or mediated by the quality to which it gives 
rise, and at the same time that which can be perceived only from the point 
of view of a transcendental sensibility which apprehends it immediately in 
the encounter (Deleuze, 1994, p. 144). 
The distinction between empirical and transcendental sensibility is highly significant 
here, as in empirical sensibility sense is already actualised and made recognisable, and 
thus has already undergone a reduction. The transcendental sensibility to which Deleuze 
refers is prior to these limitations and belongs to the moment of the encounter. In 
making this this distinction between these types of sensibility, Deleuze emphasises that 
difference cannot be reached by working backwards from recognition. Only by 
challenging the fundamental understanding by which recognition supplants sensibility 
can pure difference be sensed. 
When recognition is taken as a model for thought, thought that does not adhere to the 
dogmatic image is seen only as error or misadventure (Deleuze, 1994). While the 
identification of error has been offered as proof of thought’s affinity with truth, the 
dogmatic image reduces everything to error that does not hold to its existing 
presuppositions. This can be seen in the production of common sense, as the unity of 
the faculties is affirmed in the conscious experience of the subject and all that threatens 
this harmony is regarded as error. Similarly, good sense, in reinforcing a normative 
hierarchy, involves a rejection of that which does not constitute the good. To the extent, 
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then, that thought is based on recognition that which cannot be recognised cannot be 
thought and is therefore dismissed as an error. Deleuze (1994, p. 150) argues that that 
philosophy has often defended the dogmatic image through creating a simplistic 
opposition between fact and error by reference to artificial and simplistic conditions, the 
only conditions in which facts could exist: 
For it rather seems to us that there are facts with regard to error, but which 
facts? Who says 'Good morning Theodorus' when Theaetetus passes, 'It is 
three o'clock' when it is three-thirty, and that 7 + 5 = 13? Answer: the myopic, 
the distracted and the young child at school. These are effective examples of 
errors, but examples which, like the majority of such 'facts', refer to 
thoroughly artificial or puerile situations, and offer a grotesque image of 
thought because they relate it to very simple questions to which one can and 
must respond by independent propositions. 
The very conception of error in these instances tells us much about the banality of 
thinking understood as an act of recognition. Insofar as the dogmatic image’s only 
outside is conceived as improper recognition (the confusion of three o’clock for three-
thirty), the dogmatic image protects the presuppositions of its model and condemns 
difference to the status of a mis-answered question or improperly resolved problem. 
In its propensity to dismiss difference as error, the image of thought has a profound and 
detrimental effect on our capacity to conceptualise problems. A recognition model of 
thought, when it encounters something unrecognisable, cannot think this difference. 
Recognition, I have suggested, is a process of reduction by which a thing is compared to 
another and is either identified by sameness or distinguished by a lack of sameness. All 
that can be discerned is differences of degree, which is to say, differences between 
things already given in their identity (Deleuze, 1991). Differences in kind, differences in 
the duration of things, or what Deleuze (1991) sometimes refers to as pure difference, 
cannot be discerned through the act of recognition and thus are always determined as 
errors or to go unnoticed, mistaken for sameness.  
Taking up Bergson’s method of intuition as a mode of criticising false problems, Deleuze 
(1991) argues that ‘badly posed problems’ group together things that differ in kind. 
125 
Deleuze makes much of Bergson’s insistence that false problems assume the conditions 
of the presuppositions on which they are based, whereas true or properly stated 
problems do not reduce the problem itself for the sake of recognisability or solvability. 
Deleuze (1991, p. 23) emphasises that the ‘whole source of the false problems and the 
illusions that overwhelm us lies in this disregard for true differences in kind’. ‘Problems, 
therefore, continue to be traced from the corresponding propositions, and to be 
evaluated according to the possibility of their finding a solution’ (Deleuze, 1994, p. 160). 
As a result of these limiting conditions, problems reinforce and rediscover the very 
preconceptions upon which they are posed. What these false problems miss, Deleuze 
(1994, p. 162) emphasises, is the differential of a problem: 
Problems are tests and selections. What is essential is that there occurs at 
the heart of problems a genesis of truth, a production of the true in thought. 
Problems are the differential elements in thought, the genetic elements in 
the true. 
Whilst philosophy has evaluated problems by the possibility of their solution, Deleuze 
follows Bergson in arguing that we must ‘[a]pply the test of true and false to problems 
themselves’ (1991, p. 5). Deleuze argues that it is through attending to the truth or falsity 
of problems, rather than with their actualisation in a solution, that the dominant image 
of thought can be challenged (Williams, 2003). Following Deleuze and Bergson, then, we 
can identify as a serious limitation of the dogmatic image of thought its preoccupation 
with the actual, rather than with the virtual conditions from which the actual emerges. 
As I discussed in Chapter 3, the virtual is the preindividual potential that constitutes the 
conditions of possibility for the actual, and in the actual there is always an unactualised 
virtual excess (Deleuze and Parnet, 2007). A true problem in which creative, generative 
difference can be found can never fully be resolved as this virtual remainder will not be 
actualised. 
A well posed problem opens up the possibility of an encounter with difference, without 
seeking to understand it only in representational terms. As Rebecca Coleman and Jessica 
Ringrose (2013b, p. 10) explain, this kind of ‘empiricism is a way to study the multiplicity 
of a thing’, without seeking to locate or construct universal principles or explanations. In 
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examining the multiplicity of a thing, I argue for an understanding of the social that is 
not limited to what is actualised, instead seeking to ‘grasp the excess of specificity that 
is always present in the actual’ (Lury and Wakeford, 2012a, p. 12). Taking actualised 
subjects and objects as the proper objects of sociological analysis limits our empirical 
frame to the effects of processes of differentiation without allowing a consideration of 
the conditions through which difference emerges in the actual. 
In the previous chapter I argued that our intimate encounters with mobile digital devices 
demonstrate the inadequacy of the social as it is commonly framed, established on an 
understanding of life as constituted by conscious subjects who act with intention and 
pre-exist their encounters. I argued instead for an attention to be paid to the 
impersonal, preindividual forces prior to the formation of subjects, to the generative 
repetitions that give rise to action, rather than to the conscious awareness of these 
forces. For methods to be inventive in such a way as to resist the traps of false problems, 
the presuppositions that limit thought’s capacity to think difference must be 
undermined. The presuppositions I have discussed here, thought’s natural affinity for 
truth, common sense and good sense, are often thought to be intrinsic to research 
practice itself. However, it is only by interrogating and refusing such assumptions that 
inventive methods can facilitate an encounter with difference rather than merely 
sustain the process of recognition. Certainly, this challenge to traditional sociological 
research practice may involve taking up new methods, but the principle concern is with 
the very questions the discipline poses. 
The call for new ways of problematising and thinking about method in sociology is clearly 
not new. Scott Lash (2009, p. 176), for example, has argued that sociology’s habitual 
focus on the problem of how society holds together and maintains social order is 
premised on a kind of a priori thinking, which ‘starts from axioms that are self-evident, 
that are the most indubitable, and proceeds analytically, without undue reference to 
experience.’ This leads, Lash (2009) argues, to fundamentally conservative questions, 
which attempt to make the empirical coherent and ordered. He argues that sociology 
might more fruitfully orient itself toward a posteriori thinking, which starts instead with 
sense impressions and makes judgements on the basis of these impressions. In doing so, 
he suggests, a posteriori thinking engages with the empirical without seeking to make 
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sense of it through appropriating it into pre-existing schemas (Lash, 2009), and in this 
respect Lash gestures toward a kind of empiricism that is open to encountering the 
ongoing, multiple and processual natural of empirical reality. Law (2004), too, has 
argued that it is our ideas of research as a process of ‘knowing’ the world, our 
prioritisation of clarity over messiness and our attempts to define and determine, that 
are no longer fit for purpose. His call for new methods is a call to deprioritise distinct 
categorisation, with an eye to becoming more attuned to the messiness of the social 
world (Law, 2004).  
I would argue that there is an important difference, however, between such efforts to 
reject rigid categories of analysis and capture the messiness of social life and the kind of 
ontology of difference that I am pursuing here. Whilst Law (2004) provides compelling 
claims for the need to overcome the normativity of method, there remains a need to 
challenge the underlying presuppositions that limit our understanding of what it is to 
think. Though Law (2004, p. 154) characterises this shift in thinking as focused on ‘the 
issues of ontological methodology’, ultimately social reality continues to be confined to 
thought as a form of recognition. As I have been arguing, false problems take as given 
the presuppositions of the dogmatic image of thought, and indeed Law’s problem of 
‘messy’ and ‘neat’ social realities constructs a false problem on these terms. Law accepts 
the presuppositions upon which the more rigid categories of sociological analysis are 
established, only arguing that an approach oriented towards mess rather than distinct 
categories could yield a more accurate understanding of social life. Yet, such an analysis 
does not challenge that assumption of the dogmatic image of thought, which supposes 
that thought has a natural affinity with the true. Without challenging the implicit 
assumptions embedded in the dogmatic image of thought, attending to the ‘mess’ of 
social reality will continue to yield the same ‘clean’ results. 
As I have been arguing, in order to think difference, we must be attuned to the virtual 
potential prior to actualisation. The role of the virtual is primary here and, indeed, it is 
on the basis of the virtual that Deleuze (1994) establishes his transcendental empiricism. 
This empiricism does not elevate experience of a subject to a model of thought but 
attends to the virtual potential, which constitutes the basis for all actual encounters. 
Deleuze distinguishes this potential, the ‘virtual problematic transcendental field’, from 
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its actualisation in an individual (Sauvagnargues, 2012, p. 19) For Deleuze (1994, p. 183), 
transcendental empiricism is concerned with the virtual because the production of 
difference is not a relation between actual entities but a process of transition from 
virtual to actual: 
genesis takes place in time not between one actual term, however small, and 
another actual term, but between the virtual and its actualisation — in other 
words, it goes from the structure to its incarnation, from the conditions of a 
problem to the cases of solution, from the differential elements and their 
ideal connections to actual terms and diverse real relations which constitute 
at each moment the actuality of time. 
Individuation then is a process by which difference is resolved between this virtual 
preindividual environment and a singularity, and subjects and objects are effects of this 
process. Empiricism, as it is commonly understood in sociology as the experience of 
subjects, takes place after virtual potentials have already been actualised and can only 
perceive a reduction the transcendental field. This shift in the nature of the empirical has 
significant implications for the practice of research, as it entirely rejects accounts that 
position relations between actors as generative of social reality. While the virtual, by 
nature, cannot be perceived and therefore cannot be the direct object of study, a 
transcendental empiricism attempts to grasp the encounter, the moment of 
differentiation. As I will go on to discuss in the later part of this chapter, though the 
virtual dimensions of social life cannot be readily observed, methods can be attuned to 
their moment of actualisation. 
As I have established in the previous chapter, the conscious interpretation of individuals 
can offer only a partial insight into intimate relations with mobile digital devices. I have 
argued that consciousness is not the origin of action but the awareness of the outcome 
of these competing forces. I have challenged the ontological primacy of consciousness, 
in order to consider the user-device relationship beyond the constraints of an exclusive 
focus on human agency, intention and will. This critique is also based on a disruption of 
the category of the individual, in favour of Simondon’s (2009) argument that life is in a 
constant process of individuation, wherein potentials are actualised and matter is 
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organized, such that individuals begin to form but are never wholly individual nor 
distinct from these formative processes. An individual, by this account, is never static, 
distinct and bounded but rather in constant formation through the relation of 
preindividual forces.  
I have proposed a critique of the dominant image of thinking in the Western 
representational tradition, with its elevation of the act of subjective recognition of the 
object of knowledge to a model of thought as such (Thrift, 2008). However, it is not a 
question of rejecting representation per se; as much non-representational theory has 
insisted, the real challenge lies in the creation of new concepts and the opening up of 
new questions (Dewsbury et al., 2002). The point is not to deny that representational 
analysis has value, but to emphasise the disproportionate value that has been attributed 
to it. Deleuze (1994, p. xxi) emphasises that a critique of representation serves the 
purpose of facilitating the making, unmaking and remaking of new concepts; in doing so 
‘treats the concept as object of an encounter, as a here-and-now, or rather as an 
Erewhon from which emerge inexhaustibly ever new, differently distributed “heres” and 
“nows”’. While thinkers like Deleuze are involved in a process of constructing a radically 
new account of the structure of reality, this ‘innovation is as much about how to live and 
how to create as it is about a philosophical view of the world’ (Williams, 2003, p. 1). In 
other words, while the ontological claims of his work are central, their implications for 
action in the world are not simply a by-product. Deleuze is precisely concerned with 
what theory can do, and this informs not only the formation of his own theoretical 
concepts but also his engagement with other theorists. Deleuze’s account of using 
theory creatively provides a useful model for drawing on philosophical concepts in 
sociological work, and for reinvigorating old social research methods. Exploring 
problems at the level of ontology serves an important epistemological function in that 
it challenges existing understandings of the problem and facilitates new questions and 
dimensions of problems to come to light. 
As Lury and Wakeford (2012a, p. 2) emphasise, ‘inventiveness is not intrinsic to 
methods; it is rather something that emerges in relation to the purposes to which they 
are put’. Lury and Wakeford (2012a) argue for the creation of inventive methods to 
respond to the shift in thinking towards an ontology of becoming. Inventive methods, 
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they explain, may involve practices familiar to social science, and like these existing 
research practices ‘an inventive method addresses a specific problem, and is adapted in 
use in relation to that specificity; its use may be repeated, but the method is always 
oriented to making a difference’ (Lury and Wakeford, 2012a, p. 11). This orientation 
involves shifting how the empirical itself is understood. Adkins and Lury (2009) contend 
that the empirical is changing in sociology to accommodate a new attention to the 
virtual and preindividual relations through which social life is formed. They argue that 
sociology’s relationship to the empirical should be ‘an experiment of – or with – the yet 
to come’ (Adkins and Lury, 2009, p. 18). Clough (2009) offers a framework for such an 
empiricism, drawing on Deleuze’s transcendental empiricism to critique sociology’s 
preoccupation with conscious perception, suggesting that a rethinking of traditional 
methodologies could allow a reconsideration of the potentiality of matter. Clough (2009, 
p. 44) calls for an ‘infra-empiricism’ ‘that allows a rethinking of bodies, matter and life 
through new encounters with visceral perception and pre-conscious affect.’ Infra-
empiricism resists the dominant modes of empiricism, most commonly positivism and 
scientism, which Clough (2009) argues continue to influence sociological thinking. Like 
Clough, I seek to challenge the underlying presuppositions that frame the empirical and, 
in doing so, create space for methods that are attuned to the impersonal. 
 
4.2 Impersonal methods 
I have argued for the importance of inventive methods, which are open to an encounter 
with difference. However, the challenge remains that many familiar sociological 
research methods are tied to a recognition model of thought. Qualitative research 
methods such as the interview and participant observation are, for example, strongly 
associated with a focus on interpretation and meaning making processes. This is not to 
say that these methods are necessarily seen as unproblematic instances of objective 
data collection and much attention has been paid to their intersubjective character. For 
Norman Denzin (2001), for example, interviews are seen as opportunities for individuals 
to produce representations of the world in collaboration with the interviewer. Similarly, 
Carol Warren (2010, p. 83) describes interview participants as ‘meaning makers’ who 
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convey their experiences to the interviewer through storytelling. As Denzin (1989, p. 10) 
explains, a ‘basic question drives the interpretive project in the human disciplines: How 
do men and women live and give meaning to their lives and capture these meanings in 
written, narrative and oral forms?’ Though the multiplicity of perspectives and meanings 
is acknowledged in this focus on the intersubjective construction of meaning, the 
subjective domain of meaning making clearly remains the key point of focus. To put it in 
more Deleuzian terms, the orientation of the activity of thinking to the thinking subject, 
defined by the unity of the faculties in the self-same being, prevents a properly 
transcendental mode of analysis. Again, it is the question of the ability of such a 
methodological orientation to grasp those emerging realities produced by 
differentiating forces that is at issue here and it is no surprise, given the privileging of 
subjective meaning making in discourses on intersubjectivity, that the construction of 
identity in relation to categories such as class, gender and ethnicity remains the central 
concern (Warren, 2010; Denzin, 2001). 
Like ethnography, autoethnographic research typically takes human experience as its 
primary object. Carolyn Ellis, Tony Adams and Arthur Bochner (2011, p. 3) describe 
autoethnography as the use of 'personal experience to demonstrate facets of cultural 
experiences, and, in doing so, make characteristics of a culture familiar for insiders and 
outsiders.’ Much of the criticism of autoethnographic methods has been surrounding 
issues of validity and credibility (Ellis et al., 2011). Like interviews, autoethnography 
focuses on meaning making and the ‘insider knowledge’ of the researcher (Anderson, 
2006). Autoethnographic reflections, then, are often seen as a way of further securing 
thought’s natural affiliation to the true. Insofar as, for the dogmatic image, method is 
the way of ensuring that thinking does not stray from the path of truth to which it is 
naturally oriented, an autethnographic approach has been celebrated as a way to open 
up new forms of validity in research practice (Ellis et al., 2011). 
Whilst methods such as interviews and autoethnography have primarily been employed 
to draw out conscious experiences, I argue that they can be reappropriated for more 
generative purposes. Methods like autoethnography and interviewing have been closely 
reliant on conscious experience, due to theoretical constraints as well as practical ones, 
but, as J.D. Dewsbury (2010) argues, these methods need not be abandoned. He 
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suggests that existing qualitative research methods can be attuned to the preindividual, 
bodily and noncognitive through a performative methodology. Performative 
methodologies disrupt the habits of research that rely on the dogmatic image of 
thought, determining the ‘object’ of study according to what counts as thought in this 
image (Dewsbury, 2010).  In contrast to a more representational understanding of 
research practice, ‘the object of study for performative research literally comes into 
being through being enacted in the practice of the research itself’ (Dewsbury, 2010, p. 
324). ‘Part of the ethos of this type of research then is to keep the researcher alive to 
change and chance’ (Dewsbury, 2010, p. 324), and it is through this openness to the 
dynamic encounter of research that familiar methods can yield new insights. 
Traditional research methods can be reconsidered in light of this performative 
methodology and can used in experimental ways. Dewsbury (2010) suggests an 
approach that incorporates paying attention to immediate and somatic experiences, 
whilst acknowledging the impossibility and even undesirability of completely displacing 
conscious processes. Sarah Dyke’s (2013) ethnographic study of Anorexia Nervosa 
provides a useful demonstration of this practice, in which an attentiveness to these 
moments of excess is cultivated. During an interview, Dyke (2013, p. 159) described an 
encounter with a participant who, trying to explain the circumstances that had caused 
her eating disorder, gestures towards this excess: 
As she traced the circumstances of her own life I often sensed that something 
remained problematically inaccessible. She struggled to make sense, not 
least of all because her good and common sense conceived the body as 
bordered, fixed, autonomous and intentional. 
In the interview, Joanne has difficulty reconciling her understanding of her body as 
intentional and her experiences of bodily desires, which challenge this very 
understanding. Rather than seeking to settle or rectify these contradictions, or simply 
dismissing them as errors, Dyke’s analysis here draws out these moments of tension. It 
is in these moments, Dyke (2013) argues, that a greater understanding of the 
preindividuality of the encounter can be gained. 
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With an eye to becoming attuned to, and drawing out, those moments that exceed 
conscious awareness and the act of recognition, the empirical aspect of this project 
focused on unstructured interviews with mobile digital device users. I conducted 
eighteen interviews with individuals who identified themselves as mobile digital device 
users, four of whom were also mobile application (app) developers. Participants were 
selected using a snowball sampling technique (Bryman, 2008), with an initial contact 
known to me offering referral to other participants. I chose to use an unstructured 
interview technique, which ‘dispenses with formal interview schedules and ordering of 
questions’ (Minichiello et al., 1990, p. 92). Though this style of interviewing is often 
drawn upon with the purpose of creating a space for interpretations and meaning-
making practices from participants (Minichiello et al., 1990), more importantly for my 
purpose this style of interview allowed discussion to shift in unexpected directions. As I 
will discuss later in this chapter, these unstructured interviews functioned less as data 
or texts to be read and interpreted and more as encounters or provocations for thought. 
Given my concern with an ontology of difference, the participants were not intended to 
serve as a representative sample and the only criteria for selection was that the 
participant be a mobile digital device user. Prior to the interview, participants were given 
an information sheet that broadly outlined the aims of the project, and I advised them 
that the interview would involve a discussion of their device use and habits. The 
participants ranged in age from eighteen to thirty-five, including ten men and eight 
women, though again the selection of participants was not controlled for age or gender.  
I included app developers in the interviews because, in addition to be being regular 
device users, their work experience positions them to observe habitual mobile digital 
device use and requires they cultivate the kind of attentiveness to the emergent 
capacities in these practices towards which this thesis has been oriented. This is not to 
say that these participants possess specific knowledge in comparison to the other 
participants on the basis of their identity as designers, but rather that their practices are 
instructive. The process of designing mobile applications requires developers to 
anticipate something that cannot be anticipated, and attend to aspects of the mobile 
digital device that, by their nature, elude our conscious awareness. I drew inspiration 
here from James Ash’s (2010) study of video game designers, in which he examines the 
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design and testing of video games. Ash (2010, p. 653) argues that experience of 
gameplay is ‘a relation between the code space of the game and the embodied 
techniques users generate in response to these environments’. Video game designers 
cannot act to shape action deterministically, because it is not possible to fully anticipate 
how the game tester and game interaction will unfold. Ash (2010) characterises 
gameplay as an event, in the sense that it is transformative and contingent. Like video 
games, the development of mobile applications involves a significant interplay between 
design and testing, both of the functions of the application and of the usability of those 
functions (Gao et al., 2014; Kaikkonen et al., 2005). Because of their role in the design 
and testing of apps, I was interested in the reflections of app developers and their 
understandings of the habitual elements of device use. 
The encounter of the interview must be understood not only in terms of its in-the-
moment unfolding but also in the light of the repetitions of the recordings, and the 
practice of transcription.  All Interviews were audio recorded, except one upon the 
request of the participant, which was documented using notes taken down by hand. I 
later listened to the recordings and transcribed the interviews, whilst reflecting back on 
notes I had taken during the interview. Whilst these research practices are often 
undertaken with the purpose of carefully documenting the words exchanged in the 
interview with the intention of identifying common themes emerging throughout and 
for the purpose of validity and accuracy (Bryman, 2008, pp. 478–485), it was the 
generative repetition of difference in the listening that concerned me more. There were 
moments in the interviews that passed by unnoticed that seemed to stretch out in the 
recording, expanding in my memory as I typed out the words and further still as I 
considered what had occurred.  Far beyond their actual happening in time, the interview 
material shifted and transformed throughout the project, with some moments seeming 
insignificant in situ and proving to have a far stronger echo upon re-listening.  
Throughout the interviews and afterwards while putting together the transcripts, I also 
documented moments where participants would laugh, pause, struggle to explain and 
engage in other expressions that fail to land on distinct words. I took down notes during 
all interviews related to aspects of the conversation that would not be picked up on the 
recording device, including gestures, movements, and facial expressions. I noted, too, 
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those moments when participants would reach for their device, often left on the table 
during the interview, sometimes to explain something, sometimes just to touch it. 
Sometimes I would ask them to show me something specific, and other times 
participants would show me things without prompting. This provided an opportunity to 
observe the physical entanglement of user and object, and it was these brief moments 
that elicited some of the most unexpected aspects of the interview. I documented these 
moments in my notes and incorporated them into the transcripts of the interviews. 
Given the interest in the impersonal mode here, the interviews were broadly concerned 
with participants’ device use and practices, rather than with their interactions with other 
human subjects through the mobile digital device. Though the interviews were 
somewhat informed by a list of general questions I had in mind, they were by no means 
limited to these questions and were driven almost entirely by the conversation as it 
unfolded. The aim of these questions was not to necessarily gain answers to preformed 
questions, but rather to get the participant talking more about their everyday routines 
with the smartphone. The difficulty of conducting an interview about something that 
many participants saw as unremarkable meant that it was not always possible to get 
detailed answers to direct questions. Often participants had a sense that the more 
important and interesting aspects of the issue were related to whether the smartphone 
or tablet was a ‘good thing’ or not. It was easier to understand the routines established 
around mobile digital devices by asking participants questions that might elicit a 
narrative, rather than an ‘answer’ as such. Minichiello et. al (1990, pp. 107–145) 
describe this as a ‘storytelling’ technique, which involves using questions that require 
the participant to go beyond a descriptive answer, to explain themselves in further 
depth. Though this technique can be problematic in its tendency to encourage 
participants to reform their experiences as linear narratives (Minichiello et al., 1990, pp. 
107–145), it can also assist in garnering more detailed accounts when participants might 
not see the need to expand. For example, participants often responded to a query about 
when they first use their smartphone during the day with a self-deprecating joke about 
how ‘terrible’ it was that they woke up to the device. While their perception of what 
was healthy and not healthy was not a primary concern for this project, asking them to 
expand on why they felt bad about using their device first thing in the morning opened 
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up the discussion and allowed the participant to expand their explanation, often leading 
to them discussing in more depth those moments where they felt their device-use was 
‘out of hand’. I found this to be a useful practice, even though the interest of this project 
was in relations between human and device, not a human subject’s interpretation of 
their behaviour, as it was in these moments that participants would commonly grasp for 
the words to describe the often-contradictory desires they felt for the device and what 
they ‘know’ to be healthy. In particular, offering participants the space to describe 
practices that they thought of as inappropriate allowed me to observe the interactions 
with their device that were uneasy or cause discomfort. Moments of confusion or error 
or contradiction on the part of the participant, moments that might conventionally be 
discounted as insignificant, became increasingly significant. These rich narratives 
provided a greater understanding of the intimacy between user and device when the 
participant might initially be hesitant to describe the relationship in such terms. 
Despite using these techniques, there were certainly difficulties in the interviews in 
encouraging participants to discuss these everyday practices in depth. Some interviews 
became quite uncomfortable as I attempted to leave breaks in the conversation to allow 
participants to expand on their point further. Some participants were anxious to 
establish that they did not need the smartphone or tablet, and that their relationship 
with the device was healthy, and this is a phenomenon I discuss further in Chapter 5. 
This anxiety about being seen as abnormal was sometimes a point of tension in the 
interviews as participants sought to downplay their involvement with the devices. 
However, these points of tension provided opportunities in which participants would 
recount details of intimate moments with the device, and though these may be 
explained for the purpose of illustrating what one ought not to do these moments also 
caused participants to dwell on these intimacies further. As Dewsbury (2010) insists, we 
too often encounter the world through those familiar modes of thought that confirm 
our representational view of the world, and we must acknowledge the impossibility of 
completely overcoming these limitations. However, Dewsbury (2010) urges that we 
must continue to fail, and ‘fail better’, since it is only the dogmatic image of thought that 
renders the very idea of failure in research practice inadmissible. Indeed, it was 
moments of error, confusion, pause, awkwardness, failure, humour and tension that 
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have constituted the empirical spark of this thesis. The interviews and the processes of 
repetition in the listening and relistening afterwards, allowed me to dwell on the 
moments of tension that suggested that new forms of intimacy with the device were 
emerging. 
 
4.3 Repetition in the telling 
This project also draws on the method of the anecdote (Michael, 2012b) to further 
develop the kind of attentiveness to moments that may not traditionally be considered 
part of research practice. Michael’s (2012b, p. 26) method of the anecdote differs from 
autoethnography in that it serves the purpose not of reflecting one’s experiences, but 
‘explicitly incorporating the performativity of research’. Broadly speaking, anecdotes 
refer to stories about incidents or events, however Michael (2012b) emphasises the 
performativity of the telling of an anecdote rather than its record of an event. It is in 
their unfolding in the telling, in their anecdotalisation, that the anecdote can ‘serve as a 
means for tracing the co-emergence of research, researcher and researched’ (Michael, 
2012b, p. 27). Anecdotalisation is well placed to explore moments of failure, error and 
other encounters typically excluded from the category ‘research data’. Michael (2012b, 
pp. 29–30) provides the example of a ‘disastrous interview’, in which he recounts a 
situation in which a combination of pets running amok, disinterested participants and 
recording mishaps ultimately led to an interview seemingly yielding ‘no data’. However, 
in anecdotalising this encounter beyond its ‘failure’ Michael (2012b, p. 30) argues that: 
the episode entailed a complex set of interactions where humans, animals 
and technologies were involved in a process of constituting orderings and 
disorderings by virtue of the various relations into which they had entered. 
Michael (2012b, p. 31) emphasises that it is not merely a matter of rereading the 
encounter as if it were a text to be reinterpreted, since ‘that would be to regard the 
anecdote as simple representation upon which one could do conceptual work, to treat 
it as analytic fodder’. Rather it is the performative capacity of the anecdote that Michael 
(2012b) emphasises, as an anecdote is not only a retelling of an event but in this 
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retelling, it is an ‘irritant’ that is generative. Michael (2012b, p. 34) describes anecdotes 
operating as ‘heterogeneous interlocutors’ in their capacity to disrupt the expected 
focus of research practice. 
I draw on the method of anecdotalisation to bring my own reflections and experiences 
with my mobile digital devices into the thesis. I use anecdotes to dwell on moments of 
intimacy with my own device and moments in the research process that do not fall 
within the limits of the interview. Given my position as a mobile digital device user, many 
moments in interviews with participants elicited responses and reflections about my 
own use or experiences, which I draw on throughout the thesis. In this sense, the 
interviews themselves often contained performative anecdotes that, in the participants’ 
retelling, generated encounters with the past experiences for myself as the listener. I 
have chosen to start each chapter in this thesis with these anecdotes from moments 
connected to the interviews or retellings of experiences that were brought to mind in 
the interviews, to cultivate for the reader a sense of proximity with the empirical 
material and a familiarity with the kinds of practices that demonstrate the inadequacy 
of existing modes of thought. The purpose of adopting the anecdote as a method was 
not to gain insight into my personal experiences, as would be the classical 
autoethnography, but rather develop to develop attentiveness to habitual activities, 
both for myself in the process of recording these anecdotes and for the reader in their 
retelling in the text. This is especially relevant in relation to time, in that the experience 
of the telling of the anecdote can bring together past moments unexpectedly into the 
present, altered suddenly by the generative repetition brought forth by the anecdote. 
As Michael (2012b, p. 33) explains, anecdotalisation: 
brings together what might once have seemed distant and disconnected: 
past episodes that are marginal and trivial illuminate contemporary 
moments of critical reflection and reorientation, and contemporary concerns 
render what had long been uninteresting past moments full of relevance.  
Anecdotalisation is a process that allows the researcher to attempt to resist patterns of 
thinking and evaluation that determine from the outset what is relevant in an 
encounter, while acknowledging that such resistance can never fully be achieved. The 
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anecdote acts to draw attention to the excessive and the performative dimensions of 
practice, which are lost when we retain too firm a sense of what constitutes valid 
research data. 
Anecdotalisation differs from much autoethnographic practice, which, as I have 
discussed, is predominantly focused description and analysis of personal experience 
with the purpose of gaining insight into subjective interpretations (Ellis et al., 2011; 
Denzin, 1989). Though autoethnography, and other biographical methods are closely 
tied to individual, personal narratives and emotional intimacy (Ellis and Bochner, 2006), 
as I have been arguing, these methods can be repurposed toward more experimental 
ends. In this respect, Michael’s method of anecdotalisation provides a timely reminder 
that biographical methods can be experimentally pushed beyond their representational 
focus and adapted to attend to more impersonal forces. 
It is with such an aim in mind that I have sought to shift the focus of my methods away 
from more personal accounts, in order to attend to the preindividual and impersonal 
forces that constitute the encounter. However, in undertaking an impersonal method, 
especially in regard to addressing the technological, I do not seek to imbue impersonal 
things with human qualities. In particular, I seek to distinguish this impersonal approach 
from methods that anthropomorphise non-human objects. Jane Bennett (2010, p. 98), 
for example, suggests that a reflexive anthropomorphisation could be a useful way of 
paying attention to the capacities of nonhumans, allowing us to the see the ways in 
which nonhuman agency is intertwined with human agency. Seeing life through the lens 
of ‘humanness’, Bennett (2010, p. 99) suggests, can be a way into thinking about life as 
a complex intermingling of relations, rather than merely as subjects and objects: ‘[w]e 
at first may see only a world in our own image, but what appears next is a swarm of 
"talented" and vibrant materialities (including the seeing self).' However, my concern is 
that this approach does not sufficiently disturb the distribution of force according to 
human subjects and their (nonhuman) objects, even if it extends agency or ‘humanness’ 
to objects. To put it another way, it does not for my purposes adequately challenge the 
underlying problem with the concept of agency, human or otherwise, which is that it is 
posited as possessed by an actor. As discussed in Chapter 3, rather than argue merely 
for the extension of human status to nonhuman actors, this thesis seeks to maximise 
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the unsettling effects of an ontology that challenges the distinctness of the individual 
actor through an attention to generative, presubjective relations. 
In the same way as the interview data used in this thesis is not intended to reveal the 
truth of human experience with devices, the method of the anecdote is not employed 
to yield any kind of truth, even any truth of my own encounters with devices, which will 
always be in excess of conscious experience. Rather this practice of attending to and 
sitting with moments of entanglement with my devices offered momentary glimpses of 
the minute transformations that could occur in everyday encounters with these devices. 
The experiences recalled as anecdotes in this thesis often struck me at the time as 
confusing, or embarrassing, but it was only in the retelling of the story, and the ongoing 
repetition, that this moment began to seep into new concepts of intimacy as the thesis 
developed. 
Given the challenge to representational modes of thought that I seek to pursue, it is 
worth exploring precisely how interview data, autoethnography and anecdotes are used 
in the rest of the thesis. As I have indicated, they do not serve as proof of thought’s 
correlation to truth, nor should they be seen as offering a generalisable form of 
knowledge. As Dewsbury et. al. (2002, p. 439) argue, ‘an example is only an example of 
itself’, and each empirical moment should be considered in its specificity, in its capacity 
for transformation. The purpose of a quote is less to provide a representation of a 
concept or theme than to attempt to bring to the writing echoes of an instant in which 
something unexpected was glimpsed. In the chapters that follow I will draw on empirical 
material from my interviews and anecdotes from my encounters with mobile digital 
devices to cultivate in the reader a sense of the intimacy this thesis seeks to understand. 
Methods oriented towards the repetition of difference reverberate beyond the event of 
what would traditionally be considered ‘data collection’ (Lury and Wakeford, 2012a). As 
I have argued earlier in this chapter, the process of transcription also produced 
generative repetitions in which moments in the interviews were transformed and 
opened up through my listening and relistening. As Lury and Wakeford (2012a) argue, 
inventive methods open up spaces of difference through their repetitions. In this sense 
methods do not uncover pre-existing objects that existing in the world but invent, 
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create, giving being to what did not exist prior to its intervention (Gane, 2009). Nicholas 
Gane (2009, p. 85) argues that Deleuze saw the task of thought to ‘address the “given” 
as something that is to be placed in question, and to ask the ways through which subjects 
constitute themselves, or perhaps are constituted, through the encounters with the 
empirical or pre-conceptual world’. If we take seriously the capacity of the empirical in 
constituting subjects, the utterances of subjects are more than representations. 
Anecdotes and moments from the interviews are not brought forth in this thesis as a 
capture of the original event they stand in place for. Rather, they are generative of 
difference in their own right through their repetition and retelling. 
As this chapter has explored, this thesis responds to two interrelated methodological 
debates in contemporary sociology. Mobile digital devices, both as a part of social 
changes associated with the rise of a fluid and dynamic digital culture, and as a rich 
source of data about the movements and activities of their users, pose a methodological 
challenge to sociology. Increasingly, sociologists sense a coming crisis of the empirical 
that challenges the discipline, pushing it into unfamiliar territory. Some argue that this 
challenge comes in the form of a threat to our claims of expertise over the social, and 
that new tools must be reclaimed from capitalistic private enterprise and regenerated 
in combination with existing sociological epistemologies (Burrows and Savage, 2014; 
Savage and Burrows, 2007). Other scholars suggest that the shifting and unstable nature 
of contemporary life calls for a reconsideration of how the empirical itself is thought 
(Back, 2012; Back and Puwar, 2012a; Adkins and Lury, 2009; Clough, 2009). I have argued 
for an interrogation of the underlying presuppositions of thought in order to bring to 
the fore an ontology of difference. The image of thought presupposes an affinity 
between thought and truth, the unification of sense in the form of common sense, and 
valorises recognition over sense (Deleuze, 1994). This model of thought renders 
difference only ever a secondary representation, and thought that does not fit within 
this model can only be understood as an error. It is on and in these ‘errors’ that this 
project seeks to linger, with an eye to generating new sociological questions and 
problems and producing an expanded understanding of what constitutes the social. 
In drawing on qualitative interview material and the ‘heterogeneous interlocutor’ of the 
anecdote (Michael, 2012b) in this thesis, I seek to underscore not what the empirical 
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material represents but what it can do. As I go on to explore the themes of distraction, 
repetition and intimacy, I draw out moments in which my participants are, by necessity, 
engaged in the conscious articulation of their experiences and feelings about their 
devices. However, both in the moment and in their retelling these discussions are not 
singularly conscious experiences but are constituted by a multitude of forces, many of 
which elude conscious interpretation. There is always an excess to these moments that 
urges further consideration. These moments do not ‘stand in’ for the ‘real’ thing but are 
encounters in and of themselves in their retelling in the thesis, and it is in this generative 
repetition that I hope the reader can dwell.  
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Chapter 5: Intertwined 
As I arrive at the university, I realise I have left my iPhone at home. Noticing its absence 
as I reach into the pocket in my bag where it usually sits, the discomfort is subtle but 
persistent. Not ten minutes later I reach back into the pocket where it usually sits, 
unsurprisingly it is still empty. Later I find myself checking my pockets for the device only 
to remember that the iPhone I am reaching for is not there. 
Hours pass, and I continue to feel the same inclination to reach for the device arise at 
seemingly random moments of the day. I pause in the middle of typing a sentence and 
feel my hand just beginning to reach, but before it does I remember that the device is not 
here. These inclinations dissipate just as quickly as they spark, barely perceptible. 
When I get home, I feel anxious to check the device I haven’t held for eight hours. It is 
strangely cold, having been left on a table, out of human hands for the day. As I flick 
through the missed notifications I feel at ease. 
The encounter between device and user is constituted by a multitude of minute 
transformations. Contemporary sociological discourse on mobile digital devices and 
device culture has tended to focus on the intervention of this device on what would 
typically be seen as constituting ‘the social’; namely, being the interaction between 
human actors. As a result of this focus, the kinds of questions that have been asked 
about mobile digital devices have been primarily limited to moral questions about what 
kinds of interactions should be mediated through these devices and how existing social 
relationships are changed by the mobile digital device. However, as I have argued, 
beyond seemingly concrete entities, transformations take place beneath conscious 
awareness to generate new inclinations and capacities. These inclinations and capacities 
cannot be conceptualised in a framework concerned with concrete identities, which 
sees the social world as constituted by relations between these social actors. As I have 
argued, it is only through an empiricism that can acknowledge forces prior to the 
formation of subjects that these relations can be explored, an empiricism that is 
interested in the conditions of emergence, rather than only with its effects.  
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I argue for a reinterpretation of habits and distraction, concepts that have tended to be 
understood pejoratively in the social sciences. As I will go on to argue, there is much to 
be gained in considering what these relations make possible beyond the limited terms 
of human agency and intention. In Chapter 3 I argued for an understanding of habitual 
action and repetition that is attentive to the generative capacity of this relation. In this 
chapter I will explore these relations in depth, drawing on interview material. I will also 
include reflections on my own relations with my device in the form of anecdotes 
(Michael, 2012b), a method discussed in the previous chapter. This chapter will discuss 
the habitual and repetitive practices of the device-user, with an eye to considering the 
interplay of competing forces that constitute this encounter, through which seemingly 
distinct entities form and reform.  
As outlined in the previous chapter, and given the kinds of shifts in thinking I am 
responding to in this thesis, the empirical material is employed here not as proof of the 
correctness of a statement, but instead as a spark for new ways of thinking. These 
moments are generative, not representations or examples bounded by their place on 
the page, and they draw attention to the limitation of existing modes of thought. It is 
the moments that defy representation that force consideration of the excessive nature 
of daily life (Massumi, 2002). Both the interviews and anecdotes in this thesis, then, are 
employed with an eye to remaining attentive to moments that may not sit clearly within 
a sense of what ordinarily constitutes ‘data’. Where data collection in the social sciences 
traditionally focuses on discerning patterns or gathering statements that are 
representative or reflective of lived reality, my aim here is to identify those moments in 
the discourse of my participants at which bifurcations and new directions are 
perceptible. Michael (2012b) speaks of ‘heterogeneous interlocutors’ to indicate the 
way that the process of ‘anecdotalization’ can operate as a catalyst for new possibilities. 
As Michael (2012b, p. 34) puts it: 
anecdotalization entails a semiotic and material dialogue between past and 
present through, and with, bodies, memories, stories, objects and texts. If 
this conversation is any good, uninvited topics, unexpected insights and 
untoward issues should emerge, and in emerging should go on to feed the 
very process of anecdotalization. 
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What is crucial is that these quotes and reflections are not as content to be read, so 
much as instances of a performative retelling, and in this sense, they are encounters in 
and of themselves. As I go on to explore the themes of distraction and habits, the 
repetition of these empirical moments is not intended to demonstrate resemblance 
between these events and my concepts. Rather it is my intention for these methods to 
be generative in their repetitions for the reader in creating a sense of the excessive 
nature of these relations of distraction and habitual encounters. 
The mobile digital device user engages in routine, repetitious and regular practices with 
his or her device. A central premise of dominant critiques of digital device culture is that 
these habitual actions have transitioned from conscious contemplation to pure 
mechanism (Turkle, 2015; Y. K. Lee et al., 2014; Rosen, 2012; Oulasvirta et al., 2011). 
Particularly within psychological accounts, repetitious use of the mobile digital device 
has been associated with addiction or otherwise pathologised. Yu-Kang Lee, Chun-Tuan 
Chang, You Lin and Zhao-Hong Cheng (2014, p. 373), for example, states that ‘excessive 
usage and habitual checking on missed calls or messages may result in compulsive usage 
and even lead to mobile phone addiction for smartphone users.’ The association with a 
lack of conscious control and awareness is significant here, as actions that become 
categorised as habitual are rendered ‘unthought’. As such, they are seen only in deficit, 
as a loss of what was originally consciously managed.  
It is not only that repetitious and habitual actions are conceived as deficient in relation 
to conscious activity but that, because of this, they are understood as pathological or 
antithetical to freedom. Since habitual action is posited as sitting outside of conscious 
deliberation, it is therefore believed to be more at risk of manipulation (Hassan, 2012; 
Pettman, 2015). This is articulated by Hassan (2012, p. 136) as central to an inability to 
see the exploitation and oppression to which we are increasingly subject under late 
capitalism: 
Continually preoccupied by active and persistent information in all its 
networked diversity leaves us little time to reflection and pause; little time 
to stop and consider our increasingly inattentive condition, either as an 
146 
individual or as a member or an at least notional class of exploited 
information workers. 
For Hassan (2012, p. 3), the repetition of habitual actions generated by new devices, 
such as smartphones, serves to reconfigure temporal relations, producing what he calls 
‘presentism’, a state in which ‘past and future are compressing steadily into a constant 
now.’ This presentism prevents reflection, rendering device users ‘chronically 
distracted’ from the consequences of contemporary capitalism’s detrimental temporal 
logic. Habits are charged with operating to conceal structures of power. They are also 
associated with the deterioration of creativity and control, which, Hassan contends, are 
surrendered to one’s relation to the device. What is notable is that such an analysis 
invariably posits habits as problematic automation without contemplation. 
In contrast, I argue that the habitual dimensions of the device-user relationship are not 
secondary to the conscious relations of a thinking subject engaging with an inert object. 
I seek to challenge these pejorative understandings of distraction and prioritisation of 
conscious awareness upon which they are established. I argue that habitual relations 
are primary and facilitate conscious engagement. To be clear, these relations of 
repetition and habituation operate prior to and beneath conscious awareness, which 
arises as a result of these relations and are not their cause. This chapter will explore in 
depth the routine habits of participants and discuss the generative capacities of habits. 
Habits in this context are much more than simply ‘everyday practices’, but rather involve 
a process of repetition that is fundamentally generative not only of conscious experience 
but of moments which exceed this awareness. I argue that such habits generate new 
capacities rather than simply extinguish the spark of conscious interpretation. The 
creative capacities of repetition are of no small importance in the context of user-device 
relations. Indeed, as I will establish, it is only through this transformation of practices, 
through these generative habits, that the kind of intimate relations with the device that 
this thesis explores are made possible. Repetition creates the conditions in which a 
peculiar kind of intimacy, which I have called ‘impersonal intimacy’, is generated, as the 
next chapter will go on to explore. 
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5.1 Everyday habits 
Both in mobile device literature and in the philosophical tradition and social sciences 
more broadly, habits are associated with a loss of agency and creativity and a fall into 
mechanism. As I explored in Chapter 3, anxieties around habit stem from the assumption 
that habitual actions are not subject to conscious evaluation and therefore may conflict 
with the desired action of the individual. This is reflected in psychological discourse, 
which problematises habitual action as compulsive and symptomatic of addiction, or 
desire that is out of control (Bian and Leung, 2015; U. Lee et al., 2014; Khang et al., 2013; 
Salehan and Negahban, 2013). This perspective also informs the social psychological 
discourse on ‘automaticity’ in mobile digital device practices (Bayer, Campbell, et al., 
2016; Bayer, Dal Cin, et al., 2016), discussed in Chapter 1, which argues the habits that 
develop around the use of mobile digital devices originate in conscious intention but 
then become less intentional through repetition, eventually becoming automated. 
These perspectives all rely on the notion that consciousness is the origin of action within 
a thinking subject and that habits must constitute the loss of this origin. 
Within sociology, understandings of habit have been influenced by thinkers such as Kant 
and Bourdieu, and the concept retains negative associations with a lack of free will and 
the internalisation of class structures. Kant (1991) saw conscious deliberation and ‘inner 
freedom’ as essential for moral action, and for an action to be moral it must involve free 
will. Habit, therefore, for Kant, was a mechanism rather than arising from a 
determination of the will and therefore cannot be the basis of moral action. Kant’s 
positioning of habit as antithetical to moral judgement remains influential in sociology. 
However, the most familiar understanding of habit in contemporary sociology comes 
from Bourdieu’s concept of habitus (Camic, 1986). For Bourdieu (1990, p. 54), habitus 
concerns the reproduction of structures of privilege and the manifestation of class 
structures in the form of dispositions. Bourdieu (1990, p. 55) does not completely 
contrast habits to free will, instead arguing they arise out of ‘conditional freedom’, 
which operates within the constraints of social structures. However, it is important to 
note that habitus, for Bourdieu, is the effect of external forces. While their 
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understandings of habits differ, both Bourdieu and Kant conceptualise habits via their 
relationship to conscious intention, rather than in terms of their generative capacities. 
In contrast, I argue for an understanding of habit as an asymmetrical repetition which is 
not an effect of conscious awareness. While thinkers like Kant have understood habit as 
a loss of the moral evaluation conscious interpretation brings, I turn to the work of 
Deleuze and Ravaisson to conceptualise the habitual beyond such limited terms. As I 
explored in Chapter 3, Deleuze (1994) identifies two forms of repetition: bare repetition 
and clothed repetition. Clothed repetition operates prior to conscious awareness and is 
the dynamic process through which difference is generated. Bare repetition, which is 
the repetition that is most readily perceptible, is instead the effect of clothed repetition 
(Deleuze, 1994). What is consciously perceived as repetition of the same is, in fact, the 
effect of a more dynamic selection of difference. Deleuze’s philosophy urges an 
understanding of repetition as more than merely the return of the same action. 
Again, I turn to Ravaisson’s theory of habit to explore further the capacity of habits to 
generate new capacities. For Ravaisson (2008), actions are strengthened through 
repetition, not rendered mechanistic. Repetition is characterised not by the reiteration 
of sameness, but by the possibility of change. As I have argued in Chapter 3, this 
consideration of repetition as generative offers a way into understanding habitual 
relations that is attuned to their transformative capacities. As an action is repeated, 
effort diminishes and the efficiency of the action increases. Repetition also alters the 
way that the sensations of the action are experienced, as the repetition diminishes the 
felt sensation. Most significantly, Ravaisson (2008, p. 57) argues that habits, in their 
repetitions, create new inclinations that are transformative: 
Such inclinations, such ideas become more and more the form, the way of 
being, even the very being of these organs. The spontaneity of desire and 
intuition is dispersed, in some way, as it develops, within the indeterminate 
multiplicity of the organism. 
What Ravaisson offers here is an understanding of habits as generative of new ways of 
being, transforming the body at the level of capacities prior to conscious awareness. He 
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identifies desire as dispersed by the repetitious transformation of habits, providing a 
way to think desire beyond merely conscious intention towards a goal.  
As I explored in Chapter 3, Bergson’s theory of time as duration sheds light on the 
significance of repetition and habits. Bergson (2001, p. 90) argues that time has 
predominantly been understood as homogenous and quantitative, in which ‘our 
conscious states are arranged alongside one another as in space, so as to form a discrete 
multiplicity.’ For Bergson (2001), such an understanding of time as segmented and 
measurable cannot grasp the duration that characterises all living beings. Duration is 
heterogeneous, multiple, and not measurable. It is also through understanding time as 
duration that Bergson (1991, p. 34) produces an understanding of the multiplicity of the 
present moment, in that the past always exists in the present through memory: 
However brief we suppose any perception to be, it always occupies a certain 
duration, and involves consequently, an effort of memory which prolongs, 
one into another, a plurality of moments.  
Bergson (1991) identifies two forms of memory. One is memory-images, which take the 
form of personal recollections, and the other is habit-memory, which is formed through 
repetition (Bergson, 1991). For Bergson, habits constitute a form of a memory that co-
exists in the present; through asymmetrical repetitions, habit actualises potential 
(Grosz, 2013). At the same time, there is always a virtual remainder, a future potential 
yet to be actualised. Only by proposing an understanding of time that is not linear and 
segmented but multiple and heterogeneous, can Bergson demonstrate the significance 
of habits. Habits are the process through which past bodily capacities persist in the 
present and future inclinations emerge. Significantly, habits shape new perceptions 
through the ‘plurality of moments’ they draw into the present. 
It is this kind of generative understanding of habit that I seek to draw out here. I argue 
for an understanding of mobile digital device habits as a process of generative 
repetition, which may not rise to the level of conscious awareness. As we turn now to 
an exploration of the empirical moments that inform this thesis, this important shift in 
thinking will allow an attention to the more-than-conscious, the excessive glimpses that 
urge a rethinking of what it is to ‘use’ a device. It is precisely these moments that resist 
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our desire to ‘know’ them, that call attention to the limitations of a representational 
mode of evaluation, concerned with subjects who wilfully act on objects.  
The interactions that participants had with their mobile digital devices were established 
upon a foundation of habitual movements, which facilitated the ease of their use. 
Smartphones and tablets tend to be based on soft touch, swiping actions rather than 
the button pressing of older mobile phones, as many of these devices use touch screens 
(Goggin, 2011b). As participants in my study would operate their devices in the 
interviews I noticed that their fingers would move in anticipation of the next required 
swipe or tap, with their fingertips resting on the surface just enough to trigger the 
necessary action. They would complete actions with proficiency and speed and were 
very familiar with the layout of the applications on their own device. Many mobile digital 
devices allow these menus to be customised by the user (Goggin, 2009). Participants 
described their smartphone being easy to use, after a period of adjustment, and this 
ease of use was a significant factor in their continued use of the device. Moments that 
drew attention to this ease of movement, were in fact moments where the device was 
disruptive to this habit. Participants would quickly become frustrated if a device was not 
reacting as anticipated, as the familiarity and anticipated movements with the device 
would become quickly ruptured by the failure. In one interview a participant, Joshua, 
was showing me how he arranged his apps on his phone and was having trouble getting 
his device to respond quickly enough to his rapid finger movements: ‘Oh, my god, just 
go to things!’, he snapped at the device. Joshua’s fingers hung above the device 
impatiently waiting for it to reach the desired page. One participant, Phyllis, described a 
previous touch phone that had been less responsive than her present smartphone: 
I can’t remember what my first touch phone was like… that was ages ago but 
it was sometimes not as sensitive as you thought it should be or sometimes 
more sensitive and you’d hit stuff that you didn’t mean to… I hate that. 
Phyllis’s phone allowing her gestures to cause incorrect actions disrupted the formation 
of habits. As Ravaisson (2008) notes, habits form through a repetition that involves an 
increased proficiency in the movement and a decrease in sensation, but Phyllis’s 
movement could not become proficient. Whilst the moments I have drawn out here are 
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examples where there was some unease in the usually smooth movements; they serve 
to illuminate the unseen flow of habitual repetition that facilitates the engagement with 
the device. As I have discussed in Chapter 4, the contribution of these reflections in their 
retelling here is their capacity to generate a closeness to the encounters with these 
devices for the reader, rather than seeking to capture the truth of these encounters. 
Participants had internalised common sense ideas of habit and had a sense that habit 
threatened the control that they felt they should have over the device. Many saw their 
habitual use of the phone as problematic as a result. In particular, it was the routines 
with their devices that involved regular checking that elicited discomfort. Waking up to 
their smartphone or similar device, or reaching for it while they were still in bed, was 
something participants identified as symptomatic of a bigger problem of excessive use: 
Just because I think… I know it’s bad practice. You should… like the first thing 
you should do when you get up is like… stretch, have a glass of water, 
meditate. Like sometimes I meditate and if you jump onto… that it’s like… 
you’re jumping into the internet slipstream… a bit too early (Keith). 
It is significant that Keith identifies activities that are non-digital and explicitly 
intentional as more appropriate choices he ought to have made. Meditation, a practice 
which aims to produce relaxation through deliberate focus and the control of conscious 
attention (Lutz et al., 2008), sits in juxtaposition to the unhealthy and unthinking 
practice of scrolling through Facebook in bed. Keith’s evaluation demonstrates an 
awareness of the ways in which digital practices ought to be subordinated to other, 
more decidedly conscious, practices. His use of the word ‘slipstream’ here refers to 
seeing the internet, and the digital world, as fast-moving and bypassing deep thought or 
careful consideration. Keith’s description echoes Hassan’s (2012) account of distraction 
in contemporary capitalism, in which the onslaught of stimulation prevents 
contemplation. Keith’s explanation identifies the habit and the repetition of that habit 
of looking at the phone first thing in the morning as ‘bad practice’ and then outlines the 
appropriate practices that he would ideally like to undertake in its place.  
Though more negative understandings of habit were certainly dominant in the 
interviews, there were also glimpses of the inadequacy of these understandings, uneasy 
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tensions in which the more-than nature of habits could be felt. Though ‘bad’ habits, such 
as checking, are situated in contrast to what Keith ‘knows’ is the right thing to do, he 
confesses he often wakes up and uses the phone immediately. This disjuncture between 
knowledge and practice posits habits as potentially threatening to rational action as they 
move further and further away from what is consciously ‘known’ as the appropriate 
action. Maintaining such an understanding of habit yields only this kind of analysis. 
Beyond such evaluation, Keith’s exchange is somewhat playful as he considers the 
contradiction of his own routines: 
Yeah… I’m still distracted. I feel like I use it for, like, Twitter and stuff like that 
but I’m not using it to, like… if I was going to be using it like I wanted to… 
(laughs)... this is almost becoming like a counselling session! (laughs) Like I’d 
use it as a to do list and I’d put things on it and check things off and all that 
kind of stuff. But I don’t. I just get distracted too easy. 
Laughter here ruptures Keith’s critique of his own practices and draws out his awareness 
of something excessive going on here. While he is describing both his own behaviour 
and his ideal behaviours, this break of laughter is the moment in which he inhabits both 
these contradictory desires and takes pleasure in their mismatch. But there is more 
unfolding in this moment of laughter, as Maria Hynes and Scott Sharpe (2010, p. 49) 
have argued, ‘humour recalls to us the profound autonomy of the body.’  Hynes and 
Sharpe (2010), drawing on Nietzsche, argue for an affirmative understanding of humour, 
since the kind of transcendent judgement which draws on pre-existing ideals to 
formulate a moral evaluation cannot capture the excessive character of laughter. 
Certainly, Keith’s laughing claim that ‘this is almost becoming ‘like a counselling session’, 
alludes to a difference between his expectations and the reality of the interview. His 
observation might then be seen as a way of making light of the more discomforting and 
personal aspects of what we are discussing, and its tension with the seemingly light-
hearted nature of the topic: mobile digital devices. However, following Hynes and 
Sharpe (2010), a more affirmative notion of humour suggests that the laughter draws 
our attention to the impersonal nature of the relations that constitute the subject; in 
this case, the smartphone user. Put simply, this moment of laughter reflects a realisation 
of the inadequacy of Keith’s explanation of his own behaviour. As Claire Colebrook 
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(2004, p. 141) explains, laughter ‘shows the ways in which we do not author ourselves, 
through the presentation of puns, humour, hypocrisy and stupidity.’ If we consider 
consciousness to be the origin of action, then Keith’s practices can be understood only 
insofar as it is identifiable that there is a contradiction between his expressed desires 
and his actions. What Keith’s laughter disrupts here is this very image of consciousness, 
the image of his behaviour as belonging to him and willed consciously, and his laughter 
inclines us toward a different analysis, emphasising the excessive and impersonal.  
Laughter often accompanied such expressions of what participants ‘knew’, in contrast 
to what they ‘did’. These moments hinted to the tension participants felt when they 
could not adequately account for their own behaviour. If consciousness is maintained as 
the origin of action, then their failure to act in line with their expressed beliefs can only 
be met with a moral evaluation of their acts as the wrong thing to do. But the playful 
way participants made these admissions suggests their awareness of something much 
more complex and much less tangible than mere choices, either right or wrong. One 
participant, Phyllis, when I asked her about the apps she checked most regularly, started 
to laugh when she stated that Candy Crush, a very popular puzzle game application, was 
one she very often reached for. ‘I feel really ashamed to admit that,’ she said as we 
exchanged smiles, ‘I’m glad it’s going under Phyllis’s name.’ At her reference to feeling 
relieved that her admission will be attributed to a pseudonym, we both laughed. Though 
her statements may give the sense that the habits she described would indicate 
something inadequate or unfavourable about her, her laughter opened up much more 
than that. In those moments, despite the moral language that arises to explain the 
action, Phyllis’s laughter allowed us to dwell on the multitude of desires that gave rise 
to the reach for a game that clearly appeals more to desire than rationality. 
What constituted a ‘bad habit’ was certainly never stable and was constantly negotiated 
and renegotiated throughout each interview. However, there were certain practices 
that were more often cited as bad habits and these involved the most repetition, such 
as frequent checking of the device, or perceived intimacy between device and user (for 
example, sharing a bed with the device). One participant, Richard, when asked when he 
first starts using his mobile digital device, laughed and responded, ‘when I wake up, the 
first thing I open is Twitter… because I’m that kind of person’. This question of when a 
154 
participant would start using their phone in a day often led to this kind of playful 
response, with some participants even acting out the ‘silliness’ of the activity by holding 
their phones up and making a sleepy, zombie-like expression while they scrolled on the 
device’s screen. These moments do not merely indicate the embeddedness of these 
devices in the routines and habits of the users. Again, laughter and play draw attention 
to the excessive elements of this encounter, and thus to the inadequacy of the notion 
that this is principally a relational that is reducible to a subject’s relation to its objects.  
Like intimacy, repetition too emerged as a ‘playfully problematic’ aspect of the device-
user relationship. For example, when asked to estimate how many times he looked at 
his device or checked it, one participant, Malcolm, replied that ‘it’s probably, rather 
sadly… about every half hour’. Another participant, Ryan, also described repeatedly 
checking the device as a bad habit:  
I’ve noticed myself checking it when it’s like ‘why do I need to check it at the 
moment?’ There’s nothing on here. Just walking down the street or 
something. Sort of… every blank moment it’s like ‘Oh, I’ll just check my 
phone.’ I don’t think that’s good. 
Ryan’s evaluation of his habitual behaviour of checking his smartphone whenever he 
has a free moment alludes to the lack of conscious consideration involved in this 
practice, through his choice of phrasing, ‘I’ve noticed myself checking’. These accounts 
of frequent urges to check the device situate repetition at the centre of the ‘problematic’ 
relation with the device. The choice to pick up the smartphone is not a decision made 
consciously but is instead a culmination of nonconscious habits, desires, and 
inclinations. 
Conceptualising the user-device relation in terms of habit contradicts the way we often 
conceptualise technology as a tool or as something that we deliberately take up to use. 
Participants characterized their inclination to look at their phone in much less 
purposeful terms. As John explained, that ‘it’s just more of a habit thing… because it’s 
just there… it’s just easy to use. You can just pick it up and then I’m looking at 
something.’ John’s description highlights a common theme in the interviews, in which 
participants attributed the additional functionality and ease of using smartphones and 
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other digital devices as a cause of an increase in their use, compared with traditional 
mobile phones they had previously used. 
Of the interview participants, the app developers had experience navigating and 
confronting the habitual encounters that users have with the mobile digital device.  As I 
outlined in Chapter 4, I included app developers in my interviews because of their 
exposure to the testing and design process. I took inspiration here from Ash’s (2010) 
study of video game designers. Ash (2010) found that game designers faced the 
challenge of attempting to cultivate inclinations towards specific outcomes in the 
gameplay environment, despite the significantly unpredictable nature of the kind of 
performative co-production of play between gamer and game. Ash (2010) argues that 
through design and testing, game designers attempt to become attuned to the 
possibilities of the event of gameplay before it emerges from a specific situation. 
Applications for mobile digital devices such as smartphones and tablets also involve 
significant design and testing for usability (Gao et al., 2014; Kaikkonen et al., 2005). 
The testing process during the development of an app offers demonstrates the 
limitation of a focus on conscious experience when it comes to the user-device 
relationship. One app developer, Caleb, did most of the testing of his apps himself, and 
he described the difficulty of trying to describe when something was not right with the 
app:  
Ummm… I don’t know how to explain… I just use it and do it and if it works 
for me then… I mean you know pretty quickly when something isn’t right… If 
something is in the wrong spot… after a few uses you’re going to know if 
that’s right or wrong. 
What Caleb was describing was the process through which he had to become 
attuned to the way that the user and device are co-constituted through the 
encounter. When something ‘isn’t right’ it is experienced as a sensation of friction 
against the otherwise smooth experience. As Ravaisson (2008, p. 53) contends, 
‘continuity dulls sensibility, whereas it excites the power of movement’, and thus 
the sensation that Caleb refers to as ‘something isn’t right’, by reaching his 
awareness, suggests a disruption of habit.  
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App developers need to attempt to anticipate and negotiate the existing habits of 
their users. One developer, Ryan, explained that these habits are formed around 
the habitual practices users have from using other apps, as different operating 
systems (e.g. Apple or Android) have standard practice guidelines that are widely 
used and familiar to users:  
Apple or Google… or whoever you’re developing for, have a guide on this. 
Ummm… and it’s just sort of… people without even knowing it come to 
expect that and when it messes with that they don’t know how to do it so 
you should never really need instructions. You should just… it should just 
work. So, you should use standard user’s practices. 
Ryan emphasises that an app should not need instructions and that it should ‘just work’, 
meaning that it should tap into existing habitual practices, rather than rupture them. 
Apple’s iOS Human Interface Guidelines, which provide developers with information on 
how to structure their apps, are similarly focused on these habits. These guidelines 
explain that a ‘consistent app implements familiar standards and paradigms by using 
system-provided interface elements, well-known icons, standard text styles, and 
uniform terminology. The app incorporates features and behaviors in ways people 
expect’ (Apple Inc., 2017). Users will expect that three lines in the top left corner is a 
menu to click on, as they have clicked on menus in that position over and over in other 
apps on that device. Developers not only have to work with these habits but to 
anticipate what other expectations might accompany them. 
A central challenge for app developers was to cultivate an awareness of the habits and 
practices of mobile digital devices users, particularly as these habits operate beneath 
conscious awareness. It was also a challenge of the business of testing, and one way 
developers addressed this was to observe the testing process. Andrew described the 
testing process and the centrality of observation for helping developers to understand 
what users are wanting from the app: 
And what we’re looking for when we watch them do it… and it’s really hard 
not saying anything, you’ve just got to be quiet and just watch what they do 
and see where they’re finger goes and taps that thing. And it’s not a button 
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but they’re pushing it and you’ve got to realise… okay there’s a cue there. 
The user’s seen this thing… seeing that little icon is a cue to them and they 
think… their habit is to push that because they’ve seen it in another app. 
When Andrew was describing the process, expressing some frustration in the 
difficulty of knowing what people want, he starts to say, ‘they think…’ and then 
rephrases. As he was talking, I found myself reminded of my own experiences with 
applications that were frustrating or that, for some reason, did not feel easy to use 
and recalled the sense of discomfort of those moments. In the interview, Andrew 
emphasised the importance of watching the testing process because testers 
cannot often tell you what is wrong. Another participant, Richard, explained 
exactly why this was difficult: 
Umm… and you just kind of… you’ve got to read between the lines 
because typically when you do that kind of testing nobody actually 
knows what they want. You can’t just ask them ‘what do you want?’, 
because they’ll just be like ‘ahhhh… it seems okay to me’ (Laughs). 
You’ve kind of got to read it and try and… you know… get something 
out of it that they didn’t actually mean to say… if that makes sense. 
(Laughs) Yeah… problems are typically, I mean other than stuff that’s 
really glaringly obviously, you know, like something goes completely 
wrong, and they will notice that sort of stuff but if something’s just 
slightly wrong, like it doesn’t… maybe the layout of the app isn’t quite 
right… not quite optimised. They won’t necessarily pick up on that stuff 
at a conscious level. But they’ll realise subconsciously that it’s actually 
taking more effort or… taking a lot more time or something like that. 
Here Richard notes the difficulty of trying to communicate and identify issues that 
testers had with an app. The process of testing, he explained in the interview, is 
navigated much more by ‘feel’ than by conscious awareness. In this sense, the testers 
encounter the app intimately, and the developer must attempt to anticipate this 
nonconscious intimate encounter. In both their retelling by the app developers in the 
interviews, and here in the text, these encounters with the testing process cultivate for 
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the listener or reader a sense of the presubjective forces that constitute habitual device 
use. 
 
5.2 Distraction: the good, the bad and the bad manners 
As I have argued in Chapter 3, the so-called problem of distraction has been placed at 
the centre of debates around the mobile digital device and its role in changing forms of 
sociality (Pettman, 2015; Turkle, 2015; de Souza e Silva and Frith, 2012; Hassan, 2012; 
Ling, 2008). Distraction is often understood as a lack of attention, in opposition to 
consciousness and intention. As I will go on to discuss, distraction understood in such 
terms is always distraction from, a rearrangement of conscious awareness from one 
object, to another or a shift from ‘pure’ attention to ‘impure’ distraction. As such, 
distraction is not considered in terms of its capacities but instead through its relation to 
a normative hierarchy of what objects attention ought to be directed to. I have been 
highlighting the importance of displacing conscious intention as the origin of action, with 
an eye to considering what distraction can do. In the section that follows I will examine 
the key tenets of accounts that posit distraction as the ‘other’ of attention. I will also 
draw out this understanding as it emerged in my interviews in the form of ‘bad manners’ 
and the ‘excessive other’. In the final section of this chapter, I will argue for an 
understanding of attention that rejects the dialectical opposition between attention and 
distraction, suggesting rather that attention is dispersed, and in this way, is modulated 
and transformed at the level of bodily capacities. 
Distraction, like habit, has been associated with a loss of conscious awareness and 
critical reflection. When arising from technologies in the form of entertainment, 
distraction has been charged with operating to mask the ills of contemporary capitalism 
(Pettman, 2015; Hassan, 2012). In such accounts, distraction is a symptom of the 
‘disease’ of the technological present in which there is no time to reflect or resist. 
Central to these evaluations is the notion of an accelerated experience of time. Robert 
Hassan (2012) argues that the ‘problem’ of distraction must be understood in the 
context of the acceleration of social life, a consequence of specific changes associated 
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with the use of ICTs (information and communications technologies). Hassan (2012, p. 
xii) contends that ‘we swim in fast-flowing torrents of information and it is this digital 
overload that is causing us to regress to our infantile and weak state in terms of how we 
relate information.’ Our ‘chronic distraction’, as Hassan diagnoses it, is symptomatic of 
a significant shift in the temporal organisation of social life. This distraction is explicitly 
associated with surface understanding, which is held in direct opposition to deep 
understanding. Hassan (2012) draws on neuroscientific research into multitasking, 
arguing that our brains are incapable of multitasking and that what our surface 
engagement produces is an inferior understanding of the information at hand. He 
mobilises his diagnosis of chronic distraction as our contemporary cultural cognitive 
condition with an eye to critiquing the exploitation of information workers who are 
denied the time to dwell and focus. For Hassan, distraction is a destructive process by 
which depth and understanding give way to shallow ‘unthinking’. As discussed earlier, 
in the context of habits, conscious contemplation is closely associated with moral 
evaluation and therefore the absence of this contemplation makes free action 
impossible. 
For others seeking to address the problem of collective ‘distractedness’, distraction itself 
need not be positioned as always already negative. Dominic Pettman’s (2015) Infinite 
Distraction attempts to resist the naive celebration of technologies that he associates 
with cultural studies, and the reductive characterisation of technologies as opiates for 
the masses, which he associates with critical theory. Emphasising the pharmakon 
capacity of technologies to be both poison and antidote, Pettman (2015) acknowledges 
that new technological changes, such as the rise of social media, have the capacity to 
resist forms of structural oppression and produce different ways of being. However, he 
cautions against neglecting to see what he calls ‘hypersynchronization’, that is the 
‘cynical, corporate-governmental control of attention, behaviour and thought, through 
physiological and phantasmic mechanisms (Pettman, 2015, p. 29).’ Pettman’s 
orientation is firmly towards enhancing the capacity for collective resistance to 
capitalism, and he sees the culture of distraction as potentially harmful to this cause.  
Emphasising the inadequacy of seeking greater attention as a response to distraction, 
Pettman (2015, p. 125) still envisages distraction as shallow and superficial engagement, 
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a transformation in the attention of a distinct human subject that serves as a ‘delusional 
coping mechanism’. Despite considering the capacity of distraction to disrupt familiar 
processes of perception and interpretation, Pettman’s reimagining of distraction 
remains firmly tied to a humanist agenda that seeks to preserve especially ‘human’ 
modes of communication. Without troubling the ontological foundations of the 
reductive understandings of distraction he seeks to distinguish himself from, Pettman’s 
account fails to consider distraction as anything other than a loss. 
Accounts that seek to consider distraction in a positive light still retain the notion of 
distraction from, considering distraction as necessary relief from the demands of social 
interaction (de Souza e Silva and Frith, 2012). De Souza e Silva and Frith (2012) argue 
that mobile digital devices are part of a range of interfaces used by individuals to cope 
with the overstimulation of contemporary urban life. Drawing on Simmel’s (2002) 
analysis of the city as site of information saturation, de Souza e Silva and Frith argue that 
mobile digital devices operate as a contemporary form of the blasé attitude of the city 
dweller. In this sense, they contend that the device is taken up as a filter to manage the 
excessive stimulation of the environment, both social and informational (de Souza e 
Silva and Frith, 2012). Similarly, Hatuka and Toch (2014) contend that smartphones, 
especially when used in public space, operate to redistribute the attention of users as a 
way of overcoming excessive sensory stimulation. Distraction, then, is an important 
aspect of this filtering process by which attention is rationed to avoid total depletion. 
Distraction as distraction from was the familiar understanding for participants in how 
they conceptualised their mobile digital device practices. For many participants, some 
forms of distraction were considered ‘good’, operating as an acceptable social filter 
when needed, while others were identified as antisocial ‘bad manners’, the kind of 
habits that typify the excessive behaviour associated with addiction. Most significantly, 
when it comes to distraction, participants often associated their habit of prioritising use 
of the device over paying attention to others as problematically antisocial and 
representative of bad manners. Caleb’s explanation of why he is trying to cut down using 
his phone use in public offers an example of what was identified as ‘bad manners’: 
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I just… when I’m with people I like to be with them. And I could see myself… 
I could see it getting out of hand… I still… if I’m waiting or on my own I still 
pull it out. I could probably avoid that as well. 
What Caleb establishes here when he states he liked to be ‘with’ people is a desire to 
remain present and attentive in social interaction as opposed to being distracted by the 
smartphone. He alludes to the expectation that a human face should always be 
prioritised over a device. Similarly, Phyllis identified ‘social etiquette’ as the reason why 
particular instances of distraction are morally bad: 
Yeah. Well I guess it’s social etiquette. I would feel bad because I don’t like 
it when we’re in the tea room and we’ll all be sitting there together and five 
people will be playing on their phones… which… you know sometimes I will 
do but I try not to. I try to just… check my messages and call [partner] and 
then actually engage with the people I’m with. I think it’s rude to be on your 
phone when you’re with someone that you’re there to talk to. 
Here the participant hits on a very key idea within existing literature on mobile digital 
devices, and popular discourse, reporting feeling concerned about the way devices had 
changed the way she interacted with others. Phyllis compares the current situation in 
which people use their phones instead of communicating with others in immediate 
proximity to them, with a kind of idealised interaction in which individuals would 
‘actually engage’ with each other.  
What both Caleb and Phyllis refer to here is the hierarchy of attention that affords 
significance to face-to-face interaction between co-present human actors. As I have 
discussed earlier in the thesis, moral importance is placed on prioritising these co-
present human beings. This idea is reflected within foundational sociological literature 
that gives ontological significance to the face-to-face encounter, most notable in 
microsociological approaches (Jamieson, 2013). Mead’s (1967) approach established 
face-to-face interaction with others as the conditions in which individual subjectivity can 
emerge. Building on Mead’s analysis and focus on day-to-day human interaction, 
Goffman’s (1967) influential analysis of ‘face work’ further emphasised the significance 
of interpersonal interaction in the production of actors. Levinas (1979) has argued that 
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the face-to-face encounter with the ‘other’ is what calls us into an ethical relation with 
the other. It is the face in particular that renders the encounter transformative, in that 
it elicits in the viewer an ethical responsibility towards the other. Thus, the face comes 
to symbolise what is human, and what our obligations are to each other.  
These accounts rely on a notion of the face as possessing inherent symbolic meaning 
and giving rise to subject formation. Deleuze and Guattari (1987) argue that these are 
not qualities of the face itself, but rather the face is a product of the dogmatic image of 
thought that prioritises signification and subjectification5. The face is not ready-made 
but rather it is a specific ordering of life, constituted by the intersection of these 
processes of signification and subjectification: ‘(a)ccordingly, “facialisation” describes 
the process that causes semantic events to be captured and represented by the two 
semiotic orders of signifier and subject’ (Bignall, 2012, p. 395). The face, then, far from 
possessing an innate quality of humanness that produces us as subjects, is the product 
of dominant modes of thought that prioritise the subject as an organising structure of 
experience. 
Accounts participants gave of times when people they interacted with failed to divert 
their attention away from their phones were peppered with references to the phone 
being an intrusion that threatened the intimacy of the interaction. This statement from 
Alexander hints towards the anxiety produced when screens more easily draw attention 
than other people: 
Like sometimes it also creates a barrier between people, like if you just… 
you’re talking to someone and they’re just constantly on their phone… not 
listening to anything you’re saying, you know? 
Alexander’s account argues that the constant presence of a third party, the attention 
seeking smartphone, draws the eye away from its proper focus on the human being who 
is physically present. He notably refers to smartphones as a ‘barrier between people’, as 
something that prevents intimacy between individuals by taking up the position of an 
                                                      
5 See Chapter 3, section 3.3 Preindividual relations for a full discussion on Deleuze and Guattari’s theory 
of the face 
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intimate object. For many participants, excessive use was framed in terms of etiquette 
and appropriate behaviour. It was considered bad manners to use a smartphone in social 
situations, especially, as others have alluded to, if there are human beings to whom you 
could direct your attention to: 
I mean sometimes it’s rude, especially when it’s me because I’m not so good 
at multitasking so if I’m looking at my phone I just don’t pay attention to 
what people are saying. Vague-ing out. My sister’s the same. Sometimes 
we’ll both be on our phones and sort of intermittently talking to each other, 
but we have no idea what each other is saying. So… yeah, I think it is kind of 
rude… like to be constantly on your phone when you should probably be 
paying attention to them… (Elle) 
Elle employs here the kind of playful self-criticism that participants frequently used 
when describing their behaviour. Participants would often give examples of typical 
‘social’ situations (outings in restaurants, bars, dates) and would describe the 
interference that the phone made into those situations. This further emphasised the 
hierarchical evaluation made of distraction, which identified attention as most 
important when other people were present. 
Participants would often draw on examples from people they knew, to explain what they 
meant by ‘bad behaviour’ when it came to using mobile digital devices. This might take 
the form of a kind of ‘excessive other’ who typified the ‘addicted’ or inappropriate 
device-user, guilty of failing to control themselves. For one participant, Keith, it was his 
girlfriend’s use that he identified as excessive, but also her behaviour caused him to 
reflect on his own habits: 
I’m starting to hate this (picks up phone and uses it closely and exaggeratedly 
in front of his face). People looking at this. And funnily enough it wasn’t until 
my girlfriend got her iPhone and started getting addicted to that that I really 
started having a problem with it. And she thinks it’s hilarious. She calls me 
the biggest hypocrite. I didn’t start noticing my habits really until I noticed 
hers. And now, it’s like, if we watch a TV show I get both the phones and put 
them far away from us so we actually focus. 
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Keith characterises his girlfriend as ‘addicted’ to her device, and places both their 
smartphones away from them when he wants to reduce the checking. Keith moves the 
devices to create physical distance between device and user, rupturing the intimate 
closeness formed by and generative of habitual encounters.   
In the context of increasing anxiety about device ‘addiction’, the popularisation of 
‘digital detoxing’ or ‘smartphone detoxing’ demonstrates ‘awareness’ of this addiction 
in popular discourse. These detoxes involve abstaining from using digital technologies 
for a period of time, as part of a critique of the hold new technologies have over users 
(Booth, 2014; Edrich, 2014). Stacey Morrison and Ricardo Gomez (2014) argue that 
digital detoxes, or what they call ‘pushback’, are part of a larger response to the problem 
of information overload and the encroachment of digital technologies into all areas of 
social life. Consequently, many apps have been created to help device users kerb their 
excessive use (Goldman, 2015). Some of these apps prevent users accessing their 
smartphone during specific periods of time, while others prevent the use of specific apps 
or track the amount of time spent on the device (Goldman, 2015). Both this trend of 
digital detoxing and the accounts of participants problematised, and even pathologised, 
the desire for the smartphone or other mobile digital device.  
Distraction, however, did not always have a negative connotation in the participants’ 
descriptions of their smartphone practices. Waiting times, time that would otherwise be 
spent doing nothing, alone time and other moments that are seen as previously ‘useless’ 
become opportunities for the mobile digital device to ‘distract’. Though some were 
critical of this shift from doing nothing, to doing something, arguing that there was a 
value in experiencing boredom and ‘empty’ time, others seemed to see no problem with 
the use of phones in less explicitly social moments where you would otherwise be silent 
and alone. These comments reflect the idea of the ‘device as a filter’ of social interaction 
posited by de Souza e Silva and Frith (2012). Human life and practices still took the place 
at the top of the attention hierarchy but in the absence of human contact, distraction 
was permitted to creep in. As Caleb explained: 
Yeah. And I honestly don’t know what I did in those waiting times before. 
Because I’m not a very outgoing person so it’s not like… if I was waiting for 
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someone I’d be striking up conversations with other people because that’s 
not really how I work anyway. So, I don’t think it’s like… limiting in that sort 
of way… you know… Some people really look down on phones as antisocial. 
Everyone always has their face down in their phone in public. I dunno if I’d 
really act any differently if I didn’t have a phone. But who knows, right? It’s 
not like we can go back and see what would happen. Everything is always 
‘the worst’ at the moment. And I completely disagree I think everything is 
the best. I mean I wouldn’t want to live a hundred years ago and die of 
Cholera. 
Caleb’s comments demonstrate his scepticism of the familiar narrative of smartphones 
as antisocial, but, importantly, also situates his comments within the context of 
interacting with strangers. Throughout his interview, he emphasised the importance of 
being ‘present’ in interpersonal interaction, but these waiting times or times when he is 
surrounded only by strangers are an exception to this rule. 
For many, smartphones and other devices came to operate as a mitigator of 
awkwardness in social situations where ‘doing nothing’ or just standing there was 
uncomfortable or perceived as inappropriate. The devices became a tool for managing 
being in public without being ‘public’ or being expected to participate in the ‘public’ 
realm. Despite a connection with over-exposure through social media and data 
collection, the smartphone also operated to produce pockets of privacy and interiority 
for users: 
Yeah. I’ll sometimes take… like you’re waiting for a class… you’re waiting 
outside… there’s all these groups of people, they’re talking… And you’re like 
‘oh I’ll just go on my phone so I look busy’ (Alexander). 
Alexander identifies waiting times, specifically waiting in a place where other people are 
also waiting, as a situation in which it could be uncomfortable to do nothing. In addition 
to being uncomfortable without something to do, participants also described that they 
thought it would appear strange to others to do nothing: 
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Ummm… to kill time… while you’re waiting for something. Like if I’d arrived 
here before you had I probably would be sitting here playing on my phone 
just because it makes you look less weird than if you’re sitting here doing 
nothing… It’s kind of like ummm… really bad comparison but it’s kind of like 
smoking. If you’re standing outside and you’re waiting for someone, if you’re 
doing something with your hands like you’re smoking or you’re playing with 
your phone as opposed to just standing there staring around (Phyllis). 
Like Alexander, Phyllis identifies not only that it would be uncomfortable to be standing 
in a public area with nothing to do, but that others would perceive you in this way. 
Catherine emphasised that a central concern for her was not having anywhere to look 
without staring at others, and the mobile digital device screen provided something else 
to look at that did not seem unusual or invasive to the privacy of others: 
It kind of just happens over time… Like, I guess if you just stand there and 
you don’t have a phone it’s kind of like… what do you look at? You can’t 
really look at people because they’ll see you staring at them (laughs). It’s 
bizarre! (Catherine). 
The mobile digital device is generative of a space in which individuals can retreat from 
public space to avoid the obligations of social interaction (Hatuka and Toch, 2014; de 
Souza e Silva and Frith, 2012). What the participants identified were ways in which they 
felt that there were certain situations in which it was acceptable to use the device to 
avoid communication with others, usually strangers in public space, so as not to seem 
out of place. 
The desire to control one’s attention and to ‘rule oneself’, as Kant (1991) might propose, 
was, for many participants, an ongoing struggle. Some participants saw themselves as 
in control but identified what they saw as a growing problem of others who failed to do 
so. These others came to embody all that is excessive, immoral and destructive about 
the rise of mobile digital device culture. For other participants, they saw excess in their 
own behaviour, habits and practices, which they identified as being problematic, even 
addictive. To counter what was understood often as a lack of self-control, participants 
took a variety of steps to try to redirect their behaviour to mirror what they saw as more 
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ideal behaviour. Though participants would often explain their behaviour in terms of 
things they ‘shouldn’t’ do, their approaches to changing their practices often involved 
techniques that cut off their access to aspects of the device, suggesting that correcting 
their behaviour to what they ‘should’ be doing was not something they could simply 
decide to do. One participant, Sarah, explained: 
I used to check Facebook on my phone as soon as I woke up but I’ve just 
gotten rid of Facebook on my phone because it was… I was using it too much. 
And I read an article that correlates using Facebook a lot with being unhappy 
and I was feeling particularly unhappy that day so I was like ‘I’ll get rid of 
Facebook!’ 
I asked her if she saw a difference after deleting the app, and she laughed and said 
‘Umm… I think I’ve been happier’. Sarah removed the Facebook app from her 
smartphone to disrupt her morning ritual of looking at Facebook on the phone in bed. 
However, one could suggest that she did not alter her behaviour by regularly drawing 
upon willpower but rather by making it no longer possible to access the problematic 
app. Similarly, Andrew explained that checking his email first thing in the morning was 
something he saw as a bad habit but also highlighted the difficulty of changing:  
It scrambles your brain. And days that I don’t do that I just get up and do the 
most important… hardest thing first… instead of checking my email or going 
on my phone. That works really well. Other times… just on the phone the 
whole day. It’s a struggle to do the right thing. Yeah. 
Andrew’s reference to the practice of ‘scrambling’ the brain is pertinent as it gets to the 
heart of what underpins these assumptions about the inherently destructive capacities 
of smartphone practices. It is the brain, the locus of consciousness, that is considered to 
bear the brunt of this threat and it is our conscious selves that are fundamentally 
altered. The smartphone introduces this messiness, this ambiguity about control, desire 
and action. 
168 
Though participants explained the steps they had taken to limit their ‘bad habits’, their 
attempts were often unsuccessful. Caleb’s account of altering his notification settings to 
try to limit his checking behaviour, demonstrates the struggle to be ‘in control’: 
Yeah. I mean… when you think about it… it’s nothing to be proud of. But… 
I’ve actually stopped… I don’t get notifications anymore. Like, I get a 
notification for a text message, my phone will… buzz if I’m getting a phone 
call but emails and all that kind of stuff doesn’t buzz anymore. That helps a 
bit. Maybe it’s worse. You check it more often to see if you missed anything. 
I dunno. 
Caleb understands his checking behaviour as ‘nothing to be proud of’ but sought to 
change his behaviour by reducing notifications that call for his attention. However, he 
seems less sure as to the benefits of this change, admitting that the habit could be 
‘worse’ now as the change had elicited a new form of attention where his awareness 
was repeatedly drawn to check the device in the absence of these notifications. While 
participants would express their embarrassment and willingness to change, their 
attempts to alter their behaviour, as in Caleb’s case, often gave rise to new and 
unexpected modulations of configurations of attention. Understanding distraction as 
distraction from, as a loss of conscious awareness and control only allows moments of 
distraction to be evaluated in moral terms, whether they constitute good or bad 
manners, as participants often expressed. However, these moments of ambiguity often 
hinted at by a pause or ‘I dunno’ urge a further examination of distraction beyond these 
limited terms.  
 
5.3 Distraction: beyond attention as quantity 
Locating distraction either as a symptom of an overstimulated society, or as a coping 
mechanism to deal with this overstimulation, offers little insight into the generative 
capacities of distraction. More significantly, these accounts are built on an 
understanding of subjects consciously encountering the empirical world, either focusing 
their conscious perception by exercising their will or surrendering to distraction. Whilst 
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some scholarly accounts attempt explicitly to reposition their arguments beyond a 
simply negative view of distraction, they fail to challenge these key assumptions that 
define distraction as distraction from. These definitions always understand distraction 
as the shift from focused and, importantly, conscious attention paid to an appropriate 
object, which may be political or interpersonal, to unfocused attention or attention paid 
to an inappropriate object, usually devices and consumer culture. What is absent from 
such a consideration is a precise understanding of the variability of attention beyond the 
categories of focus or distraction. Scholars like North (2011) have challenged the 
dialectic opposition of distraction and attention. However, North’s challenge does not 
go far enough, as he concludes that distraction and attention, though they are not 
opposites, operate on a kind of continuum. North (2011, p. 5) offers an understanding 
of attention on the way that ‘the one, distraction, consists in the other, attention, to the 
lowest degrees.’ Significantly absent is a consideration of distraction itself, the 
conditions in which it emerges and its capacities for transformation. Distraction, 
understood in these terms, is always defined through the object it is reorienting itself 
away from. This kind of distraction is quantitatively defined as the lowest amount of 
attention. 
Within mobile digital device literature, phenomenological approaches have made a 
significant contribution to the rethinking of distraction beyond conscious intention. 
Richardson (2010) offers an alternate mode of understanding distraction not as the loss 
of attention but rather as a transformation in attention generated by a technosomatic 
relation, in this case, relations with the mobile digital device. By tracing the different 
modes of attention generated by relations with different screens and devices, 
Richardson (2010) argues that mobile digital devices modulate attention, as they 
become part of dynamic embodied arrangements. Conceptualised in this way, attention 
is not operated by consciousness but is instead a specific capacity of an embodied 
relation. Through this altered form of attention ‘face-to-face or frontal ontology of the 
screen is quite literally minimised, and the face-screen relation is intermittent and 
partial; attentive, inattentive and distracted in varying degrees, and absorbed within the 
broader technosomatic arrangements of the urban environment’ (Richardson, 2010, p. 
11).  Understanding the device-user encounter as involving dynamic relations of 
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attention and distraction, rather than categorising distraction as a distinct and 
recognisable state, offers a framework with which we might start to think about what 
distraction makes possible rather than what it depletes. However, Richardson’s 
understanding of distraction as ‘varying degrees’ again fails to offer a way to think 
distraction beyond a quantification of attention.  
Challenges to existing understandings of attention offer insight into how distraction 
might be rethought. Manning and Massumi (2014) explore alternate modes of attention, 
using autism to consider the diversity of experience beyond the influence of normative 
or ‘neurotypical’ understandings of consciousness. Dominant views of consciousness 
and attention are embedded in an anthropocentric framework that evaluates what 
should be noticed and how we should experience the world. Neurotypical perspectives 
become the standard to which we compare ‘deviant’ forms of attention. In their study 
of autism, Manning and Massumi (2014) highlight the way in which autism has been 
negatively understood as a lack of empathy but might be more productively understood 
as an indiscriminate empathy that is not focused on humanness. Autistic experience, 
they suggest, is excessive with respect to the neurotypical and includes an unprioritised 
attentiveness to human and non-human. Highlighting the diversity of modes of 
attention, Manning and Massumi (2014) argue that considering the capacities of these 
perspectives can assist in becoming aware of the limitations of dominant modes of 
thinking. The argument is not that we should replace neurotypical modes of thought 
with atypical ones, but rather that new thought practices can enhance the capacity to 
consider thought beyond the typical focus on language, human emotion and shared 
understanding. Non-neurotypical ways of thinking can attend to the interconnectedness 
of an encounter, the co-mingling of forces in a moment, without focusing on distinct 
objects or subjects: 
A dance of attention is not attentiveness of the human to the environment 
but attentiveness of the environment to its own flowering, at the very limit 
where experience and imagination, immediacy and cross- checking, overlap 
(Manning and Massumi, 2014, p. 6). 
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This rethinking of the nature of attention also has significant consequences for the way 
that distraction is conceptualised. While distraction is often considered to be the 
absence of attention, or the failure to ‘pay’ attention, it is more accurately described as 
attention paid inappropriately. To be distracted is to fail to rationally evaluate when and 
where to be attentive. Manning and Massumi (2014) highlight the way that neurotypical 
regimes of thinking focus on efficiency, by reducing unnecessary information and 
subtracting from a richer field of experience. In doings so, the relations between are lost, 
in favour of a focus on seemingly discrete beings and things. 
Like Spinoza and Deleuze, Manning and Massumi (2014, p. 26) seek to challenge the way 
that consciousness itself has been conceptualised as the method through which we 
know the world, arguing that conscious experience represents a simplification of a 
complexity that exceeds human apperception. As Manning and Massumi put it, ‘[w]hat 
is startling about the neurotypical is the capacity to background the in-formation of the 
field, and to pre-subtract from the expressive potential of its relational complexity’ 
(2014, p. 11). It is important to emphasise that this process is not akin to a mechanical 
‘processing’ of a situation through the filter of conscious rationality, but rather is the 
product of neurotypical habits of thinking that reduce our experience. Crucially, then, 
conscious attention can be seen as a reduction of the richness of reality, rather than a 
representation of it. 
A new understanding of distraction is needed here, to move beyond the always-already 
negative definition, tied to the disobedient subject. I have argued, following Deleuze and 
Spinoza, that dominant understandings of consciousness as the origin of action mistake 
effects for causes. Instead, as I argued in Chapter 3, I propose an understanding of action 
that posits the origin in the play of preindividual forces. Attention understood in this 
way is not wielded by consciousness to capture social experience, but is a modulated 
capacity that is felt by consciousness. I argue then that distraction is not its loss but one 
such configuration of this capacity, operating not as a quantitatively low amount of 
attention (cf. North, 2011) but rather, following Bergson’s (2001) call for a rethinking of 
time as duration, is a qualitative difference in attention. 
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I thus define distraction as a qualitative difference in attention, constituted by 
configurations of attention that can co-exist but are qualitatively different. I draw here 
on Bergson’s (2001) call for a shift from homogeneous quantitative multiplicity as the 
basis of time to heterogeneous qualitative multiplicity as the basis of duration. Bergson 
(2001, p. 87) argued that there are two kinds of multiplicity:  
that of the material objects, to which the conception of number is 
immediately applicable; and the multiplicity of states of consciousness, 
which cannot be regarded as numerical without the help of some symbolic 
representation, in which a necessary element is space. 
Arguing that a quantitative understanding of time confuses time with space, Bergson 
insists on the importance of a qualitative grasp of time. What Bergson (2001) asserts is 
that time as quantitative cannot be applied to that which does not have symbolic 
representation. Deleuze (1991) adds that a spatial organisation of time only allows for 
an understanding of differences in degree, which distinguish one thing from another, 
but an understanding of time as duration allows an understanding of differences in kind. 
These differences in kind are transformations within the thing itself, ways in which it 
begins to differ from itself. 
Bergson’s analysis to attention offers a way of seeing attention as strictly unquantifiable, 
being multiple and modulated in such a way as to produce qualitatively different modes 
of attentiveness. Seen this way, the shift in attention which constitutes a moment of 
distraction involves both a virtual and actual difference in the nature of attention. It is 
this virtual difference in attention that is neglected through accounts that focus only on 
attention as measurable or distraction as the loss of attention. As I outlined in Chapter 
3, Bergson’s (1991) theory of duration posits that time is not quantitative and 
homogenous but rather multiple and heterogeneous, as a result of the coexistence of 
the past in the present through memory. Memory, Bergson argues, is not consciously 
recalled but rather layered within our experience of the present. The past plays a 
significant ontological, rather than psychological, role, as it constitutes virtual potential 
from which the actual emerges (Deleuze and Parnet, 2007). Each actual movement 
arises from virtual, preindividual conditions and, in turn, gives rise to new virtualities. 
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Considering distraction as a qualitative difference in attention allows an understanding 
of distraction that is attuned to these virtual dimensions. If distraction is understood 
only as a low amount of attention, quantitative and homogenous, we attend only to the 
actual redistribution of attention from one object to another or to many objects. This 
kind of analysis cannot examine the differences in kind produced in the nature of 
attention itself. The argument that I am developing here sees a moment of distraction 
as an actualisation of a virtual potential, which elicits a transformation of attention. At 
the same time as this shift in attention occurs in an actual sense, the virtual potentialities 
for future modes of attention are reconfigured, though not determined. As I will go on 
to explore in the final chapter, this new understanding of distraction allows an 
understanding of the way that emerging forms of intimacy with the mobile digital device 
reconfigure attention both in the moment, as well as cultivating inclinations towards the 
device. 
If we understand distraction not as merely distraction from, distraction as the loss of 
conscious awareness or distraction as quantitative lack of attention, but instead as 
qualitatively different modes of attentiveness we can begin to examine what distraction 
can do. What is emerging here is more than new modes of attention but, as I will go on 
to discuss in the final chapter, new forms of intimacy. In this chapter, I have argued for 
a rejection of the privilege afforded to conscious intention in favour of attending to the 
role of repetition and habits. The encounters with mobile digital devices are not only 
comprised of these habitual repetitions. These repetitions generate minute differences 
through which new capacities are produced and existing capacities are altered. These 
habits are not, as dominant social theory has suggested, the effect of the will but rather 
consciousness is itself the effect of a multitude of preindividual forces, to which habit 
belongs.  
As this chapter has argued, distraction, like habit, has conventionally been defined as a 
lack of attention and seen as a tool of oppression. In contrast, I have proposed an 
understanding of distraction as a qualitative difference in attention. I have suggested 
that shifts in attention may be felt by consciousness, but not wielded by consciousness. 
Distraction is not the loss of or a quantitatively low amount of attention. Given that, I 
have argued for a rejection of consciousness as the origin of action, and instead locate 
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consciousness as the awareness of a change in potential. As I go on to explore emerging 
forms of intimacy with the mobile digital device, the role of habits and their capacity to 
modulate attention remains important. Existing accounts of intimacy in mobile digital 
device literature remain concerned with seeking to determine what remains the same 
and what has changed in our intimate relationships with the arrival of mobile digital 
devices. Absent from these accounts is a consideration of the transformations at the 
level of capacities. In the final chapter, I examine these transformations, focusing on the 
emergence of an impersonal mode of intimacy. I argue that it is this relation of 
impersonal intimacy, constituted by habitual practices and modulations of attention 
that reconstitutes what a body can do. 
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Chapter 6: Intimacy 
Today the new iPhone arrived. In its perfect packaging, pressed into the plastic mould. I 
carefully peeled the protective film off the untouched, smooth new screen. It felt cold 
and hard, much colder than I expected. My fingers flinched with the shock of the cool 
surface. I reached for my old device, which was warm from being held in my hand. Its 
screen was covered in smudgy fingerprints that traced the familiar places I reached for 
on its face. It looked small compared with its replacement. I suddenly noticed how dirty 
it was. It was turned off, a rare moment of silent indifference in the years I had held it. 
Looking at it, the thing seemed silly, lifeless. Hard to believe that I had spent so much 
time gazing at it, reaching for it, pressed against it, tracing shapes on its surface. 
For the next few days I found myself drawn to pick up the new phone often, aimlessly 
flicking from screen to screen, the movements felt more sensitive than the old phone had 
been and, though there was nothing, in particular, I needed to do, I liked to hold it. But 
my old phone remained on the table in the hallway where I had last put it down. When I 
would walk past the table, even with my new device in hand, I would reach for the old 
one with a smooth familiarity and press the home button expecting the screen to light 
up, before, with some embarrassment realising my error. Eventually, I put the old device 
away in a drawer, hoping to avoid constantly picking it up and putting it in my pocket, 
only to discover the place was already taken.  
The reach, this pull of the mobile digital device, this desire which unsettles comfortable 
notions of human sociality, might easily be explained in terms we readily accept, as the 
residue of a mechanical habit which once began as a thought. However, as the previous 
chapter has explored, such a reductive understanding of habits fails to grasp their 
transformative capacity. It is precisely with this transformation that this final substantive 
chapter will be concerned. This transformation will be understood as the formation of a 
capacity that I have termed ‘impersonal intimacy’. If we take seriously the generative 
habits that constitute our entanglements with mobile digital devices, without seeking to 
reaffirm the centrality of human sociality for sociology, the ‘problem’ of contemporary 
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device culture can be thought differently. Thus, it is with an interest in the ‘impersonal’, 
rather than the personal that I proceed.  
Contemporary academic analyses of the mobile digital device been preoccupied with 
the question of social cohesion and interpersonal relationships (Lasén and Casado, 2012; 
Ling and Campbell, 2011; Ling, 2008; Licoppe, 2004; Katz and Aakhus, 2002). These 
analyses are concerned with determining how social order and organisation are possible 
(Lash, 2009). Research has focused on how we ought to take up these devices in view of 
their potential impact on our existing social practices (Mascheroni and Vincent, 2016; 
Turkle, 2015; Ling and McEwen, 2010). Not only are the questions that can be posed in 
the light of such concerns predominantly moral ones about how we should use these 
devices, they are essentially conservative questions that assume the existence of such a 
social order. Largely absent is a consideration of the conditions in which these practices 
emerge, what precisely makes possible the kinds of relations with these devices that has 
yielded such anxious reactions, which see us focus on mitigating their ‘impact’. Here I 
use the concept of ‘impersonal intimacy’ to explore these conditions more closely. 
This thesis has proposed three key shifts in thinking around mobile digital devices. The 
first two were primarily concerned with challenging dominant modes of understanding 
in relation to the origin of action. I argued for the repetitious and habitual practices 
associated with mobile device use to be understood as generative rather than 
degenerative. As I discussed in Chapter 3, considering the habitual as the conditions in 
which difference emerges resists common understandings of habit and repetition within 
the social sciences as unthought and capable only of repeating originally conscious 
intentions. In view of this consideration of repetition as creative of difference, the 
second shift I have argued for is a rejection of the will of the conscious subject as the 
origin of action. Following Deleuze’s (1988) reading of Spinoza, I have argued that 
consciousness does not will the body into action but rather is the awareness of a change 
in potential. Thus, consciousness rather perceives a reduction of the preindividual forces 
that constitute action. These two reconceptualisations are significant in the context of 
the mobile digital device, as the previous chapter explored, drawing on empirical 
material from interviews and my own experiences with the device. Moments of habitual 
reach for the device are often pathologised or understood as a distraction from the 
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proper object of attention, usually a human face. However, in the light of these shifts in 
thinking these moments can be examined not merely in moral terms but in their full 
richness, and with an eye to the potentiality of the conditions in which they emerge.  
The final shift that this thesis has proposed is one from the personal to the impersonal, 
and it is primarily in the context of this shift that this discussion of impersonal intimacy 
takes place. It is important to first explore this changing emphasis toward the impersonal 
more clearly in the context of a thesis that may appear grounded in the personal 
experiences of device users. As I argued in Chapter 3, the turn away from the personal 
to the impersonal serves several purposes here. The first is to move the overall focus 
from discerning and even defending what constitutes the human. The second is an 
explicit intention to attend to the preindividual forces which constitute the device-user 
encounter. Thirdly, this shift allows a focus not on distinct entities but on relations, in 
an effort to resist the reduction of the device-user encounter to the action of subjects 
upon objects. Thus, the impersonal, as I am using it here, refers both to these 
preindividual forces but also more broadly to a shift away from a human-centred notion 
of the social.  
In view of the need to attend to the conditions in which entanglements with devices 
occur, this thesis proposes the concept of impersonal intimacy as a way of 
understanding habitual relations between bodies and mobile digital devices. This kind 
of intimacy is generated and made possible, in the first instance, through repetition and 
habits. This chapter will explore the ways in which this unique kind of intimacy with the 
device sits at the heart of key anxieties about mobile digital device culture. It destabilises 
firmly held beliefs about distinct and willing subjects, instead positing a fractured, 
forming and reforming assemblage constituted by repetitions and inclinations from 
which subjects and desires are themselves constituted. As this chapter will explore, 
impersonal intimacy forces us to confront the indistinctness and instability of a subject 
that can never maintain the transcendence of matter upon which notions such as 
consciousness and intention rest. 
In the first part of this chapter, I will explore how intimacy has been conceptualised in 
the context of the mobile digital device. While some scholars have seen human intimacy 
178 
as under threat from digital technologies (Turkle, 2011, 2015; Gregg, 2011; Gergen, 
2002), others have argued that mobile digital devices offer new ways to nurture 
intimacy, positioning them as yet another tool for communication (Broadbent, 2016; 
Hjorth, Wilken, et al., 2012; Wajcman et al., 2009; Licoppe, 2004). However, as I will 
demonstrate, both these perspectives rely on an understanding of intimacy that is 
personal, focused only on the interactions between conscious and intentional actors. In 
the second section of this chapter, I will unpack the importance of a shift in focus to the 
impersonal, arguing that it is only by moving beyond human sociality as our primary 
organising principle that the intimacy of our relations with mobile digital devices can be 
examined. In the final section of this chapter, I consider the new capacities to which 
impersonal intimacy gives rise. I return to the way in which impersonal intimacy 
reorganises our capacity for attention, allowing a more dispersed, persisting and 
residual awareness even when it is no longer in use. Of the inclinations to which 
impersonal intimacy gives rise, I will focus in particular on its capacity to make us forget 
ourselves. By this forgetfulness, I refer to its capacity to draw attention to the openness 
and never fully individuated nature of the individual. I argue that mobile digital devices 
offer a challenge to sociological thought precisely because they demonstrate the 
necessity to take the impersonal seriously. 
 
6.1 Intimacy: wanting to want the human 
At the heart of anxieties about the rise of the mobile digital device and its alteration of 
human sociality is the notion of a loss of intimacy between humans. These concerns play 
out in tension between retaining a preference for face-to-face human interaction and 
the increasing desire for devices. This anxiety can be widely seen in popular debates 
about the growing intrusion of smartphones into social interaction (Brody, 2017; 
Arlington, 2016; Walters, 2015). In an article titled, Smartphones are ruling our lives and 
killing our imaginations, Kim Arlington (2016) argued that looking at ‘your phone during 
a social encounter is the equivalent of talking to someone while looking over their 
shoulder to see who else is in the room’. Further, Arlington contends that the absence 
of mobile digital devices makes it easier for people to make eye contact and strike up 
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conversation. Reporting on a camp without Wi-Fi, Arlington (2016) states that with ‘no 
prospect of connecting to the internet, people made personal connections the priority’. 
Similarly, Mandy Oaklander (2016) accuses the smartphone of ‘ruining your 
relationship’, describing this as the ‘dark side’ of these devices. Whilst acknowledging 
their role in nurturing intimacy, Oaklander (2016) argues that it is moments when a 
partner is drawn away from their physically present lover that are most destructive, as 
‘[r]eal-life interactions are dulled when a person feels the urge to check their phone’. 
These accounts demonstrate the prevalent anxiety that not only will mobile digital 
devices disrupt and displace human intimacy but that they will even alter our desire for 
it. What is at the heart of these analyses is a desire to want the human again. 
Gary Turk’s (2014) viral video, titled ‘Look Up’, exemplifies these concerns. The short 
video, which calls for a regeneration of human intimacy and rejection of technological 
excess, rapidly went viral and to date has over 60 million views after being shared on 
social media sites such as Facebook and Twitter (Turk, 2014). The film features a spoken 
word poem and follows the story of a young man who meets his future wife by chance 
when he asks her for directions. The video then follows his life with the woman, 
depicting the arrival of his children and grandchildren. But, the video tells us, this chance 
meeting never happened because the young man was too busy looking at his 
smartphone and the face-to-face encounter was interrupted by the device. The film 
contrasts joy-filled family moments with the dark images of lonely individuals, their 
faces lit up by the harsh, artificial light of a screen. The creator of the film described 
‘Look Up’ as ‘a lesson taught to us through a love story, in a world where we continue 
to find ways to make it easier for us to connect with one another, but always results in 
us spending more time alone’ (Turk, 2014). In the final moments of the film Turk urges 
viewers to ‘look up from your phone, shut down that display, stop watching this video 
and live life the real way’ (Turk, 2014). Whilst this video could be easily dismissed as a 
momentary spark of outrage, quickly forgotten, the irony that the video was viewed and 
shared on the very devices it sought to hold to account draws attention to the 
contradictory desires for human and nonhuman intimacy at play here. 
What is most troubling for those who seek to defend face-to-face human intimacy, is 
that human intimacy may not be desirable enough to compete with the world of devices 
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and screens available to us. Indeed, Sherry Turkle’s (2011) Alone Together, expresses 
the concern that digital communication, once a lesser quality stand in at times when 
face-to-face communication was not available, has become our preferred experience, 
as a by-product of increased efficiency reaching into personal lives. This shift, Turkle 
(2011, p. 16) argues, transforms intimacy itself, allowing human interdependence to be 
replaced by technological dependence: 
when technology engineers intimacy, relationships can be reduced to mere 
connections. And then, easy connection becomes redefined as intimacy. Put 
otherwise, cyberintimacies slide into cybersolitudes. 
Turkle (2015, p. 7) argues that digital devices, such as smartphones, tablets and other 
digital communication tools, offer the ‘illusion of friendship without the demands of 
intimacy’. Turkle (2015) contends that mobile digital devices and other communication 
technologies make social interaction and relationships predictable and calculable, 
making it difficult for the unpredictable ‘real world’ interactions to compete. Turkle 
(2011) suggests that the primary concern lies not in the invention of particular devices 
but with the problems that these devices appear to solve; in the case of mobile digital 
devices, it is their role as substitutes for human comfort and connection that is the issue.  
Concerns about the substitution of device connection for human connection are a key 
component of mobile digital device addiction studies. The impact devices have on 
intimacy with others is often used by psychologists as a benchmark to measure addiction 
(Bian and Leung, 2015; Vacaru et al., 2014; Kwon et al., 2013; Walsh et al., 2008; Bianchi 
and Phillips, 2005). Helen Keane (2004) argues that many of the models of diagnosing 
behavioural addiction rely on the opposition of ‘genuine’ intimacy, which is seen as 
occurring within socially acceptable human relationships, with the pathological intimacy 
that constitutes the dependence on the substance or object of desire. Far from purely 
medical diagnoses, these criteria for determining addiction seek to preserve some forms 
of intimacy over others. For example, the widely-used Smartphone Addiction Scale (SAS) 
developed by Kwon et al. (2013, p. 7) includes the ‘Cyber-space-oriented relationship’ 
item, which aims to determine if the user’s ‘friends obtained through a smartphone are 
more intimate than his/her relationships with his/her real-life friends’. Certainly, the 
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opposition Keane (2004) refers to between genuine intimacy, in this case ‘offline’ 
intimacy, and pathologised intimacy, is present within studies of mobile digital device 
addiction. Intimacy with mobile digital devices here can only be understood as 
symptomatic of dysfunction.  
Within mobile device studies, the idea of intimacy has been framed around the notion 
of presence, and the changing nature of public and private space (Hjorth, Wilken, et al., 
2012). As discussed in Chapter 1, the blurring of the private and public spheres is 
considered a significant impact of new techno-sociality facilitated by mobile digital 
devices (de Souza e Silva and Frith, 2012; Wajcman, 2008; Ling, 2004; Katz and Aakhus, 
2002). Scholars have argued that mobile digital devices are changing notions of privacy 
and intimacy, as a result of the new kinds of communications and interactions that can 
be engaged in public spaces (Morley, 2006; Fortunati, 2005; Gergen, 2002).  
For some scholars, the new digital social practices necessarily limit the extent to which 
device users can engage with physically present human beings (Ling, 2008). In this sense, 
the device alters intimate relations by reconfiguring the spatial relations in which 
intimacy can take place. In effect, the mobile digital device removes the intimate 
potential in the immediate vicinity for the purpose of increasing the ability of the user 
to communicate with others who are not physically present. Ling (2008) suggests that it 
is often device-mediated communication that takes precedence, especially in public 
spaces where physically proximate individuals may not be familiar with one another or 
where device users may employ a range of body language gestures to discourage 
interaction with others. Ling (2008) suggests that new forms of interaction arising from 
mobile devices facilitate greater small group cohesion, while society in general moves 
towards looser and more abstract social membership. Gergen (2002) argues that mobile 
communication introduces the problem of ‘absent presence’ whereby the device user’s 
attention is drawn to mediated interactions through the device rather than to co-
present interactions. Gergen (2002, p. 239) argues that such shifts in attention can be 
detrimental to casual interactions in public space, but also notes that the drawing in of 
remote social actors has ‘helped otherwise disparate worlds to be knitted’. 
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Despite the capacity of new mediated modes of interaction to undermine co-present 
modes of communication, some scholars contend that they are a tool for the 
management of relationships. Licoppe (2004, p. 136) contends that mobile phone call 
and SMS practices constitute a resource drawn upon when proximate interaction is not 
available, to ‘provide a continuous pattern of mediated interactions’ to form a 
‘connected presence’ with another ‘in which the boundaries of absence and presence 
eventually get blurred.’ Licoppe (2004) notes that these mediated interactions are 
technologically and materially embedded, shaped by the devices that facilitate them. In 
the wake of growing popularity of locative dating apps like Grindr, which use GPS in 
combination with other sources of data to identify potential partners who are nearby, 
Licoppe (2016) argues that these facilitate the constitution of hybrid spaces in which 
digital intimacies with strangers coexist with co-present reality. Crawford (2009) argues 
that new social media platforms like Twitter can facilitate intimate connections with 
strangers through the documenting of mundane happenings as individuals enact 
intimacy in the digital public space. For their part, Hjorth, Wilken and Gu (2012, p. 57) 
argue that changing notions of privacy mean that individuals can create a kind of 
‘ambient intimacy’ by using their devices to maintain ‘presence within social networks 
via regular locational postings’. 
This process of maintaining a presence, checking in or checking on others is thus seen as 
a form of intimacy at a distance afforded by the device (Wajcman et al., 2009). Lasén 
(2004) adds that because of the asynchronous nature of communication tools such as 
text-messaging and instant messaging, mobile phones offer an expression of thoughts 
and feelings that are momentary, even if they cannot be received by the other person 
at that time. Within romantic relationships, Lasén and Casado (2012) have examined the 
role of mobile phones as participants in the networks that constitute couple 
relationships, arguing that the use of these devices provides new opportunities for 
conflict and resolution in the management of intimacy. They argue that as contemporary 
relationships are mediated and remediated by technologies, these shifts produce new 
potential controversies, such as concern over who a partner is texting or frustration at 
their distraction during a discussion (Lasén and Casado, 2012).  
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The transforming and dissolving distinction between ‘work’ and ‘home’ have also raised 
questions about the changing nature of intimacy. Gregg (2011) argues that the ‘presence 
bleed’ of contemporary office culture is facilitated by the coerciveness of mobile digital 
devices and other internet connected technologies like email. These technologies, Gregg 
(2011) asserts, offer convenience while concealing the extra work they facilitate, and 
making it difficult for employees to establish boundaries between their work and 
personal life. Mobile digital devices are an important contributing factor to the intimate 
relationship many workers now have with their jobs, a relationship Gregg (2011) argues 
is facilitating a corporatization of intimacy and greater exploitation. However, other 
scholars have argued that intimacy in the contemporary digital workplace is also 
changing in ways that facilitate private intimacy entering the work sphere. A study by 
Wajcman, Bittman and Brown (2009) found that mobile communication offered a way 
for intimate connections to extend into workspaces and deepen interpersonal 
connections. Similarly, Broadbent (2016) contends that mobile digital devices, along 
with other forms of digital media, bring the intimate sphere into the workplace, allowing 
continuous communication between the worker and their close social connections. 
Beyond their role as intermediaries in our interpersonal relationships, the capacity of 
the device to function as a tool for managing emotional connections has also been 
explored. Intimacy with the device itself, in the form of customisation, adaptation and 
affection, is also a key theme within studies of mobile devices. The customisation and 
personalisation of these devices is seen to increase their embeddedness in the everyday 
routines of the user; Hjorth (2006, p. 30) argues that the performance of identity 
through the fetishisation of the device highlights the way that we ‘domesticate 
technologies as much as they domesticate us.’ However, Lasén argues (2004) that 
emotional attachment to the device itself also arises from its privileged position as a 
mediator of intimacy with others and as a repository of personal information and data. 
Lasén (2014) adds that the mobile digital device can constitute the ‘public intimacy’ of a 
relationship in that it can present a log of calls, photographs, messages exchanged and 
other intimacies, which can be ‘read’ by another and in this sense an intimacy is shared 
with the device, insofar as it holds this information, the privacy of which is open to 
violation. Vincent (2006) contends that it is primarily through their facilitative role in 
184 
human interpersonal interaction that the mobile phone comes to itself be an object of 
attachment, as phones are deeply embedded in our everyday practices, routines and 
interactions. However, David Beer (2012, p. 361) argues that the mobile digital device 
shares ‘a material connection with the owner’, which facilitates the formation of a 
personal attachment beyond only the capabilities of the device. Beer draws inspiration 
from Turkle’s (2007b) concept of ‘evocative objects’, which theorises that the 
boundaries between objects and bodies become transformed by the ‘intimate 
couplings’ that take place with familiar objects. For all these accounts, however, 
whether the mobile digital device is a facilitator of intimacy or a participant in its own 
right, the intimacy that is generated is a personal one, appropriated from human 
sociality. 
Whether these scholars seek to defend intimacy in the face of the mobile digital device, 
or see the potential for new forms of intimacy between users of mobile digital devices, 
intimacy is figured in merely personal terms. For those who argue that the rise of 
smartphones and tablets presents a threat to intimacy through their capacity to disrupt, 
displace and replace it, human intimacy remains an inherent good that provides social 
actors with an ethical foundation (Turkle, 2011, 2015; Ling and McEwen, 2010). While 
others have argued that devices have the capacity to act as a tool for social interaction 
rather than only as a barrier, these perspectives remain oriented by an understanding 
of the social as the sphere of human to human interaction and defend an intimacy 
defined in solely human terms, leaving the immanent potentiality of impersonal forces 
unthought. 
 
6.2 Intimacy: beyond the personal 
Though there has been significant variation in what constitutes intimacy both historically 
and contextually (Frank et al., 2013), in sociology the term has predominantly focused 
on ‘close personal relationships’ (Smart, 2006, p. 308). Lynn Jamieson (2011) further 
explains that this definition involves both the subjective experience of ‘closeness’ 
between two people, as well as the social recognition of the relationship. This intimacy 
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can involve both emotional and cognitive contact, as well as bodily contact and 
proximity (Jamieson, 2011). For sociology, questions concerning intimacy have been 
broadly concerned with the changing nature of intimate relationships in the context of 
economic and social changes associated with contemporary capitalism (See for example: 
Giddens, 1992). Intimacy then, has been conceptualised entirely as a capacity of human 
relations and the kinds of questions posed about intimacy remain tied to these 
understandings. This is demonstrated within mobile digital device literature, and 
popular discourse, where moral discourses defend human intimacy in the face of the 
perceived threat of mobile devices. Discussions around intimacy in the context of mobile 
digital devices, as I have outlined earlier, seek to establish whether intimacy can be 
retained in new digital social practices (Mascheroni and Vincent, 2016; Hjorth, Wilken, 
et al., 2012; Lasén and Casado, 2012; Ling, 2008, 2012; Licoppe, 2004). The question, as 
it is posed in much of the literature, is concerns the process of mediation and what kinds 
of capacities it makes possible for the existing social practices and relationships. Yet, I 
have suggested that this focus on the personal comes from a fundamental error, namely, 
the ‘illusions of consciousness’ (Deleuze, 1988), which mistake the effects which 
consciousness perceives for the cause of action. 
In calling for a focus on the impersonal, I am not merely extending the analysis of 
intimacy to nonhumans. Bringing together the terms is of particular importance, as I 
seek to invoke elements of both terms, whilst challenging familiar understandings of 
intimacy. Impersonal intimacy is not oriented by human interpersonal relationships, in 
the way that intimacy has been. However, it is important to emphasise that Impersonal 
intimacy is not impersonal because it pertains to objects. It is important to distinguish 
here between the challenge I am making to what constitutes the social and those 
attempts that have been made to redraw the lines around what constitutes an actor, 
commonly associated with Actor Network Theory6 (Latour, 2005; cf. Akrich and Latour, 
1992). It is in the play of preindividual forces that the conditions of action are found. 
These forces are impersonal, in that they are ontologically prior to the formation of 
                                                      
6 I discuss Actor Network Theory and the role of actors/actants in greater detail in Chapter 2 Inhuman, 
2.2 Bodily entanglements, nonhumans, and posthumans 
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individuals or identities (Massumi, 2002, p. 9). As such, an analysis that merely reframed 
the status of ‘actor’ as including nonhuman actors need not challenge the understanding 
of action itself, and its historical associations with conscious will. In this sense the term 
impersonal intimacy refers to the presubjective forces prior to conscious awareness, but 
also signals to a shift away from human interpersonal relations as the focus for 
understandings of intimacy, instead oriented towards relations of repetition, proximity 
and inclination. 
As I argued in Chapter 3, social life is not constituted by fully determined individuals. 
Rather, individuals are never fully individuated, always retaining an unactualised 
potential, a ‘preindividual nature’. According to Simondon (1992, p. 306), the 
‘preindividual nature, which remains associated with the individual, is a source of future 
metastable states from which new individuates could eventuate.’ Simondon (1992) 
argues that to understand these processes of individuation, the constituted individual 
cannot be the focus of analysis. The individual cannot offer insight, as it is only partial 
and ‘does not represent the totality of the being’, but is only a partial and temporary 
actualisation of potentiality (Simondon, 1992, p. 300). In this respect, the thought of the 
relation must be understood as something other than the relation between subjects and 
subjects or subjects and objects, since it is primary with respect to these individuations. 
Moreover, the individual cannot be understood as distinct from or prior to its milieu 
(Debaise, 2012). 
It is with an eye to expanding the social to attend to this milieu, constituted as it is by 
preindividual forces, that I turn to the notion of the impersonal. I use ‘impersonal 
intimacy’ as a term to refer to the transformation in capacities that occurs as a result of 
the routine and repetitious habitual relations with the mobile digital device. As I 
discussed in the previous chapter, these habits involve increasing the proficiency of 
actions through repetition, but are not merely mechanical repetition but also are 
generative of new inclinations. I take inspiration here from Hasana Sharp’s (2011) 
concept of ‘impersonal politics’, in which she takes up Spinoza’s rejection of human 
exceptionalism as a resource for thinking about politics and, in particular, the limits of 
personal politics. For Spinoza, there can be no distinction between humans and nature, 
established by a philosopher such as Kant on the basis of moral agency and freedom, 
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because ‘minds are equally submerged within a system of cause and effect, operating 
according to the same principles as bodies’ (Sharp, 2011, p. 3). Spinoza rejects both the 
primacy of mind over the body and the elevation of human beings above nature. He 
insists that a true knowledge of cause will dispense with the illusions of consciousness 
and reconnect the human to the relations of composition and decomposition to which 
nature as such is subject (Sharp, 2011). As Sharp (2011) stresses, the implications of this 
reconnection of the human with the impersonal forces of nature for politics are 
profound. 
In this context, the move toward the impersonal represents a challenge to the 
exceptionalism that orients much debate on mobile digital devices, with its focus on the 
moral choices that should be made in order to defend human intimacy. Sharp (2011, p. 
6) argues that a focus on the impersonal does, however, have significant ethical 
implications: 
Spinoza’s approach reinserts human action into nature to undermine the sad 
passions, especially hatred, that attend attributions of exclusive moral 
responsibility. Renaturalization aims to cure social ills but involves 
broadening our frame of reference beyond social relations. 
As Deleuze stresses, Spinoza’s philosophy has as one of its profound implications the 
idea that morality is effectively a sad passion, which reduces a being's power to act, 
insofar as it rests on a thoroughly confused apprehension of cause and the 
disconnection of the human from the relations that constitute its power (Deleuze, 1988). 
What an impersonal politics offers is a richer understanding of the forces that constitute 
actions and a challenge to the reduction of the human through the illusions of 
consciousness. 
The significance of the challenge of an impersonal intimacy to the moral evaluations of 
mobile digital device use is most clear when we return to the question of the face. As I 
explored earlier in the thesis, face-to-face communication has been elevated both in 
mobile digital device literature (Turkle, 2011, 2015; Ling and McEwen, 2010) and social 
theory (Levinas, 1979; Goffman, 1967; Mead, 1967) as being of key significance for the 
production of responsible, empathetic and moral subjects. This contention has been 
188 
challenged by communication scholars who argue that face-to-face communication, like 
all forms of communication, is mediated through language and shared social meanings 
(Arminen et al., 2016; de Souza e Silva and Frith, 2012). However, the preference for 
face-to-face communication within mobile digital device scholarship remains, with 
specific moral importance placed on achieving a ‘balance’ between face-to-face 
interactions and mediated ones (Mascheroni and Vincent, 2016; Sørensen, 2006). Even 
when the significance of mediated interactions is analysed, it is their capacity to 
enhance, facilitate or emulate co-present human intimacy that is emphasised (Patulny 
and Seaman, 2016; Lasén and Casado, 2012; Wajcman et al., 2009). Yet the dominance 
of the personal form effectively stifles our understanding of our relations with other 
beings and things. As Sharp (2011, pp. 10–11) argues, normative political and moral 
thought remain tied to humanist thinking, so much so that there are ‘no words flowing 
in mainstream currents to express a politics of intimacy, power, and connection with 
nonhuman forces.’ 
A critique of the preference for face-to-face interaction involves an examination of the 
underlying errors in attaching such symbolic significance to the face as privileged site. 
Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987, pp. 167–192) critique of faciality, explored in Chapter 3, 
offers a useful intervention here. They argue that the face, though often seen to hold 
intrinsic significance (e.g. Levinas, 1979), is in fact the product of dominant regimes of 
thought in which signification and subjectification are primary. The face is constituted 
by a head deterritorialised from the body and arises from an absolute 
deterritorialisation (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987). This absolute deterritorialisation 
means that a face is no longer part of the polyvocal code of the body but instead has 
been overcoded by signifying and subjectifying organising structures.  Yet, the face, 
Deleuze and Guattari (1987) argue, does not possess inherent humanity, but rather is a 
specific ordering belonging to the dogmatic image of thought. They point to the 
alternate forms of organisation, faciality traits and becomings that become possible 
beyond this subjection of the face to the dominant image: 
What is a tic? It is precisely the continually refought battle between a faciality 
trait that tries to escape the sovereign organization of the face and the face 
itself, which clamps back down on the trait, takes hold of it again, blocks its 
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line of flight, and reimposes its organization upon it. (Deleuze and Guattari, 
2009, p. 188) 
Though the face is brought about through a dominant system of meaning, which can 
appear as if it is inevitable, Deleuze and Guattari argue that it is crucial that we do not 
take the face as the cause but rather only one part of this ordering system, and, from 
this point, we can apprehend the potentials for its disruption (Bignall, 2012). 
By interrogating the processes and systems of thought by which the face is afforded such 
significance, Deleuze and Guattari (2009) propose that the economy of the face can be 
dismantled and disordered, such that it no longer serves these systems. There is the 
possibility for deterritorialisations that do not attempt to organise life on the basis of 
signification and recognition, but rather are relational and multiple. In seeking to 
theorise the outcome of these creative deterritorialisations, Deleuze and Guattari (2009) 
coin the term ‘probe-heads’, to describe what replaces the face in a system of thought 
oriented towards difference rather than recognition: ‘a probe-head is then that which 
explores the terrain beyond the face, the terrain from which the face is nothing more 
than an extraction or crystallisation’ (O’Sullivan, 2009, p. 254). 
As I have argued in Chapter 3, the mobile digital device offers a way to generate such 
alternative modes of organisation. The dominant way of thinking that attributes the face 
with particular ethical significance (Levinas, 1979), or considers face-to-face interaction 
to be the origin of subjectivity (Goffman, 1967; Mead, 1967) take the significance of the 
face as given. As Deleuze and Guattari (1987) argue, it is through this dominant regime 
of thought, which prioritises signification and subjectification over difference, that the 
face is produced as such. Challenging this orientation involves destabilising and rupturing 
the ordering of the face, such that the multiple and presubjective is no longer reduced 
for the purpose of recognisability (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987). We could say that the 
economy of thought to which the face belongs and the associated privileging of face-to-
face communication tie ethics to a morality in which human beings see themselves as 
exceptional with respect to the forces of the world. With an impersonal mode, in 
contrast, alternate modes of organisation become possible, which open up new ways of 
understanding and evaluating the relations that constitute us. 
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In the previous chapter, I examined the accounts participants gave of their preference 
for face-to-face communication over the device when another person was present. In 
these discussions participants would, following dominant analyses that attach 
significance to the face, emphasise the importance of looking at people who were 
physically present. I also discussed moments that participants identified as exceptions to 
this rule, namely in public spaces where the device was considered an appropriate way 
to avoid engaging with others. Participants were not always able to adhere to their own 
guidelines however, and their proximate human companions often failed to retain their 
gaze, as one participant, Elle explained: 
Generally, it’s when I start… maybe… losing interest in the conversation. If 
it’s not that I’ve gotten a text or something… it’s generally when my attention 
wavers. Like uni or watching a TV show or… anything. Talking to someone… 
when it drops a bit low, I check my phone for something to do.  
In these lulls in the conversation or dull moments Elle described checking her device, 
drawing her attention away from physically present companions and conversations or 
other stimulus. Similarly, Malcolm described playing games on his mobile device to 
distract him from copresent interaction:  
… sometimes if I’m bored in a meeting there’s things like Reversi Free and 
Sudoku Free or whatever. And yes, I have been known to… me personally, 
you just end up passing the time away when you’re bored or when you want 
to be a little more intellectually stimulated than the boring stuff that’s going 
on. 
Despite the discussion that participants had concerning what they ought to do and their 
espousal of the importance of interpersonal intimacy and human connection, these 
moments in which face-to-face communication was neglected were notable. Yet, as I 
have suggested, they can only be conceptualised as failure from the point of view of the 
dominant mode of thought. 
With an eye to the more impersonal forces here, these moments demonstrate not only 
the limitations of such narratives but the rupture of the ordering of faciality caused by 
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the mobile digital device. If we return to Elle’s comment, she explains that when interest 
in the conversation with another person wanes she finds herself reaching for her phone. 
Her shift in attention has triggered a cultivated inclination towards the device, which 
occurs as a result of a repeated habitual reach over time. In this moment, the mobile 
digital device emerges as a new face to draw her gaze, in doing so, ever so incrementally 
inclining towards the next reach at the next moment in which conversation wanes. 
Given the rethinking of habits, repetition and distraction I have proposed in this thesis, 
there is much more that can be gleaned from these encounters beyond the terms of a 
representational frame. I have argued that the everyday routines of the device and user 
come to constitute a kind of impersonal intimacy, formed on a foundation of generative 
habits, which gives rise to transformations in attention. I argue that attention shifts not 
towards distractedness, which has been diagnosed as the ‘disease’ of the present 
(Pettman, 2015; Hassan, 2012), but rather an altogether different understanding of 
distraction. I have argued that distraction constitutes a qualitative difference in 
attention, rather than a quantitative reduction in attention. I have urged for a shift in 
focus toward impersonal forces precisely because our limited focus on the social as 
constituted by the interactions between social actors fails to account for the forces that 
produce action and generate new individuations. 
In cultivating a certain resistance to human-centred narratives, I turn to Claire 
Colebrook’s (2014) concept of ‘inhuman perception’. Colebrook (2014) addresses 
precisely this question of the preservation and loss of humanness in her book Death of 
the Posthuman, in relation to issues around climate change and encountering the 
possibility of life after human extinction. She argues that the pressing notion of human 
extinction, while often explored in relation to the importance and value of humanity, can 
also provide a way to overcome or address our preoccupation with humanness. Drawing 
on Deleuze, Colebrook (2014, p. 28) calls for an ‘inhuman perception’, an imagining of 
modes of existence beyond the human: ‘[w]hat happens if one thinks of the vision of no 
one, of the human world without humans that is still there to be seen?’ Colebrook argues 
that this inhuman perception opens space for a re-evaluation of our existing modes of 
thinking, with their humanist limitations. In the light of recently theoretical turns 
towards the lived and embodied dimensions of existence, this provocation is especially 
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useful in tempering our obsession with ourselves as masters of the self, others and the 
world. Colebrook (2014, p. 52) argues that the social sciences and humanities have 
played a central role in the construction of what it means to be human, particularly as 
part of a reaction to the rationalising, disenchanting nature of the ‘hard sciences’. 
However, their insistence on the meaningfulness of human experience normalises moral 
valorisations of humanity. Focusing the development of theory beyond this all too 
human notion of meaning broadens our capacity to imagine the world. Colebrook (2014) 
describes this as ‘after theory’, to refer to theory that is literally after the human, 
concerned not with human lived experience but instead radically questioning what 
entitlement humanity has to demand its own continuance and considering what a world 
without human life could be like. 
Recent years have seen a proliferation of anxious scholarship concerned with precisely 
what the human has become, firmly embedded as we are in the immediate and 
pleasurable world of the digital. But these questions cannot be addressed with attempts 
to repair and regain a sense of our humanness as our tradition has figured that idea. As 
Colebrook (2014) argues, we need to break from our reliance on the normative, all too 
human narratives.  I have been arguing for a shift in focus to impersonal forces from a 
focus on individual personal experience and conscious intention, precisely because the 
questions of what the human has become is a poorly posed one. It is the kind of question 
that limits our capacity for creative thought, as it is posed with an eye to calling forth 
the solution; namely, a return to a more ‘social’ human. Yet a problem, as Deleuze 
(1991), following Bergson, suggests, and is never fully resolvable, never exhaustible in 
the solution. Problems are at their most rich and potentialised when they are not formed 
so as to be directly solved, but rather operate to demonstrate existing complexity and 
tension, determining, without being fully determinable. A well posed problem can never 
be fully grasped and never fully solved and it is this that makes it akin to a call for a 
creative response (Williams, 2003). The ‘image of thought’, the reliance on 
representation and recognition in underlying assumptions about how we understand 
the world, should not be considered natural but needs to be questioned, insofar as it 
conceals the difference and complexity that contemporary reality demands we come to 
terms with (Deleuze, 1994). 
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The ‘problem’ of impersonal intimacy, I suggest, more adequately grasps the complex 
forces that form its object. Impersonal intimacy is ‘impersonal’ in the sense that it is 
concerned with the preindividual forces ontologically prior to the formation of identities 
and subjects. It is also impersonal in that it is not wholly oriented by human narratives 
and experience, but rather by an attunement to shifting capacities and inclinations that 
exceed the personal form. This impersonal intimacy is not determined by its capacity to 
replicate, generate or facilitate human sociality. Crucially, for sociology, this kind of 
intimacy urges an expansion of what is typically thought to be the empirical ground of 
the discipline. What constitutes ‘the social’ here is broadened to accommodate the 
forces prior to the formation of subjects, these impersonal forces that I have argued are 
vitally important to understanding our encounters with mobile digital devices. In doing 
so I seek to contribute to a growing debate in sociological discourse that argues for an 
‘expanded empiricism’ (Clough, 2009), an understanding of the social as more than what 
is perceptible (Fraser, 2009) and is prepared to ‘confront a newly co-ordinated reality, 
one that is open, processual, non-linear and constantly on the move’ (Adkins and Lury, 
2009, p. 18). 
 
6.3 New intimacies, new capacities 
While I have sought to challenge the personal focus of existing understandings of 
intimacy, often understood as ‘close personal relationships’ (Smart, 2006, p. 308), what 
remains then is the closeness that constitutes this intimacy. The closeness of impersonal 
intimacy is related to the proximity of the device, but more importantly to the proximity 
between the habitually repeated actions that proliferate minute differences. Impersonal 
intimacy arises from habitual mobile digital device use, whilst at the same time creating 
the conditions in which more generative repetitions take place. As I explored in the 
previous chapter, the encounter with a mobile digital device is made possible by the 
agile and familiar movements acquired through repetition. Simultaneously, each 
repeated encounter further alters these actions, increasing inclination towards those 
actions and decreasing the sensations associated with them (Ravaisson, 2008). This 
emerging impersonal intimacy with the device, solidified and constantly modified 
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through repetition, is constituted by a transformation at the level of bodily capacities. 
In the previous chapter, I outlined a new understanding of distraction. I argued that 
distraction is not the lowest amount of attention (cf. North, 2011), but, following 
Bergson (2001), a qualitative difference of attention.  
In interviews I conducted, and in my own experiences with devices, these 
transformations took the form of a kind of residual awareness of the device, which 
persisted even when it was not in use. These transformations in attention are, I argue, 
a unique capacity of impersonal intimacy. In essence, impersonal intimacy arises 
simultaneously with the set of relations in which the entity of the device user emerges. 
Thus, impersonal intimacy does not occur between a distinct individual and their device, 
but is more ontologically relational. Impersonal intimacy might be best characterised as 
a relation that generates new capacities, which are essential to achieve the familiarity 
and closeness these devices are afforded. In this final section I will explore the 
transformative capacities of impersonal intimacy, drawing on interview material and 
anecdotes. In particular, I will attend to the capacity of this impersonal intimacy for 
forgetfulness. What I mean by this is that impersonal intimacy is generative of a kind of 
creative forgetting in which the device user forgets themselves and is instead confronted 
with their co-constitution with and through the device. This, I argue, is more complex 
than a mere distraction from co-present actors or happenings, as it has been understood 
(Cumiskey, 2011; Ling and McEwen, 2010; Ling, 2004, 2008; Gergen, 2002). This 
reorganisation of attention and forgetting of the present is not a transformation at the 
level of conscious awareness but at the level of preindividual relations. It is this capacity 
of impersonal intimacy that I argue is of real significance for sociology, in the context of 
calls for a new empiricism (Back, 2012; Lury and Wakeford, 2012b; Adkins and Lury, 
2009, p. 18; Clough, 2009). Impersonal intimacy calls for a new understanding of what 
constitutes the social, forcing us to confront the inadequacy of existing models of 
thought, which posit a social world populated by subjects who pre-exist the encounters 
and relations that in fact constitute them (Hynes, 2016).  
Understanding close relations with mobile digital devices allows inclinations to be 
examined on their own terms, beyond what are essentially confused notions of rational 
choice. This is especially important for understanding the reach for the device, as for 
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some participants this seemed to focus on a kind of physical closeness, rather than 
achieving a specific goal; as one participant, Rufus put it, ‘it fits into the pocket you 
know? And it’s nice to hold’. Some participants struggled to explain moments where 
they felt drawn to pick up their device or found it difficult to explain why they felt so 
attached to it. As Sarah explained: ‘I fidget a lot just generally and having the 
smartphone, because it’s so tactile, using… yeah… so having that, just something to use 
in my hands… as much as anything else.’ As she spoke she slid the phone deftly from 
one hand to another. I also noticed that with many participants, as they described the 
way they used their devices, their hands would move, almost replicating the positions 
they would hold the device in. When a participant described getting his phone out, I 
noticed his hand flick into a position of holding the device, even though it remained on 
the table. From a perspective that seeks to evaluate how these devices facilitate or 
replicate human intimacy, this interaction with the device makes little sense, as it does 
not constitute an interaction per se. These moments do not necessarily even involve 
‘using’ the device as we might typically understand it. As I have suggested, impersonal 
intimacy is not oriented towards a human narrative. 
This reconceptualisation of the desire to reach for the device has significant implications 
for the way we consider decisions. Rather than seeing decisions as the outcome of 
conscious contemplation, instead a decision involves the integration of competing 
desires that produce various perceptions and inclinations (Smith, 2007). Following 
Deleuze’s (2006) understanding of drives is insightful here in reconceptualising these 
moments of reaching for the device which operate beneath conscious awareness. As I 
explored in Chapter 3, Deleuze (2006), drawing on Nietzsche, contends that the will, 
rather than being wielded by conscious awareness, is constituted by competing 
preindividual drives and it is the drive that wins out that is actualised. These 
preindividual forces are contradictory and seek to dominate each other, and it is the 
totality of these drives that constitute our being (Smith, 2007). The desire for the device 
in this sense does not originate from a thought but rather is an impersonal inclination 
that is felt only as it is realised. 
Desires, or drives, are not proper to individuals but rather prior to them, and arise from 
the ‘open-endedly social’ (Massumi, 2002, p. 9) relations in which subjects themselves 
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are constituted. In this sense, desires are not desires for particular objects but rather 
‘[d]esire brings about a process of the association of bodies, which creates new forms 
of existence’ (Bignall, 2008, p. 138). In the context of mobile digital device practices, 
these desires emerge in the form of the opening up of habitual practices to change. This 
could be in the inclination towards the pocket to check the device is there when leaving 
the house or starting to anticipate which button will need to be pressed next and feeling 
hands move to anticipate the required movement. These shifts, as I have explored in the 
previous chapter, may be unanticipated or even contradict conscious intention. In 
thinking through often contradictory desires in relation to the smartphone, starting with 
the notion of desire as a preindividual force allows us to better make sense of moments 
where conscious decision-making falls short as an explanation for actions. Put simply, 
this rethinking of desire demonstrates the inadequacy of representational modes of 
evaluation, which suppose that an individual can, and should, wield control of their 
desires to produce the ideal outcome. Instead, we are forced to confront the complex 
and contradictory multiplicity of desires that makes an action possible. This is an 
important shift not only for the evaluations we make but also for how we consider desire 
as a force. It is important to make clear that desire here is not something personal, nor 
simply the property of our unconscious, but an impersonal and preindividual inclination 
or drive. 
Moments in which participants described checking their devices or picking them up 
without realising they were doing so, demonstrate the inadequacy of an understanding 
of desire that originates from conscious thought. One participant, Violet, describes her 
desire to check her device: ‘I can’t help… if I’m sitting there… and then once a while I 
can’t help but check if I’ve got any message. I can’t stop myself!’ After she says this she 
pauses, and after a few seconds I ask her if she has ever tried to stop herself. She 
considers this for a moment and replies, ‘I never really had any reason… apart from… to 
test if I could do it.’ Violet’s reflections here present a far more complex depiction of 
desire than action arising from conscious intention. Violet’s reference that she ‘can’t’ 
stop herself seems surprising considering that when I ask if she has ever tried to, she 
clarifies that she has not. Yet, given my own encounters with my device, her statements 
are not confusing. As she reflects that she has never had a reason to try to stop reaching 
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for the device I find myself considering whether I had ever had a reason to do the same, 
temporarily shifting my focus from the interview as I start to feel more aware of my 
desire to check my device at that moment. Similarly, Alexander recalls the process of 
picking up his device as something that simply happens, rather than something that is 
intended, saying: ‘It’s not really something that you plan… like “I plan to pick up my 
phone” ... You just do it, you know. You don’t realise… you know?’ Alexander’s 
statement that you just do it, refers to the ease with which the desire is fulfilled before 
it reaches awareness and he distinguishes between a definitive statement of intention 
and the action of picking up the device. These are moments of impersonal intimacy with 
the mobile digital device in which presubjective relations of repetition have cultivated 
inclinations to reach. These desires cannot be made sense of as conscious decisions but 
rather demonstrate the need to look beyond the limitations of these understandings 
which render these moments only as dysfunction. 
Mobile digital devices and other data-storage technologies are charged with heralding 
the end of forgetting. Though forgetting is often negatively opposed to remembering, 
which is held up as a virtue (Connerton, 2008), some scholars argue that the crucial 
importance of forgetting is now being seen in the context of big data (Mayer-
Schönberger, 2009; Dodge and Kitchin, 2007). Mayer-Schönberger (2009) argues that a 
significant shift has taken place in which remembering has become the default, as digital 
devices like smartphones track movements and provide information when and where it 
is needed. Marin Dodge and Rob Kitchin (2007, p. 431) argue that ‘an ethics of forgetting 
needs to be developed and built into the development of life-logging technologies’, the 
use of pervasive computing or wearable technologies to create a complete record of an 
individual’s life experiences. There is concern that contemporary digital devices 
constitute a flight from forgetfulness itself. While certainly there are significant 
questions to be addressed about the forgetting of information, I reject the notion that 
these devices signal the end of forgetting. 
In contrast, I argue that the mobile digital device relationship is constituted by 
forgetfulness. The forgetfulness of impersonal intimacy consists in a kind of creative 
reconfiguration. Deleuze (1994, p. 7) explains that it ‘is in repetition and by repetition 
that Forgetting becomes a positive power’. Seen from the point of view of the primacy 
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of repetition and difference, forgetting is an active return of difference and a destruction 
of those reactive forces that separate beings from their power of acting. James Williams 
(2003, p. 22) argues that, for Deleuze, forgetting was crucially about being able to resist 
representation: 
We have to forget in order to be truly complete, in order to experiment with 
the ways in which individuals are reciprocal determinations of the actual and 
the virtual and the ways in which they resist representation and identity. 
I take up Deleuze’s ‘active forgetting’ here then to consider the way that impersonal 
intimacy elicits a kind of productive forgetfulness, in which mobile digital device users 
are subsumed by the encounter with the device. This draws attention, perhaps only 
momentarily, to the ways in which users are constituted by the relations of the event. 
Despite the focus on close intimacy here, moments where the mobile digital device is 
notably absent can yield significant insight into its intimate position. In one interview a 
participant, Elle, described the feeling of leaving her smartphone at home, ‘It’s almost 
like you’ve lost a limb!’ she exclaimed, laughing, ‘like, strange, and then you’re like… 
wrecked. I’m always really anxious about it’. As she is saying this I feel my hand reach 
over my pocket to check for my device and I feel a flush of panic wash over me as I realise 
that it is empty, before registering that my iPhone is lying on the table between us. The 
feeling is familiar, it is the same rising unease that I get if it takes me a little bit longer 
than usual to find it when I look through my bag in the morning when I get to work. Here 
these moments of disruption to the familiar intimacy call attention to the always 
relational nature of our being, which is constituted through the forces of the encounter. 
I argue that these modulations of attention are transformations that that take place at 
the level of capacities, capacities which, in the manner of Spinozan parallelism, are both 
bodily and ideal without their being a causality from one to the other. These 
transformations are the outcome of the habitual repetitions that this thesis has figured 
as generative rather than degenerative. From repetitions, new capacities for attention-
arrangement emerge. In one interview, Malcolm explained one such arrangement, 
which was a kind of peripheral awareness of the device that emerged: 
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the analogy I can think of is friends of mine who used to smoke said that one 
of the problems with giving up smoking is that they don’t know what to do 
with their hands. And in a way, I think… you just… tinker with your phone 
because… like… to fiddle. And then ‘oh there’s something interesting’ and 
you’ll fiddle some more and… most of the time there’s nothing there and 
you just put it back down but I think it’s just doing something. 
As Malcolm explained this kind of awareness I noticed his hands follow along with his 
description, almost mimicking the movement of taking the device out and swiping, 
scrolling, almost lazily. When Malcolm refers to there being ‘nothing there’ he is 
indicating that ultimately the content accessed on the device may not be of significance 
in this ‘reach’. When attention is understood in quantitative terms, such an encounter 
is confusing as the measurable time focused on the device may be small, a moment here 
and there. However, a more qualitative grasp of attention allows an understanding of 
the new modes of capacitation made possible by Malcolm’s habitual reach for the 
device. 
The role of habits is especially important in the development of these new modes of 
attention. As I have outlined in the previous chapter, through processes of repetition, 
habits open up the body to new inclinations. Though there is stability in this repetition 
there is also the possibility of change (Grosz, 2013). This change can be disruptive, as I 
recalled in an experience with my device: 
There is a particular position I sit in on my couch, where I often work with 
my laptop rested on my lap and my iPhone sitting on the armrest of the 
couch. My phone is on silent, as it almost always is, and I recently changed 
the setting so that very few alerts actually cause it to vibrate, as I only 
wanted to be notified of something important like a call or message. During 
the course of the day I started noticing that I would see, out the corner of 
my eye, that my phone would light up when it alerted me to something not 
worthy of a vibration. Eventually, I found myself looking over at my phone 
having been sure that I had seen the phone light up with some kind of 
notification, only to see that the screen was black. I would check the phone, 
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finding no notification. As I often do I immediately googled this to see if it 
happened to anyone else. Thankfully I am not alone. A Reddit user ‘ipeench’ 
(2016) termed these ‘phantom eyebrations’7. 
My encounter with the device here is recounted with the purpose of generating an 
encounter with difference, with the excessive preindividual forces that constitute my 
habitual smartphone practices. This encounter calls for new ways of thinking attention 
as these ‘phantom eyebrations’ demonstrate more than a quantitatively different 
amount of attention paid to the device. Nor can they be made sense of simply by 
distraction understood as distraction from, as either ‘good’ distraction that filters excess 
stimulus or ‘bad’ distraction that distracts from a proper object. In contrast, an attention 
to the qualitative difference, in relation to which conscious perception is always a 
reduction, allows an understanding of minute inclinations and transformations. 
These moments are forgetful ones, often characterised as moments of distraction or 
dysfunction, because they do not make sense when oriented towards narratives of 
human intimacy. These are moments that might not be understandable or discernible 
for the device user, as one app developer, Andrew put it ‘they don’t know what they’re 
doing, they don’t know why they did it.’ However, when we are attuned to the 
transformative capacities of impersonal intimacy, these moments can resonate more 
fully. Our entanglements with these devices demand that notions of intention and 
distraction be rethought.  
New forms of intimacy that arise from our habitual close contact with mobile digital 
devices such as smartphones disrupt dominant understandings of what intimacy is. 
Some scholars have attempted to defend intimacy against the threat of digital pleasures 
by arguing that it is destructive of what human intimacy offers (Turkle, 2011, 2015; Ling 
and McEwen, 2010). Other scholars have sought to recoup the practices of digital 
intimacy by attesting that they replicate, supplement or reinforce human intimacy, 
rather than replace it (Mascheroni and Vincent, 2016; Hjorth, Wilken, et al., 2012; Lasén 
                                                      
7 This is a reference to ‘phantom vibrations’, the phenomenon where mobile phone users feel non-
existent vibrations in their pockets from their mobile phones (Drouin et al., 2012), also observed among 
medical personnel with beepers (Rothberg et al., 2010) 
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and Casado, 2012; Lasén, 2004; Licoppe, 2004). However, it is with intimacy as personal 
that these accounts are concerned. In contrast, this thesis has proposed an impersonal 
intimacy that is concerned with the preindividual forces prior to both subjects and 
objects and constitutive of them. I have argued that in positing an impersonal intimacy 
I also seek to reorient analyses of mobile digital device relations beyond all too human 
narratives, that seek to defend human intimacy, and instead focus my analysis on the 
conditions through which novelty arises. 
In characterising these moments as forgetful, as moments of creative reconfiguration, I 
hope that they will be moments of creative reconfiguration for sociological thought. 
While this thesis has focused on attending to the habitual encounters with mobile digital 
devices, these moments of impersonal intimacy speak to a broader sociological 
problem. It is in view of the limitations of existing understandings of the social as 
constituted by social interaction, interaction performed by conscious actors who pre-
exist the events of these interactions that this thesis has argued for a sense of the 
excessive, reconstituting, reforming and unfolding nature of social life. I have sought to 
challenge poorly posed questions focusing on how we ought to act in the wake of the 
rise of the mobile digital device. I argue for sociology to now take notice of the complex 
relations prior to what we have traditionally regarded as the empirical, which have long 
been considered a mere distraction.  
202 
Conclusion: Implications 
I am waiting at a cafe for a friend and reach into my bag to check my iPhone while I wait. 
In the moment that I had reached into the bag, I was both reaching for something and 
reaching for nothing. My fingers slid around the intimately familiar metal sides of the 
device, still warm from the last grasp, but what I reached for was more difficult to 
identify. When I pulled the device out of my bag, my fingers effortlessly flicked open the 
Facebook app. But was I reaching for Facebook? The desire was not tangible, forgotten 
before it was actualised. My fingers moved across the smooth surface, the images and 
words slid up and up, but this was not a desire fulfilled. Rather the grasp, the reach, the 
movement was in itself a fulfilment. Folding back on itself, it was a minute 
transformation pushing the inclination further and further to reach once more. 
Impersonal intimacy is certainly forgetful. Rather than being constituted by the intense 
conscious awareness that we often associate with intimacy between subjects, 
impersonal intimacy demands and generates forgetfulness. These devices, despite our 
anxiety about how they pull our attention, are in fact threatening because they are 
forgotten. The device itself becomes so familiar, so intimately connected with us that it 
makes little sense to talk of the device as distinct from these close relations. We forget 
to look at the faces of those around us, we forget we already checked Facebook only a 
moment ago, and we forget that our hand is sliding seamlessly into our bags and 
pockets, seeking the smooth surface. We forget what pockets felt like without the 
familiar weight and shape of the device. This forgetting is an intimate one. It is not the 
passage of a conscious act into an unconscious one. This is a creative dismantling that 
challenges the illusion of consciousness as the cause of action. An entirely different 
relation is made possible by this intimacy. Only occasionally rising to the surface enough 
for us to recognise it, only to soon forget. 
In many ways, this thesis has also been about forgetting. Forgetting closely held ideas 
that dominate debates about technology, forgetting in order to think differently. This 
thesis has been deliberately forgetful of human intimacy, which has long been the focus 
of much of the research examining the mobile digital device, instead seeking to 
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encounter the intimacy cultivated with the device itself. Mobile digital devices have 
been positioned as a threat to human sociality and intimacy through their ability to 
distract from human interaction (Turkle, 2011, 2015; Rosen, 2012; Ling and McEwen, 
2010; Powers, 2010). However, I have considered how this threat could be rethought if 
our analysis of social life was a more impersonal one. I have argued for an approach to 
the mobile digital device that is less oriented towards human narratives of interaction 
and intimacy, and more attuned to the preindividual, impersonal forces. It is these forces 
that are the conditions from which subjects and objects are themselves constituted. It 
is also from these conditions of emergence that novel individuations will come into 
being. 
In response to the rise of mobile digital devices like smartphones and tablets, distraction 
has been posed as a key contemporary problem to be remedied. These objects are seen 
to possess an allure that threatens our interpersonal relationships, supplanting humans 
in our inner circle. Our attention, once paid to human faces (or so is the claim) is now 
diffused across numerous other mechanical faces, constantly shifting our awareness 
across multiple fields. Moments that may have once been spent alone are now moments 
of impersonal intimacy where we steal precious seconds for our digital companion. 
Unsurprisingly these objects come to embody the increasing threat to the qualities that 
make us human, like empathy (Turkle, 2015). They are charged with rendering us 
mechanical, subdued and controlled, but most of all they are seen to draw away. They 
distract, they intrigue, they pull, they entice, and they mediate.  
While resistance to technological change is nothing new, there is a distinct quality to 
these devices that is the focus of this anxious response. Their predecessor, the mobile 
phone, was charged with disruption as its ring intruded in social interactions, demanding 
to be attended to (Okabe and Ito, 2005; Ling, 2004; Plant, 2001). However, the mobile 
digital device constitutes an entirely different mode of attention, which is dispersed 
rather than focused. Characterised by their hybrid and adaptable nature, these devices 
provide potential access to a wide range of capabilities at any moment (Hjorth, Burgess, 
et al., 2012). The capacity of these devices to distract, to transform practices of being 
attentive, is certainly at the heart of their position as a contemporary social problem. 
Particularly in disciplines like psychology and neuroscience there has been an interest in 
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the addictive properties of mobile digital devices, especially given their role in 
distracting individuals from more ‘appropriate’ activities or the task at hand (Y. K. Lee et 
al., 2014; Rosen, 2012; Walsh et al., 2008; Bianchi and Phillips, 2005). Distraction in these 
studies is treated as always already negative, as a symptom of the social problem that is 
the device.  
Though less concerned with pathologising digital device practices, as I have explored, 
sociological analysis of the mobile digital device remains oriented by its relation to 
human interaction. Despite the significant shift in the way mobile digital devices are 
used, much of the literature remains focused on the device as a tool for communication 
and interaction (Mascheroni and Vincent, 2016; Schrock, 2015; Lee, 2012; Ling, 2008, 
2012; Ling and Campbell, 2011). More significantly, these analyses evaluate mobile 
digital devices in terms of how they compare with, supplement, replace or challenge 
face-to-face human interaction. This literature is concerned with identifying the ways in 
which social actors take up these devices, the kinds of meanings they attach to the 
device and the practices associated with it (Ling, 2008, 2012). The social, as it is 
understood and defended here, is one that is constituted by the actions of intentional 
social actors. Yet, as I have argued, and as the encounters with mobile digital devices 
that this thesis has examined highlight, this understanding of the social fails to consider 
more primordial, virtual and differential forces. 
Social scientific explorations of the mobile digital device reflect key debates within 
studies of technology more broadly, which have attempted to determine the boundaries 
of the social itself, what precisely falls within the purview of the social and what is 
beyond the influence of social forces. Social constructivists challenged the determinist 
accounts that place technology outside the social, as a force that shapes social relations. 
More recently, scholars have attempted to move beyond these terms by seeking to trace 
more precisely the intersections of the social and material. Domestication theory and 
the affordances approach attempt to acknowledge both the qualities of the devices and 
the practices of users (Goggin, 2006; Ling, 2004). However, as I have argued, though 
contemporary research attempts to address the problematic dichotomy between 
technological determinism and social constructivism, we are yet to fully abandon the 
terms of that debate. The social in this context is always personal, oriented towards 
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human interaction and meaning-making, rather than inclusive of the impersonal forces 
that I have sought to bring to the fore. 
It is not enough to extend agency to the technological object or to destabilise human 
subjectivity through the creation of human-technology hybrids. Approaches like Actor 
Network Theory and posthumanism, which challenge the boundary between subjects 
and objects, have been offered as a way to address the shortcomings of existing debate. 
However, as I have argued, extending subject-status to objects fails to challenge the 
presuppositions that attribute the will of a subject as the cause of action in the first 
instance. Indeed, while posthumanism and ANT both demonstrate the relationality of 
bodies, what must be challenged is the very notion of the social that privileges the very 
determinations ‘subjects’ and ‘objects.’ The social as it has conventionally been 
understood, takes the conscious experience of subjects as its focus, leaving a wide range 
of inclinations, desires and practices that fall outside conscious experience neglected in 
such an approach. While psychoanalytic thought, for example, or, in sociology, 
Bourdieusian theory, has certainly looked beyond consciousness to more unconscious 
forces, these have remained figured as an individual’s unconscious, or the unconscious 
of the social, conceived in narrowly human centred terms. In order to consider the 
complex, habitual and intimate relations with devices that constitute contemporary 
device culture, I have suggested that what is needed is an expanded notion of the social 
that attends to the forces prior to individuation, the impersonal forces that are only later 
registered by consciousness, and then only as a reduction. These forces do not belong 
to an individual subject, though they do provide the conditions for individuations and 
re-individuations. 
This thesis has argued that a new approach is needed to explore these moments that 
have so far eluded consideration. Crucially, it is important that this new approach is 
concerned not with discrete entities but with open-ended relations, with transformation 
rather than identities. I have argued for a focus on the ‘preindividual’ and impersonal, 
by holding to an ontology of becoming. This thesis has proposed three key shifts in order 
to explore mobile digital device practices in new ways.  
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Firstly, I argued for repetition to be understood not as mechanistic and lacking creativity, 
but as generative. The privileging of reflective thought has seen habit associated with 
‘unthinking’ and morally questionable action (Bissell, 2011). I have argued that habit is 
instead a creative relation through which new capacities and desires emerge, such as 
the inclination reach for the device. The second presupposition I sought to challenge 
was the primacy afforded to conscious experience and intention. Action does not 
originate from the conscious will of the subject, an error that mistakes the effect for the 
cause (Deleuze, 1988). This rethinking allows a consideration of microperceptions, 
habits, repetitions and routines that do not rise to the level of conscious awareness but 
are nonetheless central to unfolding social reality. Such a shift radically challenges the 
primacy given to individual will, instead favouring a conception of will that is not 
possessed by a subject, but instead is considered a force within an encounter. 
Distraction, then, is not the failure of a rational subject to appropriately direct their 
attention, but the production of a qualitative difference in attention. Conceptualising 
distraction no longer starting with a human subject wilfully taking up an inert object, but 
rather as a process through which micro-shifts are repeated, eliciting new practices and 
inclinations that facilitate a different mode of awareness in the world. While 
understandings of distraction have viewed this diffusion as a weakening of the power of 
attention (North, 2011), or as the failure of a conscious subject to regulate their 
behaviour appropriately in a social situation (Ling and McEwen, 2010; Sørensen, 2006), 
this reconceptualisation of attention and distraction rejects such evaluation. Attention 
has largely been understood quantitatively, and distraction therefore understood as a 
lack or diminished quantity of attention (North, 2011). In arguing for a qualitative 
understanding of attention, I mean for attention to be understood as multiple and 
heterogeneous, and consequently unable to be determined by its relation to a singular 
object. As I have traced through empirical encounters in this thesis, the impersonal 
intimacy with the mobile digital device reorganises attention, such that it is distributed 
rather than direct and produces a kind of residual awareness of the device, even when 
it is not in use. Certainly, diffuse modes of attention are generative of different practices, 
but this thesis has challenged the notion of the purity of attention being tainted by 
mediation. 
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Finally, this thesis has proposed a shift in focus from the personal to the impersonal. By 
this I do not intend a rejection of interpersonal interactions, or personal experiences, 
but rather an approach that rejects a humanist framework that posits human face-to-
face interaction as possessing inherent symbolic, moral and ethical significance. 
Impersonal in this sense signals a shift away from conceptualising fixed individuals, in 
favour of attending to the preindividual. This impersonal approach allows the issue of 
‘agency’ to be bypassed as it is no longer helpful to locate will or action in individual 
entities. Whilst other bodies of theory, like Actor Network Theory, have similarly 
emphasised the relations between entities, the affective approach this thesis has 
pursued not only shifts focus to these relations, but also fundamentally challenges the 
notion of individuals as distinct from relations. 
In this thesis, I have sought to draw attention to an emerging form of sociality, the close 
connection between mobile digital device and user, which I have termed impersonal 
intimacy. This term refers to intimacy not as we may be familiar with the term, as close 
personal connection between individuals, but rather describes the habitual connection 
between bodies that radically alters the capacities of those bodies and creates new 
desires. As I have argued, these new desires are not necessarily desires oriented towards 
objects but rather create new possibilities for existence. This entanglement is generated 
through habitual encounters and through the process of repetition. It is only by virtue 
of this impersonal intimacy between the user and device, that such significant 
transformations in the nature of attention and desires can take place. This intimacy is 
not something possessed by an individual body nor mind, but is wholly relational, 
situating itself amongst the variations in bodies and ideas that constitute our very being. 
The idea of impersonal intimacy has significant implications for how we then revisit the 
device-user encounter. As I have explored throughout this thesis, existing 
understandings of relations between devices and users are often embroiled in moralistic 
debates about the status of human intimacy, and what forms of interaction are worth 
preserving in the face of technological change. Practices are predominantly interrogated 
by leaning on a pre-existing hierarchy that prioritises human-to-human interaction, 
preferably immediate face-to-face interaction rather than mediated interaction. It is this 
mediated interaction, this filtering of the world through devices, that is attributed a 
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negative role in the transformation in sociality. It is this practice primarily that is 
associated with distraction of individuals from what they ‘ought’ to be paying attention 
to. This problematic distraction is both a distraction from (in reference to the proper 
object of attention) and a desire for the device. This desire is connected to perhaps the 
most pressing fear — that perhaps the smartphone is, after all, more desirable than we 
are. 
If we consider then, as I have argued, that these moments of impersonal intimacy 
constitute a form of sociality in their own right, rather than simply distracting us from 
human relations and concerns, we can attend more fully to these ‘distractions’ rather 
than simply dismissing them as errors. Moments of distraction can be understood in the 
context of this impersonal intimacy that forms within habitual relations, allowing 
consideration of the way that this intimacy modulates attention and conscious 
awareness. The smartphone-user encounter may involve a more diffuse mode of 
attention, but at the same time such a transformation may facilitate new modalities to 
be expressed. For example, a user might walk down a city street and direct their gaze 
not at those who pass by but at the screen of their device. As their attention is dispersed 
they may attend differently to the world around them, relying instead on peripheral 
vision and sound to avoid colliding with others. Simultaneously their awareness expands 
to include the worlds of the device. The multiple possible worlds accessible via a range 
of functions splinter their awareness. This may occur even when the device waits 
patiently in pockets, its presence never fully resolved, always drawing a layer of 
attention. These screened-devices involve a kind of drawing in, a reconfiguration of the 
relations in space, as a result of the more-than nature of new social worlds that the 
device pulls in. 
Taking seriously these habits, rather than considering them mechanical or pathological, 
allows us to be attentive to what is transformative in the mobile digital device 
encounter. More broadly, the generative impersonal intimacy emergent through these 
habitual relations highlights the impossibility of seeing human beings in any 
completeness or wholeness. Significantly, this thesis has demonstrated the importance 
of the impersonal for making sense of relations between. As I have explored, orienting 
explorations of technology towards the impersonal forces that constitute an encounter 
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provides a much richer account of the origin of action, often overlooked in favour of 
personal human explanations. This thesis has not set out to simply extend human status 
and agency to things, nor have I sought to absolve these devices of any role in social 
change, positive or negative. Primarily, I seek to challenge the terms of the sociological 
debates in which these devices have found themselves, and question the underlying 
assumptions that may be unseen, but nonetheless inform these debates. 
Though this thesis has focused on the mobile digital device, I argue that the concept of 
impersonal intimacy responds to broader problems with the framing of the social within 
the discipline. Much of sociology continues to retain an image of the social as made up 
solely of the interactions of subjects, an all-too-human vision of social reality that cannot 
adequately grasp the much more complex and excessive world in which we find 
ourselves. The impersonal intimacy of the mobile digital device offers a challenge to this 
vision. If, as many fear, these technologies make us forget what we are, perhaps that is 
their most promising transformative capacity: to draw attention to the always more-
than-human, to the never distinct body. They remind us that we are always forgetting 
ourselves, always partial, fluid, connected, dispersed, splintered, because we are never 
so fixed as to be whole. 
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